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Executive Summary 
This study has been prepared for the Andorran Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in order to assess possible futures for Andorran-EU relations over the short 
to longer term.  
The strengths and weaknesses of the Andorran economy 
In the second half of the 20th century Andorra saw an extraordinary boom, 
based on tourism, commerce, financial services and real estate, with its 
population multiplying 14 times, mainly due to immigration. The drivers of 
this growth were very low taxation and light economic regulation, 
combined with the attractive mountain environment. 
However since the turn of the century the economy encounters a 
mounting set of constraints: environmental limits, an apparent shortening 
of the winter sport season, the erosion of commercial advantages and 
pressures to apply international fiscal and regulatory standards.   
The government recognises that these constraints call for a new 
model of sustainable development, and has launched its ‘Andorra 2020’ 
programme, which envisages new service sector activities and a qualitative 
upgrading and re-branding of the economy. 
Andorra has valuable assets to underpin this programme: its 
investment in a modern urban infrastructure, its multi-lingual and 
cosmopolitan population, its substantial financial services sector, and the 
combination of low taxation and an attractive quality of life. These assets 
can be paired with the opportunities for location-free business services 
exploiting the new information technologies.   
The role of the Andorran-EU relationship in the new challenges 
This transformation of the Andorran economic structure would have to go 
further with a deeper integration into the modern European economy and 
its single market. New human and capital resources, as well as new ideas, 
have to circulate freely in and out of the Andorran economy.  
The terms under which this might be achieved would have to be 
based on the core principles of the European Union’s integration model, 
namely the four freedoms of movement of goods, services, capital and 
labour accompanied by extensive harmonisation of regulatory standards.   ii | MICHAEL EMERSON 
There are many further opportunities for programmes of cooperation with 
the EU, as seen in the several models of neighbourhood policy already 
developed. However, as Andorra’s experience of recent decade shows, 
these cannot be expected to develop strongly in the absence of the four 
freedoms and regulatory convergence. European Union officials are clear 
on this point.  
For Andorra, this means a reversal of economic paradigms. In the last half 
century Andorra prospered largely by keeping out of the EU’s policy 
framework. In the next half century its model for sustained prosperity will 
have to rely on inclusion in the European rules of the game. Times have 
changed.  
The present state of Andorran-EU relations 
EU-Andorran relations so far are rather limited. There has been a Custom 
Union since 1990, and this functions satisfactorily. 
There is a Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2004, covering a number 
of possible topics for cooperation, but this has seen hardly any operational 
results so far.  
Also in 2004 there was an Agreement on the Taxation of Savings, 
following pressures on all European offshore financial centres to apply new 
EU legislation in this field.   
Since 2002, the euro has been Andorra’s currency, but there is no 
agreement yet on the minting of an Andorran euro coin. 
Andorra has become de facto a virtual part of the Schengen space, 
since all travellers to Andorra have to pass through France or Spain, and 
Andorra accepts Schengen visas.   
Core components of a deep Andorran-EU relationship 
There are six basic requirements:   
  Freedom of circulation of goods, but only this one is largely 
achieved; 
  Freedom of services provision, complying with the EU’s new 
services directive; 
  Freedom of movement of workers and persons; 
  Liberalisation of capital movements; 
  Fiscal reforms, to stay ‘low tax’, but extinguish the tax haven 
reputation and 
  Financial sector to move into line with EU standards. ANDORRA AND THE EU| iii 
 
Complementary components of a deep integration with the EU 
While a long list could be drawn up, it would be best to focus on seven 
priority area: 
  Participation in EU regional policies, e.g. Pyrenean cross-border 
projects; 
  Transport infrastructure projects, for road, rail and air; 
  Full participation in euro area; 
  Participation in EU education and research programmes; 
  Cooperation with justice and internal security programmes; 
  Participation in environmental programmes and 
  Political dialogue overarching the relationship. 
Sequencing and structuring the relationship 
Development of these components would in any case take many years. 
There are technical and political limits to how much can be done fast. 
However what is essential is that the whole concept becomes credible as 
early as possible, which means a combination of up-front concrete steps 
and sufficient planning and commitment for the rest. The ‘Andorra 2020’ 
programme is largely silent on the EU relationship, and this could be 
rectified with a complementary ‘Andorra-EU 2020’ plan. The time horizon 
of 2020 is good.  
The sequencing and structuring of the process could go through the 
following stages: 
1.  A preliminary stage of unilateral reforms, preceding negotiations 
with the EU; 
2.  Negotiation of further sector-specific agreements with the EU, 
beyond those that already exist; 
3.  A comprehensive multi-sector treaty, drawing on the EU’s various 
neighbourhood agreements, and 
4.  An original model for virtual membership of the EU. 
Stage 1 corresponds to the present policy of the government. This has 
the merit of not entering into new negotiations from a position of 
weakness.  
Stage 2 would build on the three agreements Andorra has already 
made (and so the current status quo is a mix of stages 1 and 2). The Swiss iv | MICHAEL EMERSON 
experience is sometimes cited as an ambitious version of this second model. 
However the EU is against what it calls a ‘cherry-picking’ process, and the 
Swiss model is not necessarily reproducible. 
Stage 3 would raise the level of ambition. There are various examples 
one can cite. Liechtenstein in the European Economic Area is an example of 
virtually complete inclusion in the EU’s internal market space, with all four 
freedoms and extensive harmonisation of regulatory standards. The Balkan 
‘stabilisation and association agreements’ are more extensive in policy 
content, but less demanding in terms of immediate harmonisation. The 
European Neighbourhood Policy is heading towards a new model of 
‘enhanced agreements’, which will also be comprehensive in coverage but 
less demanding still in legal obligations. 
Stage 4 could become relevant in a context in which the EU is 
increasingly reticent to enlarge its full membership beyond existing 
commitments. The idea here is for full functional participation in the EU, 
with full rights for citizens and enterprises, but with a special institutional 
arrangement to avoid congestion in EU decision-making. There is no full 
precedent for this so far, but the EU has shown flexibility and ingenuity in 
devising tailor-made solutions for various European micro-states and 
autonomies. The relevance of this scenario has now been heightened by the 
initiative of San Marino of 27 August 2007, requesting discussion of 
possible membership or in any case a new ‘status’ in relation to the EU.1 
The possible and the necessary   
With Andorra so far engaged in a blend of stages 1 and 2, this could 
continue indefinitely into the future, since there is unlikely to be any 
initiative or pressure from the EU side to do otherwise. 
  The case for aiming at stage 3 would depend on whether Andorra sees 
now in its own economic interest a need to embrace the ‘core components’ 
for a deepened relationship with the EU. That is matter of basic political 
judgement, which only the Andorran authorities and people are entitled to 
make. (However, the present author, as an external observer, considers that 
Andorra does need to do this.) If this were the case, then the Andorran 
authorities might plan for a fairly early passage from stages 1 and 2 to stage 
                                                      
1 See section 4.2.1. of Part B of this report.  ANDORRA AND THE EU| v 
 
3, using the opportunity to aim also to get maximum value out of the 
possible ‘additional components’ of deepened relationship with the EU. 
If such a stage 3 were to become a successful reality, there would be a 
basis for considering stage 4. This could see Andorra gain full access to the 
EU’s policies and programmes, for its people to gain EU citizenship, and its 
representatives to gain an extensive voice and place, if still not full classic 
membership status, in the EU’s institutional system. Stage 4 would be an 
original development for the European Union itself, and would require in 
due course a very strong and credible commitment by Andorra to 
overcome a likely conservative initial response from the EU side. However, 
with increasing resistance within the EU to its further enlargement, 
arrangements of this kind would have a rationale.  
 These are possible features of an ‘Andorra-EU 2020’ plan. Given the 
fundamental political and economic implications of these possible choices, 
the ground would need of course to b e  p r e p a r e d  t h o r o u g h l y  w i t h  f u l l  
participation of the democratic institutions and civil society. With this in 
mind the government might begin by preparing for public debate with a 
‘Green Paper’, or consultative document, for ‘Andorra-EU 2020’. These 
consultations would no doubt extend on appropriate occasions to include 
representatives of the European Union and Andorra’s two neighbouring 
member states. After due processes of consultation and debate the 
government would adopt a ‘White Paper’, this time setting out its 
proposals for action.  
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Part A. The Future of Andorran-EU Relations 
1.  The condition of the Andorran economy 
In the second half of the 20th century Andorra experienced an extraordinary 
growth, with the population rising from 6,000 to 81,222 (2006), and 
transformation into a cosmopolitan society. The drivers of this growth were 
very low taxation and very light economic regulation, together with a 
favourable natural mountain environment for winter sports and tourism. 
Andorra is now a rich country, with a per capita income above the 
EU average, based on the four pillars of tourism, real estate development, 
commerce and financial services. 
However this long boom seems to have come to an end, and since the 
turn of the century business indicators have turned rather negative. This 
seems to be more than just a cyclical matter. It coincides with increasing 
optimism over business prospects in the EU. Since European business 
cycles tend to be strongly correlated, the implication is that Andorra’s 
economy is now facing structural problems. These are in fact apparent in:  
1)  Physical and environmental limits to further growth based on 
construction activity,  
2)  An apparent shortening of the winter sport season, due maybe to 
climate change, 
3)  A loss of competitive advantage by the commercial sector in 
relation to nearby French and Spanish commercial centres and  
4)  Powerful external pressures to constrain offshore financial 
services worldwide to apply international fiscal and regulatory 
standards.  
2.  New needs and opportunities 
The government of Andorra recognises these structural constraints and has 
in response developed a programme called ‘Andorra 2020’ (indicating the 
time horizon), in order to revitalise the economy. 
The ‘Andorra 2020’ programme points the way forward, aiming at 
the attraction of new service sectors, a qualitative re-branding plan, foreign 
investment facilitation and other measures coupled to tax reforms. These 
directions are surely the right ones to take. Andorra has actual and 
potential comparative advantages to support this plan, as enumerated 
below.  2 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
•  First, it has invested already in a modern urban infrastructure of 
some size, capable of becoming the base for growing clusters of 
high value-added service activities.  
•  Secondly, its resident population is multi-lingual and cosmopolitan, 
and offers a favourable human capital base for international service 
sector activities.  
•  Thirdly, Andorra can seek to exploit the new advantages of 
information technologies, which allow many service sectors to 
choose any location that offers supporting commercial and business 
services, allowing electronic offices to be plugged into wider 
European and international markets and corporate structures.  
•  Fourthly, these ‘location-free’ business activities are especially 
sensitive to the offer of a low-tax environment combined with a 
high quality of life environment (e.g. mountain sport recreations).  
•  Fifthly, Andorra already has a substantial financial services sector, 
which can seek its own niche in the rapidly developing European 
financial services market.   
However these favourable factors also link to the crucial argument of 
the present report, which is that a deepening of integration with the EU 
could provide a vital support for exploiting and synergising these positive 
elements. On the other hand, Andorra’s substantial self-exclusion so far 
from three of the EU’s four freedoms of movement and its tax haven status, 
while having served to make Andorra rich in past decades, seem now to 
have turned from being a plus to a minus, and to have become part of the 
problem. The paradigm seems to be reversed. A comprehensive opening to 
all the four freedoms and elimination of the tax haven designation now 
look essential for revitalising the economy, as well as for establishing a 
sound basis for deeper integration with the EU.    
3.  The present state of Andorran-EU relations 
EU-Andorran relations so far are quite limited.  
Custom Union. There has been a Custom Union since 1990, and this 
functions satisfactorily, providing freedom of movement of all goods 
except agricultural products without payment of customs tariffs. Since 
Andorran indirect taxes are low by comparison with those of France and 
Spain, there are franchise limits on the quantities and value that travellers 
can take back with them after visiting Andorra. This leaves incentives for a 
certain amount of day-trip tourism, but the statistics show that this has 
reached a plateau, and is even declining a little. ANDORRA AND THE EU| 3 
 
Taxation of Savings.  In 2004 the EU and Andorra made an 
Agreement on the Taxation of Savings, following pressures from the EU on 
all European offshore financial centres to apply new EU legislation in this 
field. For a transition period until 2010, some EU member states (Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg) are able to exercise the option to impose a 
withholding tax on income from savings, rather than comply with the core 
EU obligation for fiscal authorities to exchange information on non-resident 
incomes. This option was also offered and accepted by Andorra and most 
of Europe’s other offshore financial centres. The agreement provides for a 
staged increase in the withholding tax from 15 to 20 and 35% over a 
number of years, with three-quarters of the tax revenues to be returned to 
the country of residence of the saver. This scheme is now functioning 
reasonably correctly. But the issue of obligatory information exchange will 
return in a few years time.  
Cooperation Agreement. This agreement was also signed at the same 
time in 2004, covering a number of possible topics for cooperation, 
including the environment, communications and culture, education and 
vocational training, social and health issues, trans-European networks and 
transport, and regional policy. But this Cooperation Agreement has seen 
hardly any operational results so far. The most promising idea is for 
Andorra’s participation in a programme requesting support from the EU’s 
Regional Fund – the Communauté de Travail des Pyrénées (CTP) – to 
which we return below.  
Euro. This became Andorra’s currency in 2002, replacing the prior 
use of the French franc and Spanish peseta. Monaco, San Marino and the 
Vatican have made agreements with the EU (along with France and Italy) 
authorising these states to mint a limited value of euro coins of their own, 
both for ordinary usage and as a collector’s item. These agreements were 
supported by the introduction of regulatory measures for the financial 
sector based on EU directives and standards. Andorra has no agreement of 
this kind yet. 
Schengen. Andorra has become de facto a virtual part of the Schengen 
space, since all travellers to Andorra have to pass through France or Spain, 
and Andorra accepts travellers with Schengen visas. Andorran citizens are 
able to pass EU frontiers through the passport control channels reserved for 
EU and EEA (European Economic Area) and Swiss citizens.  
Overall these initiatives have amounted to a limited advance in 
Andorran-EU relations so far. Fundamentally this is because the EU has 4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
been organised first of all around the four freedoms of movement – of 
goods, services, labour and capital. More recently it has deepened the 
integration of its internal market through its member states accepting a 
major development of common regulatory standards. The introduction of 
the euro has further intensified both the opening and harmonised 
regulation of the EU’s financial markets. All the EU’s arrangements for 
close relations with its neighbours have been centred on working out how 
far the EU’s four freedoms and regulatory norms could be extended 
beyond its frontiers. In the case of the European Economic Area, which 
includes Liechtenstein as the most relevant comparator for Andorra, the 
answer has been virtually 100%. 
In the case of Andorra, only one of the four freedoms (for goods) has 
been really opened, and the other three (services, labour and capital) have 
remained subject to significant restrictions, even if there are draft laws that 
would ease these somewhat. Andorra is still considered by the OECD to be 
what it calls an ‘uncooperative tax haven’, and the quality of regulation of 
its financial markets does not yet meet all EU and internationally accepted 
standards.  
4.  Core components of a deep Andorran-EU relationship 
There is little prospect that the Andorran-EU relationship can be deepened 
without Andorra coming to terms with the EU’s four freedoms and its basic 
regulatory system in the fiscal and financial fields.  
However it also seems now that there is little chance for the 
Andorran economy to revitalise itself without coming to terms with the 
European marketplace and its regulatory standards.  
From an EU perspective the following issues are always considered 
to be matters of core importance in discussions of deep integration with 
neighbouring countries. 
Physical borders and free circulation of goods.  While the customs 
union functions correctly, there remains the question whether Andorra 
would want at some stage to aim for completely open frontiers with the EU 
for the movement of goods and people. For the movement of goods there is 
conceivably an ‘EEA + San Marino option’. Liechtenstein, which has a 
relatively very large industrial sector, adopted the whole acquis for product 
standards. However the EEA excludes agriculture, whereas San Marino has 
agricultural products included in its customs union with the EU. Andorra’s 
manufacturing industries are so small that the administrative cost of 
transposing the EU directives and regulations into Andorran law would ANDORRA AND THE EU| 5 
 
only be justified if short-cut procedures were adopted, like accepting to 
c o p y  F r e n c h  o r  S p a n i s h  t e x t s  w i t h out translation. Otherwise Andorran 
enterprises can voluntarily and unilaterally apply EU standards. There 
would be fiscal implications in scrapping border controls, for example 
acceptance by Andorra of the EU’s minimum excise rates and a value 
added tax on the EU harmonised model.   
Freedom to provide services. Today there are serious impediments to 
the development of new service sectors, which are of key of importance for 
the government’s ‘Andorra 2020’ programme. There are restrictions on 
foreigners working in liberal professions and setting up wholly or majority-
owned enterprises. There are also punitive withholding taxes imposed by 
France and Spain on the cross-border supply of services from Andorra to 
these two countries.  To overcome these barriers Andorra could become 
compliant with the EU’s new Services Directive, and make tax reforms 
sufficient to negotiate successfully the elimination of the present French 
and Spanish withholding taxes of Andorran service exports. 
Freedom of movement of workers and persons.  If the objective is to 
attract new service sector activities of high value-added and modern 
technological content, there has to be assured freedom of movement of 
workers and independent professional persons. As Andorra moves 
towards eliminating its tax haven characteristics, the structure of the 
foreign population is likely to change, with fewer non-active tax exiles, and 
more workers and self-employed persons in service sector activities. This 
restructuring will be a key feature of the economic revitalisation process, 
and would be facilitated by the liberalisation of all professions and a 
phasing out of the quota system for regulating foreigners’ residence.   
Liberalisation of capital movements. New legislation has been before 
the parliament for a year with a view to liberalising inward capital 
movements to some extent, but is not yet passed. Authorisation would still 
be required for investments of over 50% participation in commerce, 
construction, financial services hotels and real estate, i.e. in the core sectors 
of the Andorran economy. These remaining restrictions would seem to be 
an obstacle to full achievement of the objectives of the ‘Andorra 2020’ 
programme. Complete freedom of movement of capital is assured in the 
cases of  Liechtenstein, the Channel Islands and San Marino, which are 
among Andorra’s European competitors.  
Fiscal reforms to stay ‘low tax’ but extinguish the tax haven. The 
government has announced plans to introduce a corporate tax with a low 6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
rate and a reform of indirect taxes, although the draft legislation for these 
important steps is not yet published. The objective should surely be to 
achieve removal categorically and once and for all the ‘uncooperative tax 
haven’ label, while remaining an extremely attractive fiscal location. To 
illustrate this concretely, Andorra might consider a variant of the Slovakian 
tax reform of 2003, which introduced an ultra-simple flat tax regime under 
the slogan 19-19-19. This meant a flat corporate income tax of 19%, 
similarly a flat 19% personal income tax, and also a 19% value added tax. 
This tax regime is considered highly competitive by international investors. 
Andorra, because of its very lean public sector, could do better still, for 
example with a 10-10-10 regime for the same three main taxes. The addition 
of a very low personal income tax would be needed in order to install a 
regular set of double tax and information exchange agreements for persons 
as well as companies. With these measures Andorra could remain 
exceptionally attractive as a very low tax location, and at the same time 
gain an unquestionably correct fiscal reputation (extinction of the negative 
tax haven branding). 
Financial sector regulation and supervision.  Andorra has been 
moving into a higher degree of compliance with European and/or 
international standards for the regulation and supervision of financial 
markets. The most comprehensive step would be to adopt measures 
conforming to the whole of the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan, which 
consists of 42 legislative measures for all aspects of financial markets. 
Liechtenstein has already done this in the framework of the EEA, as have 
Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man and Gibraltar. Among the measures 
recommended in a recent assessment of the International Monetary Fund 
are the need to regulate the  insurance sector in line with European 
standards, a reinforcement of the independence of the regulatory authority 
(INA), and agreements to exchange information with the financial 
supervisory authorities of main partner countries abroad. 
5.  Complementary components of a deep integration with the EU 
If these core features were put robustly into good shape, the door would be 
opened for Andorra to share in virtually all EU policies that are relevant to 
it. We now discuss these possibilities under the headings of seven main 
groups of sectoral policies.   
Participation in EU regional policies. There is a limited possibility in 
the EU Regional Fund’s current regulations for the EU to finance 
expenditures in cross-border projects arising in third countries, such as ANDORRA AND THE EU| 7 
 
Andorra. The Regional Fund can finance a maximum amount of 10% of 
project costs without a contribution by the third country, on condition that 
the EU member states concerned propose this. More substantial 
cooperation can be organised on the basis of specific agreements between 
the EU and third countries for the joint funding of cross-border projects, 
such as is already the case between France and Switzerland, and between 
Finland and Norway. These possibilities are not yet activated between 
Andorra, France, Spain and the EU, but are evidently desirable initiatives.  
The most promising idea, as mentioned above, is seen in proposals 
made to the Regional Fund for the period 2007-2013 by the Communauté 
de Travail des Pyrénées (CTP). Andorra is a participant in this initiative 
along with the Pyrenean regions of France and Spain. The CTP prepares 
many projects, which are organised around four sectoral commissions for i) 
infrastructure and transport, ii) training and technological development, iii) 
culture, youth and sport and iv) sustainable development. These headings 
correspond perfectly with Andorra’s priorities for revitalising its economy. 
The CTP has formed a consortium to serve as an operational legal entity for 
requesting and managing Regional Fund support. However Andorra is not 
yet a member of this consortium, apparently for legal reasons, which 
should not be insuperable given political will.   
Transport infrastructure projects, for road, rail and air. The EU has 
major programmes for supporting transport infrastructures, which receive 
political backing through the Trans-European Networks, and obtain access 
to substantial financial support from the European Investment Bank as well 
as the Regional and Structural Funds. Road connections to Andorra from 
France and Andorra have been improved in recent years, but Andorra is 
quite far from being connected with the motorway networks of France and 
Spain. Railway networks come close to Andorra, but without entering or 
passing through its territory. The current priorities of the Trans-European 
Networks include investments in high-speed trans-Pyrenean rail links, 
whose route is not yet decided. Air connections are through Barcelona and 
Toulouse 200 km away. There is a project envisaged for rehabilitation of an 
airport at Seu d’Urgell in Spain, very close to the Andorran frontier, which 
is the subject of ongoing negotiations. There is another proposed project for 
a heliport. There is thus no shortage of ideas over how to make major 
improvements in the accessibility of Andorra, which are surely desirable as 
part of the plan to revitalise the economy. There remain questions of 
political priority and financing on the side of France, Spain and the EU, 8 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
which link to the overarching political strategy for Andorra in its relations 
with the EU and its direct neighbours. 
Full participation in the euro area. The Andorra ministry of finance 
is preparing five laws to regulate financial investment activities in line with 
EU standards, with the intention to return to the question of making an 
agreement with the EU to mint an Andorran euro in due course. The 
precedents of Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican suggest that the face 
value of this coinage might be limited to around €1 to 2 million per year, 
including the face value of special collectors’ coins of higher market value. 
This is not a large amount, however, by comparison with Andorra’s central 
government budget revenues of €340 million in 2006. More important in 
due course will be the EU’s new legislation to establish a Single European 
Payments Area, which will reduce the costs and increase the speed of cross-
border settlements in the euro area. Monaco and San Marino are preparing 
for this, which requires further compliance with EU regulatory standards. 
Andorra’s banking sector will be concerned to avoid the emergence of new 
competitive disadvantages. Both these features, the minting of euro and 
entry into the single payments area, depend on regulatory compliance with 
EU standards for banking and financial markets. 
Participation in EU education and research programmes. The EU’s 
major programme in the education sector is the Erasmus programme for 
university exchanges of students and teachers. These programmes can in 
principle be opened to neighbouring countries, but Andorra is 
disadvantaged by having only a small and new university, which is not a 
partner of the Erasmus programme. This is mitigated by the fact that most 
Andorran students are studying in Spanish and French universities, which 
do participate in Erasmus.  The EU’s main research programme, currently 
the 7th Framework Programme, has agreements with some non-member 
states for  participation as associated countries. The EEA states, 
Switzerland, Israel and some Balkan states have made such agreements. 
The interest for Andorra of EU research programmes should not be 
underestimated for the future, if Andorra is to succeed in building up a 
new high-tech service sector. Many EU research projects are based on 
extensive consortia and networks, which in the future could include 
Andorra’s participation without it having to lead a project. This links again 
however to some of the core conditions already discussed, notably for 
Andorra to secure access to EU service sector markets and to open fully its 
own labour market (service sector, liberal professions, etc.) to EU nationals.   ANDORRA AND THE EU| 9 
 
Cooperation in justice and internal security.  Beyond the de facto 
inclusion of Andorra in the Schengen space, there is the question how far 
Andorra might associate with the rapidly growing body of legislation, 
programmes and agencies of the EU in the broad field of combating cross-
border crime. Two key agencies have been established: Europol, for 
cooperation between national police forces, and Eurojust for cooperation 
between judicial authorities. Both make cooperation agreements with non-
member states, including for Europol Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, 
and for Eurojust Iceland and Norway. The EU is further intending to 
establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office within the framework of 
Eurojust. The EU has also signalled the openness of certain programmes for 
association by neighbouring non-member states, such as ‘Hercules II’ for 
combating fraud and cigarette smuggling, ‘Pericles’ regarding 
counterfeiting of the euro, ‘Fiscalis 2013’ for cooperation between tax 
authorities, and ‘Security and Safeguarding Liberties’ to counter terrorism 
and crime. Interest by Andorra in cooperation with these programmes 
would presumably be welcomed by the EU. 
Environment.  Protection of its environment is an obvious strategic 
necessity for Andorra. New legislation is being largely aligned on relevant 
EU standards. Participation in the European Environment Agency could 
also be useful, and this agency is in principle open for the association of 
non-member states. Another European micro-state recently requested to 
accede to the European Environment Agency, but was met with the 
unrelated condition that it becomes more compliant with certain EU 
standards for the exchange of information between financial and fiscal 
authorities. As a result the application failed. This illustrates the general 
aversion of the EU to ‘cherry-picking’ by its partners, and its tendency to 
make linkages in multi-sectoral negotiations.   
Political dialogue overarching the relationship.  Andorra expresses 
interest in the ‘political dialogue’ feature of many EU agreements with 
third countries. In the terminology and practice of the EU, this ‘political 
dialogue’ covers first of all major subjects of concern in the field of foreign 
and security policy. Depending upon the partner this may concern issues of 
conflict and crisis management, weapons of mass destruction, and political 
values such as democracy and human rights. In these respects Andorra 
poses no issues of concern. There is also a growing practice of alignment of 
neighbouring third countries on the common foreign and security policy 
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neighbouring countries (candidates, Balkan and East European neighbours) 
to join in this practice of alignment. The term ‘political dialogue’ is also 
used to cover discussions at foreign minister or senior official level of the 
whole relationship between the two parties, which typically takes place at 
sessions of the bilateral Cooperation Council provided to oversee the 
agreement. For Andorra such a chapter could feature in a comprehensive 
agreement.    
6.  Sequencing and structuring the relationship 
We distinguish four possible options or stages for the Andorra-EU 
relationship, which could also be stages of a process over a considerable 
number of years. These are stylised cases to serve as a basis for discussion, 
since in practice there can be overlap between the stages at a given point in 
time. There are possible variants in each case, which amount overall to a 
continuum of conceivable cases.      
Stage 1: unilateral and preparatory steps.  Here the government 
would be adapting laws and policies with a view to deepening the 
relationship with the EU, implying progressive convergence on key 
European and international standards and norms. At this stage Andorra 
would not be negotiating with the EU, but acting unilaterally to put itself in 
a better position later to negotiate agreements. This corresponds to the 
position taken by the present government, which is devoting the present 
parliamentary period to various reform measures, with a view maybe later 
to negotiations with the EU. 
Stage 2: sector-specific agreements. This stage sees a succession of ad 
hoc agreements with the EU made at different times, with a gradual 
deepening of the relationship. The accent would be on a pragmatic process, 
where the two parties add to or modify the status quo in the  light of 
experience and new circumstances. The three existing agreements with the 
EU are of this type. This might also be regarded as a defensive strategy in 
the sense of increasing Andorra’s compliance with EU and international 
standards to the extent that this was unavoidable, and in seeking specific 
agreements where most obviously needed.  
Stage 3: comprehensive treaty. This stage would see the two parties 
make an agreement covering simultaneously all sectors of mutual interest. 
The multi-sectoral content would in principle achieve a more beneficial 
agreement by achieving synergies between its component parts, and in 
encompassing a wider range of trade-offs between elements of differing ANDORRA AND THE EU| 11 
 
relative advantage to the respective parties. Such an agreement would 
normally last for a considerable number of years, and therefore provide 
certain guarantees of stability. It would imply a more pro-active approach 
towards inclusion in the processes of European integration.   
Stage 4: virtual membership.  This model hypothesises Andorra 
coming very close to complete entry into the European Union. While full 
membership is considered unrealistic for the foreseeable future, it could be 
more realistic to envisage an agreement for virtually full participation in its 
policies and programmes, together with partial institutional inclusion. This 
would of course imply a categorical choice by Andorra to aim at the fullest 
inclusion possible into the European Union. It would be assumed that 
Andorra’s ‘exceptions’ were in any case going to be under irresistible 
pressures for their substantial erosion or elimination, and that in this case it 
was better to commit irreversibly to a fully European strategy.   
This range of conceivable scenarios has fundamental implications for 
the future of Andorra’s economy, society and political system. The fullest 
integration process would undoubtedly eliminate or at least reduce 
substantially some of the exceptional characteristics of Andorra’s economic, 
fiscal and social policy system. This means that Andorra would have to 
examine very carefully the implications of such scenarios, with an attempt 
to draw up a cost-benefit analysis of the options.  
However far from everything is a matter of Andorra’s free choice, 
since the current processes of globalisation and European integration 
amount to hugely powerful external dynamic factors whose pervasive 
influence Andorra can hardly avoid. There are several objective indicators, 
as mentioned above, warning Andorra about the unsustainability of its 
development model of recent decades. In addition Andorra has to watch 
carefully what is happening in other very small states and entities in 
Europe, with which it competes, since these other jurisdictions are creating 
precedents, examples and trends that will bear on Andorra’s case in 
various ways.  
6.1  Unilateral and preparatory steps 
The unilateral approach has some serious arguments in its favour. It would 
see Andorra making extensive use of EU directives, regulations and 
policies as a guide for its actions, even to the point of simply copying many 
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align its new legislation on EU norms and standards now in any case. 
There is no need for Andorra to ‘re-invent the wheel’. Moreover it seems 
increasingly the case that the EU is the standard-setter in global markets. 
There are important cases, for example in financial services and accounting, 
where the EU obliges its member states to adopt standards that are agreed 
internationally for voluntary application elsewhere. Further advantages of 
this approach are that it can be pursued at a speed and depth that Andorra 
finds best, and avoids the burden and complications of negotiating formal 
agreements. In particular it avoids entering into a negotiation process from 
a position of unnecessary weakness. 
However therein also lay disadvantages. The process may lack 
strategic coherence and credibility, and may be vulnerable to short-term 
politics. It may also miss the possibility to negotiate various advantages. 
These problems of weak strategic coherence and credibility could in 
principle be overcome by adequate planning, consultations and 
commitment of medium to long-term plans. The government’s ‘Andorra 
2020’ programme could be taken as the time frame for a two-stage process 
of first a ‘Green Paper’ and later a ‘White Paper’ on Andorra’s plan to 
thoroughly work out the European dimension to its 2020 programme. The 
Green Paper would be in the nature of a consultative document sketching 
different options for Andorra’s future European policy. Such a document 
might be given a year for debate in parliament, business interest groups 
and society at large. It would be followed by a White Paper that would set 
out the government’s proposal. This should have the vital quality of 
informing the population at large and all economic actors – Andorran and 
foreign – about the nature of the economic regime to be expected over the 
medium to long-term. A checklist for the contents of these Green and White 
Papers is effectively available in the lists of topics covered by the EU in its 
negotiations and agreements with neighbouring countries, including both 
those with or without membership perspectives (see Table 12 below on the 
EEA, and Annexes H, I and J for other examples). The agenda is virtually 
the same in all cases, and the main differences lie in the extent of legally 
binding obligations that the partner takes on, and the speed of alignment 
on EU norms.  
This still leaves as a matter of political choice whether the stage of 
unilateral action is to remain the main system indefinitely into the future, 
or to serve as a preparatory stage before passing to the negotiation of more 
formalised agreements with the EU. We now therefore consider the options 
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6.2  Sector-specific agreements 
A pragmatic approach would be to make step-by-step progress in 
negotiating sector-specific agreements with the EU, sequenced to follow a 
stage of unilateral preparatory measures. The status quo in fact already 
consists of a hybrid regime of some unilateral acts of convergence on EU 
standards alongside some sector-specific agreements. 
There is certainly room for a higher level of operational effectiveness 
for the several sectoral headings written into the 2004 Cooperation 
Agreement – environment, transport, education and regional policy. As 
remarked above, this agreement has so far remained largely an empty 
letter. From our consultations it is our impression that at the present time 
any ambitious requests from the Andorran side to upgrade the sectoral 
chapters of the 2004 Cooperation Agreement would encounter requests 
from the EU or its most interested member states for a quid pro quo, 
consisting of greater convergence by Andorra on the EU’s four freedoms, 
and its regulatory standards and fiscal norms.  
The 2004 Cooperation Agreement is conspicuous for the absence of 
all the core features of the European Union’s priorities, first of which are 
the four freedoms. This implies that the 2004 Cooperation Agreement was 
from the start structurally defective in supposing that major progress could 
be made on the soft agenda of Andorra’s preferences, while neglecting the 
hard core of the EU’s concerns. It represents the reverse of the logic 
presented above in discussing first core requirements of a deeper Andorra-
EU relationship and then the additional agenda items for deeper 
cooperation. It may be possible to negotiate on both together, but to take 
these two groups of agenda items in reverse order is not succeeding at 
present, and is no more likely to do so in the future.  
The EU for its part has been taking no initiative, except when it had 
its own strong reason to do so as in the case of the taxation of savings, 
otherwise leaving it to the Andorran side to come up with proposals. 
There are other examples of the current step-by-step approach. 
Andorra initiated discussions about joining fully the euro area, with a view 
to an agreement for minting Andorran euro coinage. This led to the 
conclusion that it was first necessary to pass a set of laws on the regulation 
and supervision of Andorra’s financial markets.  
There are also the proposed reforms for introducing a corporate tax, 
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France and Spain to reduce or abolish their withholding taxes on Andorran 
enterprises that supply cross-border services.  
A step-by-step evolutionary approach certainly allows for a careful 
process, avoiding dramatic ruptures in the system, and giving time for 
Andorrans to adapt to new conditions for doing business. It takes time to 
make far-reaching changes, such as introducing accounting systems 
corresponding to international standards in companies, which until now 
had no obligation to draw up audited accounts, since there has been no tax 
on profits.  
The most developed example of this evolutionary approach, with 
multiplication of sector-specific agreements, is seen in EU-Swiss relations. 
The Swiss model stands for a long and progressive process, a continuous 
sequence of negotiations, with the objective of combining deep integration 
with avoidance of excessive or automatic harmonisation on EU policies. As 
detailed below (in section 4.1.3 of Part B), Switzerland has concluded no 
less than 42 agreements with the EU (or its earlier institutions) between 
1956 and the present day. 
However the availability and relevance of this model for Andorra 
should not be overestimated. The EU for its part strongly resists what it 
calls ‘cherry-picking’ by European partner states, which are otherwise 
seeking the benefits of deep integration with it. The Swiss government for 
its part sought to join the European Economic Area with the other EFTA 
states in the 1990s, and negotiated the treaty to do this, only for it to fail in 
the referendum for its ratification. The subsequent packages of agreements 
negotiated between 1994 and 2004 were a salvage operation to repackage 
much of the EEA agreement. Even so the EU imposed the condition that all 
the sector-specific agreements would have to be ratified on the Swiss side, 
such that if one failed ratification all others would be rendered null and 
void. In addition the institutional provisions of the Swiss packages turn out 
to be less satisfactory from the standpoint of having a voice in EU policy-
shaping than for the EEA partners. It is therefore something of an illusion 
to suppose that there is a Swiss model on offer that gives a more favourable 
balance of advantages because it is more selective and tailored to its 
national needs. 
 There are further risks in the step-by-step approach, which turn on 
questions of interdependence and synergies between the components, and 
of credibility of the whole. Consider for example just one circuit of 
interdependencies. Andorra wishes to create new, dynamic and higher-tech 
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Spain to lift their withholding taxes on Andorran service exports, and also 
liberalisation of the Andorran labour market to attract new skills and 
entrepreneurship. However the Andorra labour force will be apprehensive 
about increased competition for jobs in the absence of a more substantial 
social security safety net in the event of becoming unemployed. On the 
other hand the tax reforms will increase the capacity of the state to make 
such provisions. This example thus sees a possible chain of linkages 
between freeing movement of people and capital, removal of external fiscal 
sanctions, domestic tax reforms and domestic social security provision.   
These are reasons why a more comprehensive approach deserves 
consideration, simultaneously for the programme of domestic reforms as 
well as the relationship with the EU. 
6.3  Comprehensive treaty  
The EU has an active policy for establishing special relationships with 
neighbouring countries, based on comprehensive treaty level agreements.  
It is instructive to look at the contents of the several categories among 
the EU’s comprehensive agreements and negotiation processes with close 
neighbours. One can compare in particular: 
  The accession negotiation process (see Annex H for the standard 
chapters of the accession negotiations),  
  The Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Balkan states (see 
Annex I for the chapters of the agreement with Croatia) and 
  The Action Plans of the European Neighbourhood Policy (see Annex J 
for the contents in the case of Ukraine).  
The outstanding message from all these examples is that while the EU 
regards its several of neighbours as being categorically different from 
political and institutional standpoints, the content of these negotiations and 
agreements has much the same structure and content. The main difference 
is the degree of flexibility in the precise agenda, and in the degree to which 
EU norms and standards become legally binding obligations. In all cases 
the four freedoms occupy a prime place. The justice and home affairs field 
also becomes important in all cases. The long list of sectoral policies is the 
same, only that for the Neighbourhood Policy these are largely matters for 
‘cooperation’, whereas for the candidate states they become legally binding 
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Apart from ongoing developments in the EU’s neighbourhood 
policies, a specific article (No. 1-57) on the special relationship between the 
EU and its neighbours was included in the Constitution signed on 29 
October 2004, which is reproduced in Box 1. In addition several small 
neighbouring states, including Andorra, pushed for and were successful in 
securing a Declaration attached to this article for the EU to take into 
account the particular situation of small-sized neighbouring countries.  
Box 1. Extract from the ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ 
Title VIII - The Union and its neighbours - Article 1-57 
1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded 
on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations 
based on cooperation.  
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific 
agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain 
reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking 
activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the subject of periodic 
consultation. 
……Declaration on Article 1-57 
The Union will take into account the particular situation of small-sized 
countries which maintain specific relations of proximity with it. 
 
Source:  European Union, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed 29 
October 2004, published 2005, Office of Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg.   
 
In the event, the Constitution failed to be ratified, after the negative 
referenda results in France and the Netherlands in May 2005. However in 
June 2007 the European Council agreed a mandate for negotiations to 
overcome the impasse, through preparing  amendments to the existing 
treaties instead of a de novo text. The agreed mandate goes a long way, 
however, towards rescuing the institutional innovations of the 
Constitution. The mandate proposes in particular to retain Article 1-57 of 
the Constitution. The current Portuguese Presidency has retained both this 
article and the annexed declaration in the text of the draft treaty that the EU 
member states are now due to negotiate to a conclusion before the end of 
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The significance of this article, whether it is retained or not, should 
not be overestimated. The EU is able to make agreements with third 
countries in any case. This item was itself hardly controversial, and so its 
inclusion in the draft Constitution can be regarded as a broad statement of 
intent on the part of the EU, without direct legal force.  
In any case the EU is already in practice tending towards new models 
of treaty-level agreements with close neighbours and partners. The 
emerging model goes in the direction of a single treaty combining 
provisions relating to all three pillars of EU competences, for (I) economic 
integration, (II) foreign and security policy, and (III) justice and home 
affairs, which will now be facilitated by the European Union acquiring a 
single international legal personality under the forthcoming treaty 
amendments. Already the EU begins to negotiate a treaty with these 
characteristics with Ukraine. The past agreements with the more limited 
scope of a single pillar, such as the European Economic Area, are becoming 
increasingly obsolete with the growing importance of pillar II and III 
activities. 
Mr Pedro Solbes, in his report prepared for the Andorran 
government in 1999,2 devoted particular attention to the model of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), which currently brings Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway into the EU’s single internal market. Of these 
three countries that case of Liechtenstein is of special interest as comparator 
for Andorra. As described below (in section 4.1.2 of Part B) accession to the 
EEA has entailed transposition into the laws of the non-EU member states 
of over 1,000 EU directives, covering the whole internal market field. It is 
worth noting that Liechtenstein, as a state of similar size to Andorra, 
managed to apply this huge body of EU law without crippling the 
administration of its enterprises with excessive burdens. Short cuts were 
possible, either by copying the German language laws of Austria, or by 
simplifying legislative procedures where the measures were essentially 
technical and without political implications.  
                                                      
2 P. Solbes, Éléments de définition d’un modèle de relation entre l’Union Européenne et 
l’Andorre, Andorra La Vella: Govern d’Andorra, Ministeri d’Afers Exteriors, 
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In the particular field of financial market regulation and supervision, 
moreover, the same obligations have been taken up not only by 
Liechtenstein within the EEA, but also by several of Andorra’s other 
European competitors – Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man – in 
adopting the whole package of 42 measures of the EU’s Financial Service 
Action Plan. This has been accompanied by the latter four cases entering 
into information-sharing agreements with the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities of other financial centres, in conformity with the standards set 
by the G-7-sponsored Financial Action Task Force, administered in 
cooperation with the OECD and IMF. 
The EEA model is in itself interesting, but in some respects perhaps 
not so well adapted now to Andorra’s needs. The EEA Treaty, of 1992, has 
since been overtaken by important developments in the EU’s economic 
policies falling outside the precise internal market agenda of the EEA, and 
in its Justice and Home Affairs competences. From an Andorran 
perspective, looking ahead for a model for the next decade, the EEA could 
be viewed as both too much (excessive detail with the 1,000 directives) and 
too little (in excluding new areas of EU policies). It is also uncertain 
whether the existing EEA states would want to enlarge their membership. 
A more plausible approach would therefore call for Andorra to think 
in terms of its own comprehensive treaty model with the EU, bearing in 
mind certainly the important experiences of the Swiss and 
Liechtenstein/EEA models, as well as the EU’s wider set of neighbourhood 
policies. This might become feasible as and when Andorra had achieved 
recognition as a ‘cooperative’ low-tax jurisdiction, and a financial centre 
fully compliant with the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan. 
Andorra would also have to come to terms with the EU’s four 
freedoms, maybe with some limited negotiated exceptions. However this 
seems necessary in any case to revitalise the economy and to develop new 
service sector niches, with the aid of liberalised labour and capital markets. 
In the new era of mobile locations for many service sector activities, based 
on IT and internet communications, Andorra is favourably placed to profit 
from its huge investment in recent decades in the most substantial and 
modern urban conglomeration in the Pyrenees. It already has a cluster of 
business services and infrastructure as a basis for this development, 
coupled to valuable language skills of the population and a highly 
attractive mountain quality of life. But to exploit these comparative 
advantages, the labour and capital markets must be completely open, since 
mobile resources will not come there otherwise, given that today’s ANDORRA AND THE EU| 19 
 
European standard is one of complete openness. Without this the objectives 
of the ‘Andorra  2020’ programme are going to be very hard to achieve.      
This hypothetical reform package would be a sound basis for seeking 
the most favourable possible comprehensive agreement from the European 
Union. Given the strategic interest now of the major powers in Europe and 
the international community to see best standards prevail in all the world’s 
offshore centres, one could expect a serious response to a credible and 
comprehensive reform process in Andorra. Full participation in projects 
such as that of the Communauté de Travail des Pyrénées and its funding by 
the EU Regional Development Fund would become plausible. An 
agreement over full participation in the euro zone, as part of the European 
payments system would be feasible. Upgraded or new transport 
infrastructure connections with France and Spain, by motorway, rail and 
air, could also be considered for possible financing from the European 
Investment Bank as well as the Regional Fund. Full participation in EU 
education, research and SME development programmes would be 
plausible. Andorran citizens could achieve full access to the EU labour 
market. 
6.4  Virtual membership 
Given the extent of regulatory convergence on EU standards, and of 
participation in EU policies hypothesised in the preceding section, the 
question naturally arises whether Andorra might envisage a final, logical 
step, and seek full EU membership. This would seem to be conceivable in 
principle on the basis of the legal texts, since from the Treaty of Rome to 
this day “any European state that respects the principles [of democracy] 
may apply” (Article 49).  
However the right to apply does not mean the right to be accepted. 
The criteria for accession have been spelled out since in more detail as the 
‘Copenhagen criteria’, adopted by the European Council at their meeting in 
Copenhagen in 1993. These criteria concern first democracy, the rule of law 
and human rights, secondly the capacity to implement the EU’s legislated 
acquis and thirdly the capacity of the economy to cope with competition in 
the EU economy. 
Andorra’s political institutions already satisfy the first criterion. The 
legal and administrative burden of acquis compliance would be very 
substantial. However the example of Liechtenstein in the European 
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market acquis without insuperable difficulty. As regards the competitivity 
criterion the key sectors – tourism, financial services and commerce – are 
already subject to wholly or largely competitive conditions.  
The main obstacle to a hypothetical Andorran application for 
membership does not therefore arise with the Copenhagen criteria, but 
rather around the so-called ‘absorptive capacity’ question, now officially 
termed by the Commission as ‘integration capacity’. In 2006 considerable 
attention was paid to this issue, as a result of the growing resistance to 
further enlargement following the huge jump from 15 to 25 and now 27 
member states, as well as French and Dutch failures to ratify the 
Constitution. The nature of this ‘integration capacity’ has been extensively 
discussed in an official Commission Communication,3 as well as in an 
independent CEPS study.4  
The Commission’s main concern is over the adequacy of the 
institutions to function with a growing number of member states, which is 
essentially a problem for the decision-making procedures of the Council of 
Ministers. Here there is a very real issue of the burdening of decision-
making procedures with an ever growing number of seats round the table. 
The number of ‘tables’ in question is huge, since there are hundreds of 
working groups and committees of the Council and Commission where all 
member states are represented, with dozens of them meeting each day. 
Actually the EU of 27 member states has not encountered decision-making 
gridlock.5 Nonetheless this concern over further expansion is perceived to 
be a very real one.  
Even existing commitments to further enlargement are under tension 
politically within the EU, bearing in mind the commitments for full 
membership extended to all the Balkan states (Croatia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and presumably 
soon Kosovo). Their accession would raise the number of member states to 
34. While the case of Turkey has supporters and opponents, there are also 
constituencies in the EU in favour of Ukraine and Moldova, with far from 
                                                      
3 European Commission, Integration Capacity, Annex to the Regular Report on 
Enlargement, December 2006. 
4 M. Emerson, S. Aydin, J. De Clerk-Sachsse, and G. Noucheva, Just what is this 
absorptive capacity of the European Union?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 113, October 2006. 
5 S. Hagemann and J. De Clerk-Sachsse, Decision-making in the Enlarged Council of 
Ministers: Evaluating the Facts, CEPS Policy Brief No. 119, January 2007. ANDORRA AND THE EU| 21 
 
unanimous support in all these cases. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland 
could easily become member states if they wished, in which case 
Liechtenstein might also seek to follow suit. This exercise in hypothetical 
futures already touches up to 40 sovereign states.  
Today it is not possible to forecast how the EU will respond to the 
continuing dynamics of Europe’s widening and deepening, which seem 
nonetheless to be long-term endogenous processes of great force. 
Responses will have to be found to sincere and justified demands for 
inclusion from democratic European states. It is not inconceivable that the 
EU might in due course restructure itself to have a formal wider European 
structure (viz. President Mitterrand’s proposal for a European 
Confederation), alongside a more compact structure consisting of all 
member states that were fully participating in all its policies and willing to 
adopt a more strongly federal constitution (such is the essence of the ‘core 
Europe’ proposal advocated by various independents from the original six 
member states). On the other hand at some point in the future, maybe in 
the 2020s or 2030s, the European Union’s institutional system might find a 
way of accommodating a further substantial increase in the number of 
member states. The United States, with 50 states, can function because of its 
maturely developed federal structures, in which inter-state decision-
making hardly exists at all. Perhaps the EU will be getting closer, but surely 
not fully, to a maturely federal system in the second half of the 21st century.  
The point to bear in mind is that the EU is a living political organism, 
which has shown great ingenuity over the last 50 years in adapting its 
structure to new demands, and may well continue to do so over the next 
decades if faced with continuing requests for further enlargement from 
other European democracies. The question for Andorra to consider is 
whether it could in some way anticipate these future developments in ways 
acceptable both to it and to the EU.  The initiative of San Marino of 27 
August 2007, in formally requesting discussions with the EU over possible 
membership of a new ‘status’, illustrates the constant emergence of new 
dynamics in the European integration process that Andorra has to bear in 
mind; these are ranging across the whole of the map of Europe, from the 
biggest to smallest of its component states.6 
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The main problem on the EU side is to avoid congestion around the 
tables of the Council and its numerous working groups. Would it be 
possible to devise an interim system of ‘virtual membership’ of the EU, 
which would mean full functional membership for the  people and 
businesses of Andorra, while making special arrangements in relation to 
the institutions? 
The starting point for a ‘virtual membership’ hypothesis would be for 
the citizens of Andorra to become citizens of the European Union (their 
passports would bear the title ‘European Union’ as well as ‘Andorra’, as in 
the case of existing member states), sharing the same fundamental rights at 
the individual level (freedom of movement, residence, employment etc.) 
without discrimination. Andorra would be considered ‘part of the EU’. All 
EU law, policies and programmes would be applicable to it, except in the 
event of specific derogations. 
Regarding institutional issues, the number of Commissioners is soon 
going to be reduced to less than the number of member states in any case. 
On the other hand Andorran citizens could be eligible to become European 
civil servants, with access on the basis of merit to high positions in all the 
institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament, European Central Bank, 
Court of Justice, EU agencies, etc.). 
In the European Parliament the average constituency size is now over 
500,000 people. For Andorra the number of non-Andorran residents of EU 
nationality is substantial, and these people are able to vote in their home 
countries. It would be a considerable concession, but not an inconceivable 
one, for the EU to grant one seat in the Parliament for Andorra in spite of 
the very small number of Andorran citizens. Alternative formulae might be 
for there to be one Andorran observer member, or for Andorran citizens to 
be granted the right to vote in neighbouring Spanish or French 
constituencies. Already EU citizens can vote in European Parliament 
elections in their country of residence even where this is not their country 
of citizenship. There should be no problem in granting a seat to Andorra in 
the EU’s two consultative bodies – the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions. 
This would leave the Council as the biggest problem. Could there be 
innovative solutions, given the inevitable resistance to a new seat at the 
table representing so few people? Might Andorra be granted the right to 
have its voice represented in the Council by another member state of its 
choice? Alternatively might Andorra be granted the right to attend and 
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itself see such arrangements as compatible with its status as an 
independent sovereign state (this is of course a highly sensitive issue, but it 
can be argued that a voice in the EU’s policy-shaping process, even without 
a vote, would be a plus rather than a minus).  
Following the age-old principle of ‘no taxation without 
representation’, there could be a compromise in the event of incomplete 
institutional representation. If Andorra had no seat or vote in the Council it 
might be agreed that it contribute only part of the normal budget 
contribution. For example it might surrender the customs duties own 
resources, but only part of the value added tax contribution.  
7.  The possible and the necessary 
‘Politics is the art of the possible’ is a well known dictum. For Andorra this 
concerns the politically feasible speed of adaptation to new circumstances, 
both new problems and new opportunities. The politically feasible is the 
constant concern of any democratic government having to balance the 
interests of different segments of society. Andorra is a typical European 
country in this respect, with a real political competition between 
government and opposition parties. Changes to the status quo may open 
new possibilities, but they will also threaten or be perceived to threaten at 
least some existing interest groups. It is not for the present author to 
discuss these aspects of the Andorran political scene, beyond 
understanding that there are natural constraints on the speed of policy 
reform processes, although these constraints may be eased in the course of 
informed political debate. 
‘The necessary’ refers to pressures bearing down on Andorra from 
the outside world, which may be more or less irresistible. There are indeed 
new realities in both Europe and the world that Andorra cannot escape, 
since it cannot conceivably revert to some earlier historical model of a tiny 
self-sufficient community isolated in the mountains. Moreover the 
processes of Europeanisation and globalisation have both been accelerating 
to the point of having made qualitative changes not only over recent 
decades, but even perceptibly in the few years already of the 21st century.7 
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The EU’s multiple achievements of the single market, single currency 
and single space for the movement of people and now single area for 
freedom, justice and security have been decades in the making. But only in 
the last few years have all these elements come together. Much is made in 
the media about the shortcomings in the EU’s foreign policy and the failure 
of the Constitution to be ratified, but this should not for Andorra obscure 
the fact that the EU has become a massive legal and regulatory space. 
Moreover, even as the enlargement process now  slows, the external 
projection of the EU’s norms and standards is continuing way beyond its 
frontiers. 
The globalisation phenomenon, while an obvious reality for all, has 
two features of importance to Andorra that have only in the last years 
achieved a qualitative change. First has been the explosive growth of 
globalised offshore financial markets. It is estimated that the world’s 
offshore centres now manage between $5-7 trillion of assets, or about 6-8% 
of global wealth. This has led the world’s leading economic powers to 
develop a comprehensive array of standards for fiscal systems and for the 
regulation and supervision of financial markets with which to review the 
performance of every offshore entity in the world, going as far as the tiniest 
island in the Pacific Ocean. The G-7 summits have mandated the 
International Monetary Fund and the OECD to be the agents of review of 
the fiscal and financial policies of all states and entities, even those that are 
not members of these organisations (Andorra thus included). As Part B to 
this report shows, these reviews are done and published in great detail, and 
do not fail to criticise laggards in the process of converging on international 
standards.  
This process was in motion already before the seminal terrorist event 
of 9/11/2001, but has been further reinforced by the new strategic security 
concern to combat the financing of terrorism and the partly related matter 
of money laundering.  
These several landmark features of the early 21st century – European 
integration, globalisation of the world economy and finance, and global 
terrorism – have come together as the rationale of a drive to make 
internationally accepted standards prevail world-wide. No single state or 
entity is targeted, but none is granted exemption from the process.  
More than that, the major powers have put a competitive dynamic 
into the process, whereby the best-performing offshore centres are 
rewarded with favourable reports and publicity, and the lagging entities 
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offshore centres to adopt pro-active regulatory policies and strive for 
explicitly ‘whiter-than-white’ brand reputations, which has tended to result 
in good business success. This is beginning to suggest a model of the 
dynamics of competition between offshore centres, in which there can be 
observed parallel processes of virtuous and vicious circles, in which the 
centres with best reputations attract the best clients, and vice versa for the 
centres with less good reputations.  
The major powers and international organisations are respecting the 
legal prerogatives of internationally recognised sovereign states. But at the 
same time they are developing increasingly powerful carrots and sticks to 
achieve the application of minimum global standards, in order to avert 
security risks and systemic risks in the financial system, and to ensure a 
more level playing field for competition. The carrots and sticks are 
essentially made up of the same instruments of reputational branding, 
either positive or negative.  
What is ‘necessary’ for Andorra, as for other offshore centres, has to 
mean not only moving progressively in the direction of dominant 
European and/or international standards, but also not proceeding slower 
than the competitors. To move slower in a given positive direction than the 
competitors risks becoming a negative in the perception of mobile 
international resources.  
The government of Andorra recognises the challenges. The Head of 
Government stated in his speech to the parliament on 14 June 2007 that “to 
be considered a tax haven costs us too dear … The Government bases the 
ineluctable internationalisation of the economy on three pillars: 
transparency, orthodoxy and international accepted standards of control 
and supervision”. This is also reflected in the ‘Andorra 2020’ programme 
for revitalising the economy, through improving infrastructures, upgrading 
the tourist sector, encouraging the emergence of new service sectors and 
more generally strengthening Andorra’s ‘brand image’ in the European 
and international economy.   
At the same time technological progress is working in favour of these 
plans. In particular advances in information technologies, at the heart of 
modern service sectors, bring new opportunities in the competition for 
attracting investment, with increasing numbers of niche activities now 
becoming ‘foot-loose’, i.e. capable of being located almost anywhere 
geographically, and indeed in mountainous locations that were earlier 
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Put in other words, a reversal of economic paradigm is called for. To 
sustain its achievements Andorra needs to put into reverse some of the 
factors that made it rich in the last half century. How is this possible, it may 
be asked? Is this not an illogical contradiction? Actually there is a robust 
explanation of this. It is not that extremely light taxation and economic 
regulations are no longer attractive to mobile resources; of course they 
remain so. It is rather that the global and European economic environment, 
within which Andorra has to find the sources of its prosperity, has been 
changing fast under the headings of the three key words: globalisation, 
Europeanisation and technology.  
The optimum has to find its way of reconciling the ‘possible’ and the 
‘necessary’. This should in principle correspond to an enlightened long-
term view of Andorra’s interests, while avoiding either excessively brutal 
ruptures to the status quo, or excessive short-run protection of the status 
quo that would impede the emergence of new dynamic factors crucial for 
the longer-term future. A classic technique for managing the inevitable 
dilemmas that arise in any reform process is to announce the final 
objectives for a medium-term process with sufficient credibility that actors 
have time to adapt, and to schedule individual measures over time 
according to practical considerations. But the question is then how to 
achieve the vital credibility factor, when much of the policy action is spread 
over a multi-year period, in which there could be changes of government 
with different ideas.  
This is where the European Union could be the key, crucially 
providing ‘anchorage’ for the reform process. The idea of ‘anchorage’ is 
based on two factors. First there has to be the bedrock on which to anchor, 
which exists in the EU’s corpus of operational laws and policies, and is 
quite transparent as information for strategic business planning. Second 
there is the mechanism of anchor and chain for attaching the ship to the 
bedrock. The EU’s legal and institutional infrastructure ensures not only 
enforcement but also stability. EU laws cannot be simply changed by a new 
government in a member states. With non-member states in the 
neighbourhood, the EU is making treaty-level agreements, entailing legal 
obligations at the highest level of international law, backed up by legal 
remedies (European Court of Justice or other procedures). A non-member 
state that concludes a treaty-level agreement with the EU, with legally 
binding obligations to become compliant with identified EU laws, makes a 
credible commitment. It is noteworthy here that the EEA system goes as far 
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amendments to laws in the single market field, thereby guaranteeing 
against problems of obsolescence of the agreement. This is a clear 
reinforcement of the credibility of the ‘EU anchorage’.  
In this situation Andorra has an important latent advantage and 
resource to draw upon in its two neighbouring states and the European 
Union. If it made the big break, to become an unquestionably cooperative 
player by best European and international standards within a small 
number of years, and to make binding political commitments to such a plan 
at the outset, Andorra could then seek the most favourable possible deal 
with its neighbours and the EU. As pointed out above, there is plenty of 
room still for Andorra to remain ‘exceptionally’ attractive as a very low tax 
jurisdiction, while coming entirely into line with the key standards of 
international cooperation.  
As a final word, we return to summarise some key features of the 
four stages, or sequence of models presented above. The present situation 
consists of some unilateral reform measures in the governmental pipeline, 
alongside some sector-specific agreements with the EU, which however are 
not developing very substantially. It is suggested that the current stage of 
unilateral actions be enhanced by the publication first of a Green Paper on 
‘Andorra-EU 2020’ to complement the existing ‘Andorra 2020’ programme 
that has set out the domestic agenda for this time horizon. After a period of 
political consultation, there could be a White Paper, in which the 
government would set out plans to anchor its ‘Andorra 2020’ programme 
on a comprehensive and deep integration with the EU. This would mean 
coming to terms with the EU’s four freedoms and other core requirements. 
As soon as the government was ready with these plans, and had advanced 
a sufficient number of them concretely, the way would be open 
negotiations for a comprehensive treaty level agreement with the EU, 
which would include full access to all relevant EU policies and 
programmes. While full membership is understood in both Andorra and 
the EU to be implausible along the classic lines for the EU’s enlargement for 
institutional reasons, these steps might lead to a conceivable model of 
‘virtual membership’ by around 2020, if Andorra chose to pursue a fully 
European vocation.  
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Part B. Background Study 
8.  The three ages of Andorran history 
8.1  A millennium of Malthusian subsistence  
A little history is called for.8 It is certainly intriguing for non-Andorrans to 
know how it came about that this independent and democratic state’s head 
of state consists of two ‘Co-Princes’, who are the President of France and a 
Spanish bishop. More important for Andorrans is that their special identity 
and place in Europe are understood which requires the presentation of a 
little historical background.  
Andorra is a natural geographic valley space, a triangle with sides 
about 25 km long, in the Pyrenean mountain range between France and 
Spain. The highest peaks reach almost 3,000 meters on the French side, 
whereas the main valley descends into Spain.   
Map 1. Andorra 
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Charlemagne is believed to have granted a charter to the Andorran 
people in return for their fighting to keep the Moors out of France. It is 
documented that Charlemagne crossed the Pyrenees with an army in 778, 
and favoured a system of defensive buffer states in the region. While the 
authenticity of a Foundation Document of 784 held in the official Andorran 
archives is contested, it is established from a document of 843 that Charles 
the Bald, Charlemagne’s grandson, appointed the Count of Urgell as 
overlord of Andorra, Urgell being a town close to the border of Andorra on 
the Spanish side. In 1133 this possession was transferred to the Bishop of 
Urgell. (His church remains today an outstanding example of Romanesque 
architecture, of which there are also several notable examples in Andorra 
itself.) However the Bishop placed himself under the protection of a 
Spanish noble family, de Caboet, whose rights were later transferred by 
marriage to Count of Foix in 1208. This family’s seat was the imposing 
fortress at Foix, about 100 km north of Andorra into France, and a major 
centre of regional power in medieval times.  
In the early decades of the 13th century there were many tensions and 
hostilities over Andorra between the Bishop of Urgell and the Compte de 
Foix, which was only resolved in 1278, and confirmed in 1288, though 
mediation by the King Perre II of Catalonia and Aragon. On these two 
dates, treaties (paréages) were signed between the church and the lay 
seigneur. These documents are regarded as the first legal foundation of 
today’s Andorra, establishing a condominium, which conferred equal 
rights and powers on both the bishop and the count as ‘Co-Princes’. The 
texts spelled out arrangements governing fiscal issues, military obligations 
and a kind of magistrates’ court (batlles). The inhabitants of Andorra had to 
recognise allegiance to both the Bishop and Count, and to pay tribute to 
them each on alternative years. This practice did not entirely disappear 
until Andorra adopted its present constitution in 1993. Such is the 
longevity of Andorra’s political identity.  
Andorran society was that of a small, poor and closed mountain 
community, with the population stagnating for centuries at around 3,000 
inhabitants. By the 19th century the population was still only around 4,000-
5,000. The shortage of agricultural land meant a Malthusian regime, with 30 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
emigration becoming necessary whenever the population risked increasing 
substantially.9  
Their economic survival was helped by exemptions from customs duties 
extended by the Conseil du Bearn in 1532, the Parliament of Toulouse in 
1604, Louis XIV in 1644 and by the Conseil d’Etat du Roy in 1767. However 
significant taxes, according to 17th century records, had to be paid to the 
Co-Princes. In the early 18th century there were wars and troubles between 
Catalonia and Castille, which resulted in 1728 in the imposition of a 10% 
import duty on Andorran exports to Spain. This was of vital concern to the 
Andorrans, and it took until 1738 for the Andorran leadership to negotiate 
with Spain a special agreement for exemption from these duties.  
The French Revolution of 1789 sent shock waves into Andorra, since 
all feudal privileges were abolished, inter alia those of the Compte de Foix. 
It was not until 1806 that the situation was clarified,  with Napoleon 
Bonaparte becoming Co-Prince, a role that subsequent French heads of 
state have maintained ever since.   
Andorran representative government and democracy has remarkably 
early origins, with some features of the Paréages of 1278 and 1288 blending 
feudalism with elements of representative governance. From medieval 
times society maintained a distinction between the heads of the leading 
families (Caps Grosses or focs) and the ordinary people (casalers). The leading 
families voted 2 or 3 representatives by parish to a council or parliament 
(Consell de la Terra) created by decree of the Co-Princes in 1419. This council 
designated individuals (one or more syndics) to represent the Andorran 
people in negotiations with the Co-Princes. The system was upgraded in a 
reform (Nova Reforma) signed by the Co-Princes in 1866-68, which extended 
the vote to all heads of household (781 in a population of 5,000 at that time), 
and replaced the Consell de la Terra with a Consell General consisting of 
members elected for four years, and reformed mechanisms of local 
government. The next democratic reform was undertaken in 1933 when the 
vote was extended to all adult male Andorrans (women were granted the 
vote in 1970).  
Andorra had some iron ore deposits and this permitted a little 
industrial development from the second half of the 17th century, and 
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several forges were established, leading to a lively expansion of trade. This 
meant also some demographic expansion to 4,130 in 1852. 
Tobacco was introduced into Andorra and became a profitable 
product in the 17th century, partly because of opportunities for smuggling 
into Spain. This was however condemned by the Co-Princes, and the 
Bishop of Urgell ordered the burning of plantations in 1735. The tobacco 
smuggling business did not die however, and in 1790 the Bishop called in 
the troops of the King of Spain to counter the smuggling, and it is recorded 
that in 1896 a smuggler was punished with a heavy fine.   
In the 19th century there were the beginnings of tourism. There was 
an attempt in 1842 to start a casino, but the Co-Princes refused permission, 
with the Bishop of Urgell objecting on moral grounds and the French side 
fearing competition for a nearby spa resort. 
8.2  A half century of vertical take-off 
8.2.1 The population 
Demographic statistics give the surest indicator of Andorra’s ‘vertical take-
off’ in the second half of the 20th century. From its level of 6,000 in 1950 the 
total number of recorded residents grew to 78,000 by the end of the century 
(Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Evolution of the Andorran population 
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Source: Andorra in figures, published by Government of Andorra, Finance Ministry.  32 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
This population explosion has been largely due to immigration. 
Andorran citizens now represent only one third of the resident population. 
As Table 1 shows this dramatic development has had four main 
components: first Andorrans, secondly citizens of the two neighbouring 
states, thirdly immigrant labour from low-income countries, and fourthly 
non-active immigrants from high-income countries.  
Table 1. Population by nationalities, 2006 
Andorran 29,535  Italian  428  Uruguayan  113 
Spanish 27,638  German  393  American 90 
Portuguese 12,789  Filipino 348  Others  1,901 
French 5,104  Belgian  245  Total  81,222 
British 1,050  Dutch  240     
Argentine 583 Chilean  128     
Moroccan 512 Indian  125     
Source: Andorra in figures, published by Government of Andorra, Finance Ministry. 
Table 2. Evolution of population by nationality 
 1980  1990  1995  2000  2004  2005 
Andorrans 9,792  15,616  19,653  23,697 27,465  28,251 
Foreigners 25,668  38,891  44,206  42,147 49,410  50,298 
Spanish 20,378  27,066  28,778  26,750 28,728  28,073 
French 2,474  4,130  4,299  4,283 5,095  5,078 
Portuguese 1,092  3,951  6,885  6,748 9,980  11,294 
Others 1,724  3,744  4,244  4,366 5,607  5,853 
Total 35,460  54,507  63,859  65,844 76,875  78,549 
Source: Andorra and its financial system, published by Associació de Bancs Andorrans, 
and  Basic Andorra, published by Cambra de Comerç, Indústria i Serveis 
d’Andorra. 
The Andorrans themselves have become more numerous, but of the 
27,465 total a large fraction have acquired Andorran citizenship by 
naturalisation, of which many have been Catalans. This means that while 
Andorran citizens account about one-third of the resident population, those 
of Andorran ancestry are much fewer. Of the nationals of the neighbouring 
countries, Spain and France, the Catalan Spanish are especially numerous, 
no doubt due to their common language with the Andorrans and easier ANDORRA AND THE EU| 33 
 
geographical access. However the Portuguese have now become the second 
most numerous foreign community, arriving mainly as immigrant workers. 
In addition there has been immigration of workers from very-low income 
countries, notably from Morocco, Philippines and India. Finally there is the 
category on non-active immigrants, who are wealthy individuals from 
high-income European countries, and even the US and Australia, many of 
whom are retired and attracted by the low-tax regime.  
Andorra follows a stringent policy towards the acquisition of 
citizenship by naturalisation. For some time the qualification for persons 
not born in Andorra was 30 years residence, while this has now been 
reduced to 20 years. Non-Andorrans born in Andorra may elect to acquire 
Andorran citizenship at the age of 18. Double citizenship is excluded. By 
comparison, most European countries require 5 to 7 years residence, and 
permit double citizenship. However other very small European states, such 
as Monaco, San Marino and Liechtenstein, also follow at least as stringent 
naturalisation policies, if not more so. 
The direct role of France and Spain remains especially important in 
the field of education. There is a tri-partite school system, with the 
Andorran government responsible for schools taught in the Catalan 
language (but these schools also teach some subjects in French and 
Spanish), whereas France and Spain maintain separate school systems 
teaching primarily in French and Spanish. Families are free to choose which 
system to use. At present the schools are evenly balanced between the three 
systems, meaning that Andorra is very much a trilingual/cultural 
community. 
Table 3. School population by system of education 
  1999-00  2004-05 
French educational system  3,586  3,650 
Spanish educational system  3,510  3,499 
Andorran educational system  2,180  3,328 
Total 9,276  10,477 
Source: Andorra and its financial system, published by Associació  
de Bancs Andorrans. 
For university education there is a quite new and small University of 
Andorra, established in 1997. Spanish/Catalan universities are attracting 
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the Catalan language in the major universities of Barcelona and the 
contemporary rise of the Catalan identity.  
Table 4: University population by country of study (number of students) 
  1999-2000  2004-05 
Andorra 227  342 
Spain 837  644 
France 256  181 
Others 21  6 
Total 1,341  1,173 
Source: Andorra and its financial system, published by Associació de Bancs Andorrans. 
8.2.2 The economy 
The main driver of this demographic explosion has been the economy. The 
beginnings of the new economic structure can be traced back to the pre-war 
period when the first major hydro-electric investments were made. This 
required a considerable number of immigrant workers from Spain, who in 
turn needed some banking facilities, so leading to the opening of the first 
bank in Andorra in 1930.  
However the real economic take-off had to wait until the early post-
war period. The commercial sector first developed on the basis of trade in 
some basic commodities that were available in France but not in the 
protected Spanish economy. Andorra thus became an increasingly active 
marketplace for small traders, including smugglers. At the same time there 
was capital flight from Spain and the Andorran banking sector developed 
rapidly providing services under attractive conditions of bank secrecy. The 
liberalisation of the Spanish economy led in due course to the 
disappearance of trade in basic commodities, but meanwhile Andorra 
developed an expanding line of commerce due to its very low indirect 
taxation. The tobacco and cigarette industry developed considerably, again 
with the aid of contraband trade. However this was practically put to an 
end in 1997 after Spain had taken drastic steps to secure adequate 
cooperation. The commercial sector carried on expanding, serving today 
over 8 million day-trip tourists that pass through Andorra each year. Duty-
free franchises for tourists re-entering France and Spain are quite limited, 
but enough to encourage day-tripping.   
The economy saw the build-up of major investments developments in 
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sector profited from excellent skiing resources. The residential 
accommodation sector saw a huge expansion, partly to serve a wealthy 
clientele of non-active or retired foreigners. In addition there was strong 
demand from Spain and elsewhere for secondary residences and 
speculative real estate investment.   
Thus the modern Andorran economy was built up on four pillars of 
tourism, real estate, banking and commerce. The drivers for the exceptional 
growth were undoubtedly low taxation and (until recently) a lightly 
regulated banking sector, coupled with the natural endowment for 
mountain tourism.  
Table 5. Andorra and EU-15, comparative data 
  Year  Andorra EU-15 
GDP per capita (€)  2004  28,729 25,516 
Consumption of electricity (kWh/capita)  2002  6,898 5,912 
Vehicles per 1000 inhabitants  2002  653 495 
Central government income per capita (€)  2004  3,151 6,365 
      
Primary schooling rate (%)  2002  89 95 
Secondary schooling rate (%)  2002  71 91 
      
Employment rate  (over 16-64 years)  2004  73 65 
Structure by sector (% of employment)   
Primary 2004  0.3 3.8 
Secondary 2004  19.3 27.1 
Market services  2004  66.2 38.2 
Non-market services  2004  14.2 30.9 
Source: Basic Andorra, published by Cambra de Comerç, Indústria i Serveis d’Andorra. 
Although macroeconomic statistics are lacking, the Andorran 
economy must have grown in real terms on average for the entire second 
half of the 20th century at a rate comparable to the Asian ‘tigers’.10 As a 
                                                      
10 Actual macroeconomic ‘national accounts’ statistics do not exist yet, but while 
the population grew over twelve times the rate of increase of real per capita 
incomes was presumably not less than that of Spain (increasing five times over the 
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result Andorra’s national income and development level came to exceed 
that of the EU-15, a little above Spain and a little less than France. Income 
data are confirmed by the level of electricity consumption and the number 
of vehicles per capita, both of which exceed the EU-15 average.  
By comparison with EU-15 the employment structure is marked by 
an almost twice as high share of market service workers, alongside half as 
high share of public service workers, and smaller agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors. Corresponding to the low public service 
employment statistics, the total tax burden is about half that of the EU-15. 
Educational enrolment is significantly lower that the EU-15 average, which 
must be a matter for concern in order to sustain very high income levels. 
The employment rate exceeds that of EU-15, which presumably reflects in 
part the absence of an unemployment benefit scheme in the social security 
system.  
The tourist sector is of huge size, with almost 11 million visitors per 
year, even if 80% of these are day trippers who are not spending a night in 
Andorra, but are presumably doing a useful amount of shopping and/or 
skiing. There are 200 hotels, which together with other facilities have a 
capacity of 26,000 beds. Andorra is the biggest skiing domain in the 
Pyrenees. 
Table 6. Visitors entering in Andorra by season 2006 
  Tourists  Day-trippers  Total 
Spanish 1,625,893  4,612,061  6,237,954 
French 485,183  3,705,536  4,190,719 
Others   115,846  192,203  308,049 
Total 2,226,922  8,509,800  10,736,722 
Source:  Basic Andorra, published by Cambra de Comerc, Indústria i Serveis d’Andorra. 
Table 7. Number of visitors 2004-2006 
  2004  2005  2006  Var. (%) 04-06 
Tourists 2,791,116  2,418,409  2,226,922  -20.2 
Day-trippers 8,877,344  8,631,081  8,509,800  -2.8 
Total 11,668,460  11,049,490  10,736,722  -8.0 
Source: Andorra in figures, published by Government of Andorra, Finance Ministry. 
Andorra’s trade in goods is characterised by a huge apparent excess 
of imports over imports (over 10 to 1 in the official statistics). However 
these figures are deceptive in that while the imports of the Andorran ANDORRA AND THE EU| 37 
 
commercial sector are recorded, their sales to visiting tourists are not 
recorded as exports, which mean that the true trade deficit will be much 
less than suggested by Figure 2. According to 2004 data, the main imported 
commodities are electrical appliances (12.9%), vehicles (11.3%), perfumes 
and cosmetics (6.8%) clothing (5.3%), tobacco and alcoholic beverages 
(6.7%). Imported goods are mainly coming from Spain (over half the total) 
and France (about one-fifth), while other European countries account for 
13.5%, with only 12% from the United States and Asian countries. 
Figure 2. Growth of imports and exports 1991-2005 (millions of euros) 
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8.2.3 The constitution 
In the last few decades Andorra has transformed itself institutionally into a 
normal European democratic state. 
In spite of the very early elements of democracy referred to already, 
at the beginning of the post-war period Andorra still exhibited a confusing 
mix of modernity and vestiges of feudalism. In 1981 a decree of 
representatives of the Co-Princes established a ‘quasi-constitution’ using 
the expression ‘federation of Andorran parishes’, with an executive council 
and head of government elected by the parliament. The first head of 
government took office in 1982. However the distribution of powers 38 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
between the Co-Princes, central government and parishes was not totally 
clarified. Immediately this first government started pressing for a proper 
constitution. 
Significant legislative acts were possible in 1980s, yet in matters of 
justice the system remained archaic. The Co-Princes continued to nominate 
judges, while persons condemned to more than three months in prison 
could choose whether to serve their terms in French or Spanish prisons.  
In 1990 the parliament formally requested of the Co-Princes the 
opening of negotiations to elaborate a real Constitution. Tripartite 
negotiations between the Andorrans and representatives of the Co-Princes 
began in 1991. The negotiations received personal support from President 
Mitterrand for Andorra’s internal and international sovereignty, 
notwithstanding some opposition from his Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
the granting of international legal personality to Andorra.11 The resulting 
text was voted by referendum of the Andorran people on 14 March 1993.    
The Constitution declares Andorra to be a legal, independent, 
democratic and social state, whose sovereignty resides in the Andorran 
people. Its regime is described as a parliamentary Co-Principality.  
The function of Head of State remains with the two Co-Princes, 
whose role is similar to various contemporary constitutional presidencies 
or monarchies, albeit with some particular features. Both the President of 
France and the Bishop of Urgell exercise their roles independently of 
respectively the law of the French state or the authority of the Pope. Their 
roles are identical, notably signing legislative acts and treaties, receiving 
the accreditation of ambassadors, convening elections, etc. They can take 
issues to the constitutional tribunal, but not otherwise hold up legislation 
(for example they cannot request a second reading of a bill).  A special case 
concerns treaties that may be concluded with France or Spain on matters of 
security, defence and juridical and penitentiary cooperation. The Co-
Princes participate in such negotiations through a personal representative, 
and have to agree to the treaty or agreement. 
The parliament of 28 members is elected according to a double 
system, two each from the seven parishes, and the other half from national 
lists. The head of government is nominated by the Co-Princes after election 
by the parliament. Legislation is adopted by the parliament, with an 
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absolute majority of members required for certain domains (e.g. 
nationality, or constitutional matters). The parliament can dismiss the 
government by a motion of censure passed by absolute majority. The 
government can request a vote of confidence, which may be passed by 
simple majority. The head of government can dissolve the parliament by a 
decree signed by the Co-Princes, but without engaging them politically. 
The party political structure is conventional, with two main parties 
inclined respectively to the right (Andorran Liberal Party – PLA) and to the 
left (Social Democratic Party – PS). The Social Democrats were in power 
between 1993 and 1997. The Liberals were holding a majority before the last 
elections in 1995, when they won exactly half the seats in the parliament (14 
out of the 28), with the Social Democrats winning 11 seats, with the balance 
held by two minor parties. The Liberals remain in power. 
The system of justice is now in line with standard European practice. It 
distinguishes civil, penal and administrative categories of litigation. Prison 
sentences are now served in Andorra, rather than France or Spain. There is 
also a constitutional tribunal composed of four magistrates, two nominated 
by the parliament and one each by the Co-Princes. In practice the parliament 
has nominated French and Spanish citizens to the tribunal, thus enhancing 
its neutrality in relation to Andorran politics.    
8.2.4 International relations 
The post-war period soon saw how Andorra’s uncertain constitutional 
status complicated its international affairs. There were negotiations over its 
accession to some relatively technical international conventions in the 1950s 
which raised questions over who represented Andorra. The two Co-Princes 
disagreed between themselves, with France claiming to be the sole 
international representative, with which the Bishop of Urgell could not 
agree. It took until 1973 for an agreement to be reached to have Andorra 
represented in such affairs by members of the Consell General and 
representatives of the two Co-Princes, but tensions remained. 
The Council of Europe became involved in this confused 
international legal environment, notably through the case of a Spaniard 
and a Czech condemned in Andorra in 1986 for armed robbery, who took 
their case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. After long 
dealings the Court finally in 1992 declared itself not competent, the whole 
affair illustrating institutional and juridical confusion over the residual role 
of the Co-Princes and the unsettled international status of Andorra.  40 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
Box 2. Andorra’s participation in international organisations and agencies 
International Criminal Police Organisation 
(Interpol)  Approved 27 November 1987 
UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)  Joined 23 July 1993 
United Nations' Organisation (UNO)  Joined 28 July 1993 
UNESCO  Joined 20 October 1993 
International Telecommunications' Union (UIT)  Joined 12 November 1993 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)  Joined 2 May 1994 
World Organisation for Intellectual Property 
(OMPI) 
Deed of membership deposited 
28 July 1994  
Council of Europe  Joined 10 November 1994 
EUTELSAT 
Deed of membership of 
deposited 2 December 1994 
World Tourist Organisation (OMT)  Joined 17 October 1995.  
European Centre for Living Languages  Joined January-February 1996 
Organisation for European Security and 
Cooperation (OSCE)  Joined 25 April 1996 
International Office for Animal Health (OIE)  Joined 3 January 1997 
World Health Organisation (WHO)  Joined 15 January 1997  
World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Observer status since 22 October 
1997 
International Studies Centre for the Conservation 
and Restoration of Cultural Goods (ICCROM)  Joined 5 June 1998 
Council for Customs Cooperation (CCD)  Joined 3 September 1998 
European Commission for Democracy through 
Law  Joined 1 February 2000 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
Member elected 1 January 2001 
to 2006 
Organisation for International Civil Aviation 
(OACI)  Joined 25 February 2001 
International Criminal Court 
Signed 17 July 1998, ratified on 
30 April 2001 
Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW)  Joined 29 march 2003 
Group of States against corruption (GRECO)  Joined 24 November 2004 
Unión Latina  Joined 21 October 2004 
International Organisation of the Francophonie 
(IOF) 
Associated member since 26 
November 2004 
International Exhibition Bureau (BIE)  Joined 3 December 2004 
Ibero-American Summits 
Entry accepted 20 November 
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In addition, the accession of Spain to the European Communities in 
1986, requiring that Andorra’s customs regime be negotiated and 
regularised with the EC, further pushed in favour of a proper constitutional 
reform. Given Andorra’s uncertain international status the 2000 Customs 
Union agreement between Andorra and the European Economic 
Community (to which we return in more detail later) took the form of an 
‘Exchange of Letters’, implying a less than full legal rank.   
Adoption of the constitutional reform of March 1993 led immediately 
to international recognition as a sovereign state. In June 1993 Andorra 
signed a trilateral state-to-state treaty of ‘good neighbourliness, friendship 
and cooperation’ with France and Spain. In July 1993 Andorran entered the 
United Nations. Between 1994 and 1998, 80 countries established 
diplomatic relations with Andorra.   
Andorra has energetically pursued accession to numerous 
international organisations, amply consolidating its new status as a 
sovereign independent state in international law, as shown in Box 2. The 
politically most significant accessions, after the UN in 1993, were the 
Council of Europe in 1994 and the OSCE in 1996. Potentially the most 
important of these steps operationally is the accession to the Council of 
Europe, coupled with accession to the Conventions on human rights, which 
are subject to the supreme jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights. This removes any remaining doubt over the status of Andorra in 
this legal domain as a conventional European state. 
There have also been some trilateral agreements between Andorra, 
France and Spain, for example concerning the circulation of people, to 
which we return later. The main open question at this stage is if and when 
Andorra may accede as full member to the World Trade Organisation, to 
which it applied in 1997. Andorra is already an observer member, but the 
accession negotiations have been stagnating for some time. In 2002 the 
Andorran government published a detailed analysis of the issues posed by 
WTO accession, prepared by Paul Dembinski.12 The author’s conclusions 
were that WTO accession would only make sense if it was accompanying 
profound structural changes in the Andorran economy and policies, with 
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“the shift from one form of growth to another, accompanied by a radical 
change in the model of society”.13 This leads indeed to our next section. 
8.3  A new century of sustainable development? 
There is little disagreement that Andorra’s economic and population 
growth cannot continue on the same trajectory as in recent decades. There 
is simply not enough space in the valleys for continuing the rate of new 
building, without seriously eroding Andorra’s attractiveness as a tourist 
destination. Monaco has a higher population density, but this is not a 
useful comparison. Monaco is open both to the sea and functionally part of 
the French côte d’azur, whereas Andorra is a virtually isolated mountain 
retreat, which has to preserve the qualities of its natural environment; 
otherwise people will come there less. Already there are signs of stagnation 
if not a small decline in the number of tourists. Problems of traffic 
congestion for the millions of day-tripping tourists are evident. 
It is reported that there are about 5,000 completed apartments which 
are empty to the point of not being connected to the electricity network. 
The current conjunctural crisis of the real estate sector in Spain may also 
weaken the demand also in Andorra for new construction of secondary 
residences and speculative investments in real estate, even if Andorra’s 
banking system is amply covered for possible credit risks. Given the extent 
of over-building in both Spain and Andorra it could take a decade for the 
real estate market to recover buoyant demand. 
The Andorran Chamber of Commerce conducts surveys of business 
sentiment, which in the absence of national macroeconomic accounts give 
the most solid indicators of economic trends. A selection of these indicators 
i s  r e p r o d u c e d  i n  F i g u r e s  3  t o  5 .  I n  general these indicators, of business 
confidence, expected business turnover and employment in the hotel 
sector, were mostly positive until 2001, after which there have been serious 
declines in all sectors, indicating what would presumably be recorded as a 
recession if full economic statistics were available. 
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Figure 3. Industry: Confidence indicator  
 
Note: G-J: January-June; J-D: July-December. 
Source: Cambra de Comerç Indústria i Serveis d’Andorra, Enquestes de conjuntura 
Juliol-desembre 2006, p. 7. 
 
Figure 4. Expected trend of business turnover for the next year 
 
 
Note: Indústria = Industry; Construcció = Building sector; Comerç minorista = Retail 
trade; Hoteleria: Hotel sector. 
Source: Cambra de Comerç Indústria i Serveis d’Andorra, Enquestes de conjuntura 
Juliol-desembre 2006, p. 28. 
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Figure 5. Hotel sector: Employment level compared to the previous year 
 
Note: G-J = January- June; J-D = July-December. 
Source:  Cambra de Comerç Indústria i Serveis d’Andorra, Enquestes de conjuntura 
Juliol-desembre 2006, p. 13. 
It is important to look at these tendencies alongside comparable data 
for the EU economy, especially France and Spain. Normally the business 
cycles of the EU member states move together with a high degree of 
correlation, which of course reflects the high level of mutual economic 
integration. Andorra is also highly open and integrated with the European 
economy, but since the turn of the century its business indicators have 
moved sharply opposite to those for the EU economy, as can be observed in 
Figure 6.  
Figure 6. Economic sentiment indicator: EU, Spain and France 
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Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/business_consumer 
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The EU began the new millennium at a cyclical low point, but has 
since been recovering strongly, with rising buoyancy of economic growth 
and business confidence. During the last five years, therefore there is a 
story of rising business confidence across the EU and a declining trend in 
Andorra. This contrast is an important indication concerning whether the 
adverse trends in Andorra are merely cyclical, thus to last only a few years, 
or structural and possibly to last indefinitely into the future without major 
policy reforms; the evidence is suggesting that Andorra is indeed already 
suffering a structural as well as cyclical recession.  
Moreover permanent pressures from the major economic powers at 
EU and G8 level are crowding in on offshore banking centres and tax 
havens. These pressures are based on four concerns: risks of financial 
instability from poorly regulated financial centres, losses of tax revenue 
because of tax havens, difficulties in combating organised crime at the 
international level, and finally, the new priority since 9/11/2001, to combat 
international terrorism and deprive it of financial means of action. We 
return to these issues in some detail below. 
At this stage one has to note that Andorra is facing a tough set of 
challenges to the status quo, or at least to continuation of the level of 
prosperity achieved over recent decades: these are a combination of the 
environmental, conjunctural, structural and systemic.  
The Andorran government is of course aware of these factors. The 
Head of Government, Albert Pintat, observed in his address to the 
Parliament on 14 June 2007: “The economic conjuncture has ceased to be 
characterised by a comfortable and east optimism”, and to its credit has 
embarked on an initiative to address the challenges under its ‘Andorra 
2020’ programme. This consists of 20 programmatic priorities for the years 
ahead to 2020, aimed at securing a renewal of Andorra’s economic 
comparative advantages and adaptation of its economy to the new 
challenges.14 As set out in Box 3, the programme aims at improving the 
transport infrastructures, developing a more adequate legal environment 
for business, modernising the tax system, upgrading the tourist sector and 
developing new service sector business niches.   
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Box 3. The ‘Andorra 2020’ programme 
Modernising the economic framework of Andorra 
1 Communications & infrastructures plan 
  Road infrastructures, with tunnels and bypasses 
  Road, rail, airport, & heliport connections with France and Spain 
2 Foreign investments Act 
  Specify protected sectors 
  System of exceptions and open zones 
  Foreign investment Bill submitted in August 2006 
3 Reinforcement of the legal framework 
Bills ready: Limited companies, Foreign investment, Business accounting 
  Bills to be prepared: Auditing, Insurance, Commerce, Financial sector 
  Contemplated: Registers, Tax inspectors, Property office 
4 Tax reform 
  Reform multiple indirect taxes in a general tax (VAT type) 
  Corporate tax bill 
 Double  tax  agreements 
  Measures to exclude Andorra from list of tax havens 
5 Employment plan 
  Training and integration of immigrant workers 
 Legal  framework 
Revitalising tourism and commerce 
6 Nature improvement plan 
  Cleaning up visual pollution 
  Develop key nature attractions 
  Maintaining livestock farms 
  Develop mountain refuges, improve mountain paths 
7 Urban improvement plan 
9 Projection of quality poles 
10 Valuation of other poles (high quality leisure) 
11 Trade improvement plan 
12 Tourist quality plan 
13 Brand attraction plan 
14 Tourist promotion campaign 
15 Creation of the Andorra Tourist Agency 
Encouraging the emergence of new sectors 
16 Business plan competition 
17 Entrepreneur support network 
18 New processes to create business 
19 Innovation financing programme 
20 Business sectors with potential 
Source: Govern d’Andorra, Secretaria d’Estat de l’Agencia Andorra 2020. ANDORRA AND THE EU| 47 
 
A highly ambitious, long-term transport infrastructure plan has been 
drawn up for road, rail and airports. The alleviation of congestion in road 
transport is the most advanced, in terms or works underway and planned, 
with an emphasis on building tunnels through the mountains. A first major 
tunnel of 2.8 km. connecting with the French border was completed in 2002. 
In the current period 2003-2008 another major tunnel of 2.9 km is under 
construction together with bypass roads, costing €123 million. From 2008 to 
2015 there will be a further major tunnel of 5.2 km and other bypass roads 
costing €230 million. From 2015 to 2025 another major tunnel and bypass 
roads are planned for an estimated cost of €230 million, and from 2025 to 
2043 there will be further tunnels and roads costing an estimated €275 
million.  
While Andorra has at present no airport, there are plans to 
rehabilitate a disused facility a few kilometres from the Spanish frontier at 
Seu d’Urgell. This project requires the support on the Spanish side from 
both Madrid and the Catalan government in Barcelona, and is the subject of 
ongoing negotiations. There is also a project for a heliport. French and 
Spanish rail networks pass close by Andorra, but without direct 
connections, which however Andorra would like to construct. 
In 2006 the government proposed three laws, a company law, a law 
on the accounts of enterprises and a law for limited liberalisation of foreign 
investment, which are not yet passed by the parliament. These would begin 
to bring Andorra into line with normal European standards, whereas in the 
past there was a conspicuous lack of such legislation. With no corporate 
tax, there was no need for either company law or obligatory accounting 
standards. 
The government has also prepared a plan for the energy sector for 
2005-15, which foresees a diversification of energy supplies and an 
increase in renewable energies to a level of 12% of total energy demand by 
2015.15 It is not the task of the present report to evaluate this programme, 
but rather to note its orientations and relate them to the options for 
Andorra’s European policy to which we will be turning in detail below. 
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We may conclude this chapter with a summary of Andorra’s 
achievements and challenges at the beginning of the new century. In the 
course of the past half century of ‘vertical take-off’, Andorra has succeeded 
convincingly in its political transformation from a quaint historical feature 
into a modern, European, democratic and internationally recognised state. 
It was also extraordinarily successful in transforming a poor mountain 
subsistence economy into one of the world’s richest economies on a per 
capita basis. But now, while the new political structures are very sound and 
essentially complete, the foundations of its economic prosperity are looking 
vulnerable. The ‘exceptions’ that in part drove the economic growth are 
being eroded. At the same time the relationship with the European Union 
is both ambiguous yet becoming more intrusive. As we will see below, the 
options regarding this relationship also relate to the serious economic 
challenges ahead.  
9.  Andorra’s relationship with the EU so far 
9.1  Customs Union Agreement, 1990 
The Customs Union Agreement is based on an ‘Exchange of Letters’ 
between the European Economic Community and the Principality of 
Andorra signed on 28 June 1990 and entering into force on 1 July 1991. The 
agreement establishes a customs union between the EU and Andorra for 
non-agricultural goods (i.e. chapters 25-97 of the harmonised system trade 
nomenclature). The agreement was notified to the World Trade 
Organisation in February 1997, after some debate whether it was 
compatible with WTO rules, which require that customs unions cover 
substantially all trade.  
The Customs Union means essentially that Andorra applies the EEC’s 
common external tariff for imports from third countries, while trade 
between the EEC and Andorra is free of customs duties. Agricultural 
products are subject to import duties, but products with certified Andorran 
origin are exempt from EEC import duties. 
Commercial trade is still subject of course to domestic indirect 
taxation, namely VAT and excises in importing EU member states, and 
various indirect taxes imposed in Andorra. 
Customs posts and controls at the French and Spanish frontiers are 
still in place, with queues at times for personal travellers.  
Andorran excise duties are generally low by EU standards. For 
example a typical packet of cigarettes costs €2.0 in Andorra, €3.2 in Spain ANDORRA AND THE EU| 49 
 
and €5.0 in France. Personal travellers are allowed certain franchises for 
tax-free imports into France and Spain, as indicated in Box 4. These 
franchises are somewhat more generous than those applied by the EU to 
imports from other third countries outside the customs union (e.g. 300 
cigarettes for Andorra, compared to 200 for other countries; 1.5 litres of 
alcohol for Andorra compared to 1 litre for other countries; €525 for other 
goods for Andorra compared to €175 for other countries).  
Given the low level of Andorran excises and indirect taxes, the day 
traveller to Andorra can make some profit, which explains the very large 
commercial sector servicing the 11 million day visitors per year, 78% of 
whom are day-trippers who do not spend a night in Andorra. The visitor 
from France can gain €45 from buying 300 cigarettes in Andorra, and 
correspondingly more if he uses all the franchises allowed. However if he 
travels from the nearest urban centre in France, for example Toulouse 200 
km away, the journey will hardly be very profitable taking into account the 
time spent and travel costs, unless he would have been pursuing other 
tourist attractions at the same time. Coming from Barcelona the benefits 
will be even less. In general price competition in French and Spanish 
supermarkets has also been reducing the competitive advantage of 
Andorran commerce.  
Box 4. Tax-free allowances for individual travellers entering the EU from Andorra 
Agricultural products 
  1000 gr. coffee; 200 gr. tea 
  1.5 lt. of alcoholic drinks; 5 lt. of table wine 
 300  cigarettes 
  Up to €150 of other products (milk, butter, cheese, sugar, meat) 
Industrial products 
  75 gr. perfumes 
  Up to €525 of other industrial goods  
In the past tobacco has been a source of friction. The EU wanted 
tobacco to be included in the Customs Union agreement, but Andorra did 
not. Andorra grows tobacco and has had a substantial cigarette industry. 
Tobacco smuggling into neighbouring France and Spain had a long history 
until quite recently. For many decades small-scale smuggling was a way of 
life for poor people, who hiked across the mountain frontiers with 
backpacks of tobacco and cigarettes as a basic source of income. But there 
was also large-scale industrial contraband. A crisis point was reached in 50 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
1997, when Spanish police guarded all the mountain tracks and paths 
leading into Spain. Andorra took remedial measures, with amendments in 
1999 to the law on customs fraud, making smuggling an offence and fixing 
penalties. The Parliament also adopted a law on control of sensitive goods, 
as well as making changes to the penal code. This problem is now 
considered a matter of past history, and the size of the cigarette industry 
has declined, to the point that one old factory has become a tobacco 
museum as part of the modern tourist infrastructure.  
As part of its anti-money laundering policy the EU introduced in June 
2007 a limit of €10,000 in cash amounts that may be carried by persons 
crossing a frontier into the EU, beyond which declaration is obligatory, 
with penalties in the case of non-compliance. Andorra has been advised by 
the Council of Europe’s Moneyval programme to introduce a €15,000 limit. 
The customs union is generally considered to be functioning well. 
Although there are always some problems, these are solved in a Joint 
Committee of Andorra and the European Commission, which meets once a 
year.  
9.2  Agreement on taxation of savings income, 2004 
Andorra and the EU signed this agreement on the taxation of savings 
income on 15 November 2004, as part of major campaign first of all within 
the EU to curb tax evasion by savers who could place their assets in 
countries of which they were not resident (see Annex C for the text). The 
problem was that various ‘offshore’ financial centres have combined very 
l o w  o r  z e r o  t a x a t i o n  o n  s u c h  i n c o m e  w i t h  a n  a b s e n c e  o f  a g r e e m e n t s  t o  
share information between fiscal authorities. This resulted in major losses 
of tax revenue. Within the EU itself Germany suffered very substantial 
revenue losses through its residents placing savings in Luxembourg. 
Pressure therefore built up among EU finance ministers to introduce a 
harmonised withholding tax and/or to have a system of automatic 
information exchange between fiscal authorities. When these intra-EU 
negotiations became serious, Luxembourg with support from Belgium and 
Austria pointed out that if there was compliance with such measures only 
within the EU the savers could easily transfer their assets to other European 
financial centres, of which Switzerland was the most important, followed 
by several offshore financial centres such as Andorra, Monaco and the 
Channel Islands. Beyond Europe there were other such financial centres, 
such as in the Caribbean.  ANDORRA AND THE EU| 51 
 
Concretely the European Commission adopted in 1997 proposals for 
a tax package, including a code of conduct to eliminate ‘harmful or 
potentially harmful’ business tax regimes and for a minimum withholding 
tax on income from savings. Intense negotiations between member states 
led to two conclusions.  
First, the Council opted for a regime based on the automatic exchange 
of information between fiscal authorities from 2004, although for a 
transitional period of seven years up to 2010 three member states (Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg) were authorised to rely on withholding taxes. 
All newly acceding states were obliged to introduce the regime for 
automatic exchange of information, with no transitional option. The 
automatic exchange of information could be combined with a withholding 
tax, which many countries have chosen to do, but the information exchange 
element became the primary obligation, subject only to the transitional 
regime for the three EU member states. Second, the EU’s law would only be 
passed into effect after comparable measures would be agreed and 
implemented in five European non-member states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland). In addition EU member states 
concerned “commit themselves to promote the adoption of the same 
measures in all dependent or associated territories (the Channel Islands, 
Isle of Man, and the dependent and associated territories in the 
Caribbean”.16  
Andorra and the other European non-member states have all 
basically copied the transitional regime adopted by the EU three (Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg), i.e. a withholding tax accompanied by only a 
voluntary information exchange regime which individuals can choose 
instead of a withholding tax. 
The main operating provisions of the agreement are: 
    Andorra will establish the identity and country of residence of the 
beneficial owner of the assets. 
  It will levy a withholding tax on interest payments of 15% in the first 
three years, 20% in the following three years, and 35% thereafter. 
                                                      
16 Conclusions of the European Council meeting at Feira of 19-29 June 2000.  52 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
  75% of the withholding tax revenues will be transferred to the EU 
country of residence of the beneficiary of the income, with 25% retained 
by Andorra. 
  Individuals may voluntarily opt to disclose information to the tax 
authorities of his country of residence, and then be exempt from the 
withholding tax. 
  The EU member state of the beneficial owner will ensure elimination of 
double taxation, by granting a tax credit of the amount of the 
withholding tax. 
  Exchange of information is mandatory where a requesting state (i.e. EU 
member state or Andorra) has reasonable grounds for suspecting 
criminal tax fraud. 
  The agreement only enters into force on condition that the other states 
and associated or dependent territories (referred to above) do the same. 
The Agreement is marking a number of important points for the 
future of Andorra’s relations with the EU. 
This is a first example where the EU virtually imposed its own policy 
collectively on all of Europe’s very small non-member states and entities. 
From a formal standpoint these were negotiations that led to agreement, 
yet agreement was reached only because the EU’s partners felt the pressure 
could not be resisted. 
The agreement with Andorra and the other European sovereign 
states is likely to be subject to a request by the EU for re-negotiation when 
the present transitional period (for the three EU member states) runs out in 
2010. It can be expected that the EU will seek agreement for the automatic 
exchange of information. Switzerland can be expected to lead the 
opposition, and it remains a matter for speculation how this will turn out. 
However Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man have already 
agreed to automatic information exchange.   
Andorra took the occasion of the negotiations over this agreement to 
make several counter requests: for rights of passage at Schengen frontiers, a 
Cooperation Agreement (which was agreed on the same day), right to mint 
euro coins, etc. This is suggesting a dynamic mode of interaction with the 
EU, whereby if one party presses for an agreement meeting its interests the 
other party may introduce other unrelated requests for bargaining a wider 
package. This is a pointer therefore in the direction of multi-sectoral 
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9.3  The Cooperation Agreement, 2004   
This agreement was signed at the same time as that on the taxation of 
savings, and was the result of requests from Andorra for more positive 
measures, bearing in mind the costs for it of the taxation agreement. It was 
hoped that the Cooperation Agreement would open up a wide range of 
activities, as can be seen from its several chapter headings: 
(a)  Environment. Andorra will endeavour to adopt environmental 
standards equivalent to those of the EU. There is in fact a process of 
aligning new laws and regulations on EU standards. The agreement 
foresees a study on the feasibility of opening EC environmental 
programmes for Andorran participation, and cooperation with the 
European Environment Agency. The specific issue of transfer and disposal 
of Andorran waste is mentioned, which is a problem for Spain.  
(b) Communication, information and culture. It is agreed to undertake 
joint projects in this area, with specific reference to Pyrenean architectural 
and cultural heritage and the Catalan language. One idea is for a cross-
border project in relation to Romanesque architectural monuments, where 
Andorra shares a fine endowment alongside neighbouring regions.  
(c) Education, vocational training and youth. It was agreed to study the 
feasibility of Andorra participating in EC programmes in this field, but this 
had not yet materialised. Andorra is not officially part of the important 
Erasmus programme for exchange studies of university students.  However  
in practice Andorran students in French and Spanish universities are able 
to participate in Erasmus projects on a personal basis.   
(d) Social and health issues. There is a provision to avoid discrimination 
against workers on grounds of nationality. However there is no mention 
for Andorra to converge on EC labour market and social policy acquis. 
(e) Trans-European networks and transport.  It is intended to study 
projects of common interest, and there is concrete Andorran interest 
establishing a joint airport at Seu d’Urgell, and railway connections on the 
French side. These ideas are not yet operational, and depend on decisions 
on the Spanish and French sides.   
(f) Regional policy.  The parties agreed to step up cross-border, 
transnational and inter-regional cooperation. The specific idea is mentioned 
of promoting a cross-border regional project for the Pyrenees comparable 
to that developed in the Alps. Subsequent to the signing of the Cooperation 
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Development Fund for 2007-2013 include an article of potential interest to 
Andorra regarding cross-border cooperation, including regions of third 
countries.  
The relevant article reads:  
In the context of cross-border, transnational and interregional 
cooperation, the ERDF may finance expenditure incurred in 
implementing operations or parts of operations on the territory of 
countries outside the European Community up to a limit of 10% 
of the amount of its contribution to the operating programme 
concerned and where they are for the benefit of the regions of the 
Community.17 
Thus Andorra, as a third country, could participate in cross-border 
programmes sponsored by the Pyrenean regions of France and Spain if 
these two member states agreed this to be beneficial, with a maximum of 
10% of the programme spent in Andorra without an Andorran financial 
contribution. There are also cases of projects where non-member states join 
in cross-border Regional Fund projects, but make agreements with the EU 
to pay themselves for the expenditures in their country, while the Regional 
Fund finances the part of the project within the EU regions (Sweden-
Norway, France-Switzerland). Where the non-member states are rich, it is 
not to be expected that use of the 10% provision will be agreed on a large 
scale, but that negotiations would take place over specific contributions by 
the third country. 
There is in fact a regional organisation capable of advancing projects 
of the highest interest to Andorra, the Communauté de Travail des 
Pyrénées (CTP). Andorra is a member of the CTP, although not yet a 
member of its operational Consortium, which has been formed to manage 
projects operationally and to secure funding (see Box 5). The CTP’s 
domains of interest largely coincide with the sectoral chapters of 
Cooperation Agreement. This suggests t h a t  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  E U ’ s  
current financial period 2007-2013 there could be activation of various 
chapters of the Cooperation Agreement through cross-border regional 
projects, e.g. for infrastructures, environment, culture, health, etc. The 
priorities for Pyrenean cross-border cooperation for the period 2007-2013 
were presented to the European Commission in June 2007, with multiple 
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projects concerning transport infrastructures, research for SMEs, IT 
technologies, renewable energies, environmental projects, labour market 
and human capital formation measures. 
In 2005 the CTP created a Consortium, which has legal personality, 
and competence to manage projects that could be funded by the EU and the 
governments of participating states. For the time being Andorra is not a 
member of this consortium for various formal legal reasons, but a solution 
is currently being sought to allow this.   
Box 5. Communauté de Travail des Pyrénées (CTP)  
The CTP has eight participating territories:  
•  Andorra 
•  French regions of Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées and Languedoc-
Roussillon 
•  Spanish regions of Aragon, Catalonia, Euskadi (Basque) and 
Navarra  
The organisation was initiated in 1983, and now has a structure 
consisting of a leadership, a secretariat (provided by Catalonia) and four 
sectoral commissions for: 
•  Infrastructure and transport  
•  Training and technological development 
•  Culture Youth and Sport 
•  Sustainable development.   
  (g) Institutional provisions.  The agreement is administered by a 
Cooperation Committee, composed of a high official of the European 
Commission and the Foreign Minister of Andorra, with alternating 
chairmanship. The Cooperation Committee meets annually. The agreement 
runs for an unlimited period. Disputes over implementation of the 
agreement are to be submitted to the Committee, but none have arisen so 
far.  
In general the Cooperation Agreement, while functioning correctly 
from a formal and procedural standpoint, is considered to have been 
disappointing on the Andorran side. The European Commission remarks 
that Andorra might come up with proposals. The agreement established a 
quite extensive possible agenda, but with no directly operational or binding 
content. The several chapter headings have seen little activity develop as a 
result.  56 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
Map 2. Andorra & the Pyrenean regions of France & Spain 
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9.4  Towards an Andorran euro  
Before the euro, both the French franc and Spanish peseta were used in 
Andorra. The euro became the new currency of Andorra from the time that 
the franc and peseta were withdrawn on 1 January 2002.  
Andorra does not yet mint its own Andorran euro, unlike Monaco, 
San Marino and the Vatican. Andorra has entered into discussions with the 
European Commission with a view to making a monetary agreement with 
the EU for coining euro and other monetary policy issues. These 
discussions are not yet at a conclusive stage. However the other three cases 
that have seen monetary agreements provide information on possible 
conditions for Andorra and the EU also to reach agreement.18 
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In all three cases (Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican) the euro is 
the official currency with legal tender status granted to all euro banknotes 
and coins (i.e. including euro coin minted by other states). They shall not 
issue any banknotes, coins or surrogates unless on conditions agreed with 
the EU.  
Coins may be minted for maximum face value annually of €1 million 
in the case of the Vatican, €1,944,000 for San Marino, and for Monaco 
1/500th of the quantity minted by the Banque of France. Euro collector 
coins may also be produced but their face value is to be included in the 
amounts indicated, and these coins shall not be legal tender.  
Regulatory requirements include in all cases the application of 
Community rules applicable to euro banknotes and coins. The three states 
agree to cooperate with the EC on measures against counterfeiting, and to 
suppress and punish counterfeiting in their territories.  
Further provisions applicable only to Monaco are of likely interest to 
Andorra, since both states have banking and financial sectors of 
significance. Monaco shall apply the measures adopted by France to 
implement EC acts regulating credit institutions and payment and security 
settlement systems; and also measures equivalent to EC member states 
regarding investment compensation schemes, and the EC’s money 
laundering directive.19 
The three states also have access to the payments system of the euro 
area, in Monaco on the same conditions as for financial institutions located 
in France, and in the case of San Marino and the Vatican on conditions 
determined by the Banca d’Italia and the European Central Bank. 
The Andorran Ministry of Finance intends to re-launch discussion 
with the European Commission after they have progressed with five pieces 
of legislation, which will prepare the ground in terms of Andorra’s 
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transposed into the law of Monaco covers monetary operations, minimum 
reserves, other monetary instruments, penalties/sanctions, statistics, credit 
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regulation, payments and settlement systems, prevention of systemic risks in 
payment and settlement systems, the fight against fraud and money laundering. 
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regulatory policies regarding various types of financial institutions and 
instruments.20  
Overall the possible way ahead seems to be quite clearly marked out. 
Andorra could well make a monetary agreement with the EC in due 
course, with benefits from the minting of coins and access to the euro 
payments system, on conditions that would bring Andorra’s regulation of 
financial institutions into line with established euro-area standards.  
9.5  Schengen cooperation and the European area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice 
Given its virtually open frontiers with France and Spain, and no airport, 
Andorra is de facto part of the Schengen space. No citizen of a non-EU state 
can enter Andorra without first satisfying the Schengen visa requirements, 
if any, applied by France and Spain. In these circumstances Andorra issues 
no visas of any kind. Third country nationals wishing to visit Andorra need 
a multi-entry Schengen visa, since to leave Andorra they must enter a 
second time into the Schengen space. 
According to a Convention adopted by Andorra, France and Spain in 
2000,21 Andorra agreed to coordinate its visa policy with that of the 
Schengen area. However this remains a theoretical provision with Andorra 
retaining the right to impose visa requirements on non-EU citizens, but not 
so far making use of it.  
Andorra has been concerned by its citizens encountering delays by 
being required to pass through the ‘rest of the world’ corridor at EU 
external border crossings, rather than being able to use the privileged 
corridor reserved for EU, EEA and Swiss citizens. In 2004 the EU agreed to 
meet Andorra’s concern, and now allows that “citizens of Andorra and San 
                                                      
20 These concern laws on minimum capital requirements for financial investment 
entities and for non-banking financial/credit entities, on regulation of collective 
investment organisms, asset management activity and the creation of new non-
banking financial/credit entities. 
21  Convention entre la Republique francaise, le Royaume d’Espagne et la Principauté 
d’Andorra relative a la circulation et au séjour en Principauté d’Andorre des ressortissants 
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Marino may use EU corridors at external borders of the member states 
applying the relevant provisions of the Schengen acquis”.22 
However the same document underlined that any relaxation of 
border checks going beyond the above approach would have to be “subject 
to the conclusion with Andorra and San Marino of an agreement on the free 
movement of citizens, as is the case for the EEA countries and 
Switzerland”. 
The EU position is thus that the EEA states and Switzerland have 
entered into much more far-reaching commitments with the EU than 
Andorra regarding the free movement of persons and the conditions for 
foreign workers on the Andorran labour market.  
If the project to build a joint airport at Seu d’Urgell close to the 
Andorran frontier goes ahead, there could be issues of arranging a special 
access corridor into Andorra, rather like Basle and Geneva airports shared 
by France and Switzerland. This would require a specific agreement related 
to Schengen rules, but the project itself is still a long way off a decision 
point on the Spanish side. 
For the EU the Schengen system is part of a much vaster agenda for 
the Common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which has been the 
fastest growing field of EU legislation in recent years. The priorities set out 
by the European Commission for the five years from 2005 may be 
summarised as follows:23 
  Monitoring and promoting respect for the fundamental rights of 
people, and enhancing European citizenship; 
  Fighting against terrorism in the global context; 
  Establishing a common asylum area, with harmonised procedures in 
accordance with the EU’s values; 
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of Andorra and San Marino, 13020/1/04, Rev 1, 6 October 2004. 
23 European Commission, Communication on The Hague programme: Ten 
priorities for the next five years. The partnership for European renewal in the field 
of freedom, security and justice, COM(2005)184 final, 10 December 2005. See also T. 
Balzacq and S. Carrera, Migration, Borders and Asylumn – Trends and Vulnerabilities 
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  Defining a balanced approach to migration, maximising the positive 
impact of legal migration, and with strengthened measures against 
illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings; 
  Developing an integrated management of the external borders of the 
Union, with a common visa regime, while ensuring the free movement 
of peoples; 
  Striking the right balance between safeguarding privacy and sharing 
information among law enforcement and judicial authorities; 
  Developing a strategic concept for combating organised crime and 
  Guaranteeing a European are of justice, building mutual trust and 
mutual recognition in judicial cooperation. 
This long list of objectives is not going to be achieved overnight, and 
indeed the agenda will need more than five years. However the scale of 
these activities in the linked fields of border and migration management, 
crime prevention and the fight against global terrorism represents a 
fundamental development for the European project, ultimately on a scale 
comparable in political importance to the economic and monetary union. 
Given Andorra’s virtually open borders with the EU, there will be the 
closest attention paid to ensuring that Andorra is not in any way a haven 
for any of the several categories of illegal activity – be it illegal migration, 
crime or terrorism. This whole area therefore presents an inevitable agenda 
for deep cooperation between Andorra and the EU in the years to come.  
9.6  Political dialogue 
Andorra, as a member state of the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe, has a 
voice and vote in these organisations. Its foreign minister wishes to have 
adequate means to discuss with EU opposite numbers foreign policy issues 
of common concern. The EU has a system for associating certain 
neighbouring states with the declarations on foreign policy issues regularly 
made by the Council of foreign ministers. The countries concerned at 
present are the candidate states, other Balkan countries, and certain Eastern 
European neighbours such as Ukraine. The procedure for this is that after 
Council meetings at which declarations have been adopted, the texts are 
circulated to the agreed list of neighbouring countries, which have a short 
period to indicate whether they wish to be associated or not with each 
specific declaration. No formal procedu res of this kind h a v e been ma de 
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10.  How exceptional is Andorra? 
In 2005 a report was prepared for the Andorran Head of Government by 
Michel Camdessus.24 This report addressed the ways in which Andorra 
was still an exception in relation to the predominant European norms of 
economic and monetary policy, and asked in what degree these exceptions 
might be sustained in the future, concluding with recommendations that 
Andorra should aim at the paradigm of the ‘exemplary’ rather than the 
‘exceptional’.  
Such issues are highly relevant to the present report in addressing the 
future relations between Andorra and the EU. For any state to be very 
closely integrated with the EU, be it full membership or something close to 
that, there arises the question whether its laws and policies are compatible 
with those of the EU; or in Brussels terminology whether they are 
consistent with the acquis communautaire. To the extent that the 
neighbouring state’s laws and policies are not compatible, the state has to 
assess the costs and benefits of remaining non-compatible. Such an 
assessment has to include whether the ‘exceptions’ are in any case 
sustainable in the light of underlying developments in the world economy 
and the realities of European integration. Or, put in another way, it may be 
asked whether the optimal degree of ‘exception’ for the state in question 
may be changing over time as a function of factors that are beyond its 
control.     
Of course a non-member state has no general obligation to make itself 
compatible with the EU acquis communautaire. All options are open in 
principle to the independent sovereign state. Moreover the EU never takes 
the initiative to request or even invite non-member states to apply for 
membership; it even tends more to the contrary position of discouraging 
applications, being worried about the institutional problems posed by the 
continuously expanding membership.  
In the present context there are four sets of Andorran ‘exceptions’ to 
be considered, which concern taxation and the public finances, the 
regulation of financial market, and the free movement of capital and 
labour. 
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10.1   Taxation & public services 
Andorra remains a very low tax state, with zero direct personal income tax 
and zero direct corporate income tax. Its total tax burden is 18.6% of GDP 
or well under half the EU average. The lowest tax burdens within the EU 
are seen in Latvia (28.7%) and Ireland (31.2%).  
There is no harmonisation of personal income tax in the EU. It has no 
legal basis to influence the personal income tax, and there seem to be little 
or no prospects of this changing. Such steps would require unanimity of all 
member states, which today is virtually inconceivable. 
Table 8. General government tax revenues as % GDP 
Country      % of GDP 
Andorra     18.6 
EU-25   41.5 
France   45.7 
Spain   36.5 
Ireland   31.2 
Malta   34.2 
Latvia     28.7 
Source: Standard & Poors, A Survey of Credit Ratings on Small European Sovereigns, 
October 2005 (Andorran data for 2002); Eurostat, Statistics in Focus – Tax revenues in 
EU Member States, No 3/2005 (EU data for 2003).  
The situation for corporate taxes is more complicated. There is no 
harmonisation of corporate tax so far, but there are proposals being 
prepared by the Commission for a harmonisation of the corporate tax base, 
without harmonising tax rates. This proposal is opposed by some member 
states, which leads to another idea that a group of member states, acting 
under the ‘reinforced cooperation procedure’ of the treaties, might adopt a 
harmonised tax base, for example the members of the eurozone. Many 
independent economists have sympathy for this proposal, since it would 
lower the cost of accounting for companies with multinational operations 
in Europe and provide for greater transparency for companies assessing 
different investment locations.25 
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However the EU is already active on the question of corporate tax 
rates, out of concern for fair conditions of competition. Ireland had for 
many years a regime of very long corporate tax grace periods for new 
investments. The Commission put pressure on Ireland to levy a significant 
corporate tax in order to ensure something of a level playing field from the 
standpoint of competition for investment. Ireland now has a regular 
corporate tax of 12.5%. Cyprus has acceded to the EU with a 10% corporate 
tax, which is now the lowest rate in the EU. Estonia has an unusual 
corporate tax system, with a zero rate for retained earnings, but a 26% tax 
on distributed dividends. However this system is the subject of concern for 
the EU on grounds of breaching competition policy rules, and is the subject 
of ongoing discussions between Estonia and the Commission. In general 
there are serious competitive pressures in the direction of driving down 
corporate tax rates, led by some of the new member states, and followed by 
some Balkan non-member states such as Montenegro (9%). Overall one can 
say that the EU has more or less established 10% as a minimum corporate 
tax rate standard, even if this has not been explicitly legislated. 
The government of Andorra is preparing legislation to introduce a 
corporate tax, for which it might choose a rate similar to the minimum 
already seen in the EU, such as in Cyprus and Ireland; in which case this 
Andorran ‘exception’ will be eliminated.    
The EU has adopted legislation on the taxation of income from 
savings. At the insistence of Luxembourg, with support from Austria and 
Belgium, the conclusion of the savings directive became politically 
dependent on reaching agreement with European non-member states 
specialising in low tax offshore financial centres. This led to the 2004 
agreement with Andorra, which eases a further ‘exception’, but we must 
return to this in more detail below.  
The EU has long had a harmonised value-added tax, and this system 
has become a general standard throughout Europe. The government of 
Andorra prepares an indirect tax reform, under which the present set of 
multiple indirect taxes would be rationalised in a single consolidated 
system, but it is not yet evident whether this would be an EU-type value-
added tax. The EU has established minimum harmonised rates of 15% for 
the standard rate, 5% for a reduced rate, and in addition some member 
states have agreements to apply a zero rate for some commodities.  
The EU has also established harmonised minimum rates of excise 
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excise duties and VAT should not be less than 57% of the retail selling 
price; for petrol the minimum is €421 per thousand litres; and for the 
minimum for alcohol is €550 per hundred litres of pure alcohol. Andorra’s 
rates for cigarettes and alcohol are notably lower. 
The absence so far of any direct taxation has led France and Spain to 
levy severe fiscal penalties against Andorra’s service-sector suppliers, 
corporate or individual persons, who invoice from Andorra services 
supplied to French or Spanish clients. The penalties amount to 33% of the 
invoiced amount in France and 25% in Spain, and thus make it extremely 
difficult for Andorrans to be competitive. This is a serious problem in 
relation to the important objective of the Andorran government to develop 
new service sector activities, as set out in the ‘Andorra 2020’ programme. 
The Andorran head of government indicated in his speech of 14 June 2007 
that an objective of the proposed tax reforms was to persuade the French 
and Spanish governments to lift these penalties. 
There is also the broader political question how the EU may view a 
very low tax neighbour. On several accounts there can be no objections. For 
example there can be no objections to Andorra’s low tax burden because it 
does not need or want to have expensive military forces, or because it may 
function with a very lean public administration. However other features 
cause more concern, principally the loss of tax revenue through the use of 
offshore tax haven facilities. Also in the case of Andorra the extreme 
flexibility of the Andorran labour market, without an unemployment 
benefit scheme, prompts the concern that it tends to export to the countries 
supplying migrant labour the burden of social assistance when labour 
demand weakens.  
The EU is working with the international community on policies 
towards low tax jurisdictions, as in the case of the OECD which has 
established a Forum on Harmful Tax Practices. This work does not seek to 
dictate to any country what its tax rates should be, but to support fair tax 
competition, so as to minimise tax induced distortions of financial flows 
and investment. The OECD member states agreed in 1998 to act collectively 
to eliminate harmful tax regimes within the OECD area. It published its 
definition of harmful tax practices under four main categories: 
  Zero or low effective tax rates 
  Lack of transparency 
  Lack of effective exchange of information and 
  Preferential tax regimes for offshore activities insulated (‘ring-fenced’) 
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In 2000 the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs applied these criteria 
in detail to all OECD member states (but not to non-member states such as 
Andorra) and identified 47 preferential tax regimes in categories 
considered potentially harmful (insurance, financing and leasing, fund 
managers, banking, headquarter regimes, distribution centre regimes, 
service centre regimes). To give an indication of actual trends in policies, in 
its 2004 Progress Report on harmful tax practices the OECD noted that of 
the 47 cases initially identified, 18 had been or were being abolished, 14 had 
been amended to eliminate harmful features and 13 were found upon 
further analysis not to be harmful.26   
The OECD has also since 2000 extended its work beyond its member 
states, in establishing its ‘Global Forum on Taxation’. This involves analysis 
of the tax policies of 82 jurisdictions world-wide. ‘Participating Partner’ 
states and entities have committed themselves to the principles of effective 
exchange of information and transparency. These ‘cooperative’ non-OECD 
member states and entities number 33 in all, and in Europe included 
Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Malta and San Marino; 
but not Andorra. A number of these ‘Participating Partners’ of the OECD 
worked together to develop a Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on 
Tax Matters.27 The Model Agreement covers information exchange for both 
civil and criminal tax matters. Parties adopting the Model Agreement must 
provide information requested even if the country receiving the request 
does not need the information for its own tax purposes. They must further 
have the authority to obtain information held by banks and other financial 
institutions.  
The OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs has published since 2000 
“List(s) of Uncooperative Tax Havens”,28 which are those states and entities 
which have declined the invitation to j o i n  t h e  O E C D  G l o b a l  F o r u m  o n  
Taxation, or to make commitments for the exchange of information and 
transparency. Andorra has neither joined in this OECD Forum nor 
subscribed to the Model Agreement. The list of ‘uncooperative tax havens’ 
identified by the OECD has become  shorter over time, and currently 
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consists of three jurisdictions: Andorra, Liechtenstein and Monaco. The 
OECD indicates that it would welcome dialogue with these jurisdictions 
and the prospect of their accession to the Model Agreement.  
The OECD’s most recent report on tax cooperation, of 2006, includes 
comprehensive information on all 82 states and entities, listing compliance 
or non-compliance with elements in the Model Tax Agreement.29 Of the 82 
jurisdictions reviewed, Andorra is one of 11 that have no tax information 
agreements (i.e. either double tax agreements, or tax information exchange 
agreements). Of the same 82 jurisdictions, Andorra is one of only four that 
apply the principle of dual incrimination (in both requesting and requested 
country) to admit information exchange on tax matters.  
Table 9. OECD criteria for transparency and information exchange in tax matters  
  Andorra  Other 82 countries/ entities 
A. Exchanging information on 
taxation 
  
A.1 Number of Double Taxa-
tion Conventions and Tax 
Information Exchange 
Agreements 
Zero  10 of 82 countries/entities 
have no such agreements 
A.3 Application of dual 
criminality principle 
Yes  4 of 82 countries/entities 
apply this principle 
B. Access to bank information     
B.1 Bank secrecy reinforced by 
statute 
Yes  60 out of 82 reinforce bank 
secrecy 
C. Access to ownership, identity 
and accounting information 
  
C.2 Statutory confidentiality 
provisions restricting disclosure 
Yes  30 out of 82 restrict 
disclosure 
D. Availability of ownership, 
identity and accounting 
information 
  
D.1 Domestic trust law  No  53 out of 82 have such laws 
Source: OECD, 2006, op. cit. See Annex G below for a complete listing of the OECD 
criteria.  
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As Table 9 shows, on other accounts Andorra has much more 
company, such as over the reinforcement of bank secrecy and 
confidentiality provisions. Moreover Andorra has no domestic trust law, 
which in many offshore jurisdictions provides the legal basis for 
controversial transactions.  
Overall one can say that Andorra is preparing several steps in the 
direction of reducing or in some cases eliminating Andorra’s fiscal 
‘exceptions’, but there is likely to be continuing external pressures for a 
higher degree of conformity with European and international standards. 
However these pressures will not go as far as preventing Andorra from 
remaining a low tax jurisdiction.  
It is evident that there is considerable momentum behind the 
international community’s efforts to curb harmful tax practices, including 
the issue of information exchange. Many low tax jurisdictions, beyond 
O E C D  m e m b e r  s t a t e s ,  h a v e  j o i n e d  i n  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  O E C D ’ s  G l o b a l  
Forum on Taxation. It can only be expected that the number of OECD 
designated ‘uncooperative tax havens’ will get smaller, and the pressures 
on those few remaining will increase. 
10.2  Financial services  
Andorra has developed a substantial offshore banking sector. In recent 
years the international community has become increasingly concerned with 
offshore financial centres, seeking to bring them into closer compliance 
with the standards of major world financial markets. There have been 
multiple initiatives, decided at the highest level, involving all the major 
international organisations and forums (G-7 Summits, IMF, OECD, EU, 
Council of Europe, Bank for International Settlements), which set the 
external environment in relation to which Andorra has to define its future 
policies.  
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was established by the 
supervisory authorities of mainly OECD countries in 1999, with the aim of 
strengthening international financial supervisory standards. It has a base at 
the Bank for International Settlements in Basle. It has created a Working 
Group on Offshore Financial Centres, intended to help offshore financial 
centres come into line with international  standards of regulation, 
supervision, disclosure and information-sharing. Following endorsement 
by the G-7 at their Okinawa Summit meeting in July 2000, the IMF was 
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As a result the IMF has conducted two detailed reviews of Andorra’s 
financial markets, the second published in February 2007.30 The banking 
sector was summarised as in Table 10.  
Table 10. Andorra: Banking system ownership structure, as of December 2005 
(millions of euro) 
 
The data relate to 2005, but there have been some important changes 
in bank ownership, with the two main sources of Spanish participation sold 
in 2006 to Andorran interests. The financial services sector has grown to 
15% of GDP and employs 1,523 persons (3.6% of all employment). This is 
also the highest paid sector in the economy, with salaries above twice the 
national average.31 The financial system consists of 7 banks, 1 specialised 
credit institution, 7 collective investment entities, 4 wealth management 
companies and 28 insurance companies, 15 of which are branches of foreign 
insurance companies. Total bank assets and deposits amounted in 2005 to 
€11.3 and €9.3 billion, respectively. About €2.7 billion of loans were 
extended to non-residents.  
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The banks are highly profitable, capitalised and liquid, and according 
to the IMF “far above” the minimum requirements of the standard (Basel I) 
prudential requirements.32 For the banking system as a whole the capital 
adequacy ratio (minimum capital to risk weighted assets) was 28.8% in 
2005, compared to the 10% minimum. The ratio of liquid assets in relation 
to short-term liabilities was 66.2% compared to the minimum 40% required.  
Comparison may be made between statistics of bank deposits per 
capita of Andorra and relevant countries, as in Table 11. Although data on 
non-resident bank deposits in Andorra are not so far available, Andorra 
has evidently developed a significant offshore banking business, with 
deposits per capita about six times the levels found in France and Spain. 
However, its score is relatively modest by comparison with Liechtenstein (4 
times higher still), Monaco (12 times higher) and Jersey (20 times higher). 
Table 11. Bank deposits per capita in Andorra and six other jurisdictions 
  Bank deposits 
(millions of euro) 
Population  Bank deposits per 
capita resident 
population (euro) 
France 2005  1,225,577  60, 500,000  20,257 
Spain 2005  976,176  43,060,000  22,670 
Switzerland 2005  320,213  7,250,000  44,137 
Andorra 2005  9,289  75,000  123,853 
Liechtenstein 2001  19,300  32,491  594,010 
Monaco 2005  19,780  29,972  659,949 
Jersey 2002  210,618  85,200  2,472,044 
The financial sector is supervised by the Institut Nacional Andorra de 
Finances (INAF), which is an independent public body established in 1993. 
The legal environment has been under constant development since then, 
with new draft laws pending on company establishment, accounting, 
auditing, fiduciary and prudential duties, business conduct and market 
disclosure and supervision.  
While the IMF recognises Andorra’s high level of compliance with 
the basic international (Basel I) standards, its reports contain detailed 
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proposals for further improvements.33 For example it is recommended that 
INAF have greater powers, independent of the government, to undertake 
all types of remedial action, including suspension of bank licenses. The staff 
of INAF needs to be strengthened. A formal agreement on cooperation with 
the banking authorities of Spain is desirable. Accounting standards need 
revision to be brought into line with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), as used in all major European financial centres. Details of 
the IMF’s recommendations, together with the responses of the Andorran 
authorities, are given in Annex G below.  
The life insurance sector in Andorra has grown with a big jump in 
gross premiums in 2005 to €1,758 million, from only €61 million in 2004. 
This was due to the beginning of the retention by Andorra of EU taxes on 
income from savings. As a result there was a tendency for EU customers of 
Andorran banks to move into other financial instruments not covered by 
the EU directive. This is illustrating the difficulty of partial attempts to 
regulate and tax financial markets, and suggests that there may be more 
extensive requests put by the EU in due course. The IMF notes the need for 
proper regulation of Andorra’s insurance sector, which should be 
supervised by INAF.34 The EU in 2007 has adopted new proposals for risk-
based regulatory standards, known as ‘Solvency II’, intended to set an 
international benchmark for regulation of the insurance sector. 
The EU is engaged in a huge programme of harmonisation and 
integration of its entire range of financial markets. Its Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) was initiated in 1999, with proposals for 42 measures, 
with the following broad characteristics: 
  Accounting and auditing, 6 measures, 2 of which are legislative 
  Banking and financial conglomerates, 3 measures, all legislative  
  Company law and corporate governance, 3 measures, 1 of which is 
legislative 
  Financial markets infrastructure, 3 measures 1 of which is legislative 
  Insurance and pensions, 6 measures, 4 of which are legislative 
  Securities markets, 1 legislative 
  Retail financial services and payments, 8 measures, 2 of which are 
legislative 
  Securities and investment funds, 7 measures, 5 of which are legislative 
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  Taxation, 1 legislative. 
By 2005 this programme was 98% adopted by the legislative or 
policy-making institutions of the EU. Of the measures 24 are directives, 
meaning that the member states have to proceed with their transposition 
into national implementing regulations, which as of today remains work in 
progress. The EEA member states (Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway) are 
also implementing this programme in full, as also Guernsey, Gibraltar, 
Jersey and the Isle of Man.   
A further initiative relevant to Andorra, given its use of the euro as its 
currency, is the EU’s proposed Payments Services Directive, which will lay 
the foundation for the Single European Payments Area. This will create a 
single market for electronic payments, including credit transfers and direct 
debit and card payments. It is intended to make cross-border payments as 
easy as national transactions, and also to intensify competition among 
banks and non-banking institutions to enhance quality and reduce costs. 
This Single European Payments Area will add a certain number of further 
regulatory requirements. Liechtenstein and Monaco are already preparing 
to join this initiative. 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering was 
set up by the G-7 Summit at its meeting in Paris in 1989. It is serviced by a 
unit in the OECD, and published 40 recommendations in 1990, which have 
become the international benchmark for money laundering legislation. The 
FATF established four regional groups, with Europe entrusted to the 
‘Moneyval’ committee of the Council of Europe, and which is concerned 
with anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of 
terrorism (CFT). Moneyval has undertaken three evaluations of Andorra.35 
The first report in 1999 expressed a positive overall impression concerning 
Andorra’s anti-money laundering regime, but noted concerns over the 
bank secrecy law which restricts responses to foreign authorities’ requests 
for information and allows the existence of numbered bank  accounts. 
Furthermore, it was noted that there were no provisions sanctioning failure 
to declare suspicions as criminal offences. The second report in 2002 
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welcomed progress made since the first report, for example legislation 
requiring the identification of clients and adopting a more open definition 
of suspicion.  The report recommended measures concerning cash 
operations exceeding €15,000. It remained concerned by the continued use 
of numbered bank accounts, and noted that only two cases of money 
laundering had been subject to condemnations, due to an excessively strict 
burden of proof. The third evaluation is in the course of being completed in 
2007. On the basis of preliminary results the IMF reported that progress 
was continuing, with need still for further improvements.36  
The EU’s current directive on prevention of money laundering and 
terrorist financing was adopted in October 2005. The importance attached 
to this is evidenced by the directive’s first recital: “Massive flows of dirty 
money can damage the stability of the financial sector and threaten the 
single market, and terrorism shakes the very foundations of our society.” 
The directive requires member states to forward information regarding 
suspected money laundering or terrorist financing to other member states 
concerned. 
Overall Andorra is steadily moving towards fuller conformity with 
international standards, while the official international bodies concerned 
are keeping all offshore financial centres under systematic, regular and 
detailed surveillance. At the same time the pace of regulatory reform at the 
European and global levels is accelerating. It has to be expected that 
Andorra’s degrees of ‘exception’ in the areas of supervision of financial 
institutions will be under increasing pressure, from market pressures as 
well as official policies, to converge on European and/or international 
standards.  
10.3  Capital movements 
Foreign direct investment in Andorra remains until now severely 
restricted, with maximum participation in Andorran companies limited to 
33% in all sectors with the exception of banking. A new law ‘On foreign 
investment in the Principality of Andorra’ proposes to liberalise the regime 
for foreign investment to a significant degree, from a very restrictive 
starting point. This legislation has been before the parliament for a year 
without yet being adopted. The proposal is to distinguish three categories 
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of foreign investment: direct investment, portfolio investment and real 
estate investment. 
For direct investment the sectors of the economy would be divided 
into three groups: 
  sectors for which foreign investment is free and subject only to ex-post 
declaration to the government;  
  sectors where authorisation is required for share capital participation 
that would exceed 50%; and  
  sectors for which authorisation is required in any case. 
The free sectors would be mainly manufacturing industries and some 
service sectors like consulting and management. 
The sectors for which participation over 50% would require 
authorisation include tobacco, construction, wholesale and retail 
commerce, sale and servicing of automobiles, hotels, restaurants, banking 
and financial enterprises, real estate and insurance agencies.  
The sectors requiring authorisation in any case would include 
agriculture, silviculture, aquaculture and energy production. 
It can be noted that the second category, requiring authorisation for 
participation over 50% account for most of the important sectors of the 
Andorran economy in tourism, real estate and financial activities. The third 
category requiring authorisation in any case includes the important hydro-
electric sector. The free sectors are those where there is little or no activity 
at present. Overall this new law has to be regarded as only a limited step in 
the direction of the European norm of freedom of capital movements, 
contrasting for example with the case of Liechtenstein which under the 
EEA assures complete freedom of direct investment. 
Portfolio investments are free, and subject only to ex-post declaration 
to the government. 
Real estate investments in Andorra by individuals are subject to the 
granting of permission by the government, and are normally restricted to 
one residence only. Limitations on personal real estate investment exist in 
the EU in a small number of special cases. In its accession negotiations 
Malta, which like Andorra has an acute shortage of land, reached 
agreement that non-Maltese EU citizens could buy a single residence freely, 
and that they could buy second or more properties only if they have been 
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Why should Andorra want to keep the restrictions on direct 
investment when the EU and other major advanced economies have opted 
for total liberalisation? The advanced economies of the world have opted 
for liberalisation in order to boost investment and therefore economic 
growth, and also to enhance the efficiency of investment through open 
competition. For Andorra these considerations are also valid for the 
purpose of achieving a new model of economic growth, based on more 
diversified service sectors. Of course the increased competition would also 
mean reduction in the ‘economic rents’, or exceptional profits, created by 
the combination of low tax and regulatory burdens and restricted market 
entry. It is of course rational for the rent-owners to want to keep the status 
quo. However this cannot avoid the question whether, of how far and for 
how long, such rents can continue to be protected, and what the cost for the 
broader Andorran economy is in terms of dampening the prospects for 
new investments.   
10.4  The labour market, residence and citizenship 
Any ambitious degree of integration with the EU necessarily raises the 
issue of freedom of movement of people. Here Andorra has many 
exceptions.  
Andorra’s immigration law can grant three types of authorisation: 
  Frontier workers, allowing work without residence 
  Active residents, allowing both work and residence 
  Non-active residents, allowing residence without work.  
The number of active resident permits granted is regulated by quotas 
that are opened at given points in time. The current quota decision allows 
up to 2,000 new residence and work permits to be delivered. Enterprises 
are able to make new or extended employment contracts until the quota is 
full. Preference is given within the quotas to French and Spanish citizens, 
and after that to EU and EEA citizens. The current quota is already fully 
used. Decisions on the quotas are strongly influenced by the labour 
demand of Andorran enterprises, and are an instrument for flexible 
management of the labour market. Labour turnover for foreign workers is 
quite high, since many do not establish long-term residence, preferring to 
save money for a while before returning home. The flexibility of the labour 
market for foreigners is heightened by the fact that there is no 
unemployment benefit scheme in the social security system.  
A quota system also applies for non-active residents. The current 
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at a slow rate, and so is not presently a constraint. Applicants have to make 
an interest-free deposit of about €25,000 with the government, which is 
returned as and when the individual leaves.    
Andorra has agreed with France and Spain a trilateral convention on 
the movement of persons, residence and professional establishment of their 
citizens in Andorra and vice versa.37 The main provisions are: 
  For stays of up to 90 days there is freedom of circulation without visa or 
permit 
  For stays longer than 90 days a residence permit is required 
  France and Spain extend to Andorran citizens conditions of 
establishment at least as favourable as for citizens of other EU member 
states, and Andorra extends to French and Spanish citizens conditions 
at least as favourable as for other EU member states 
  Students have the same rights of access and social security coverage for 
their studies in France and Spain or Andorra as the case may be 
  Person without gainful employment have to assure their own resources, 
including health and accident insurance 
  Salaried persons benefit from the same conditions as nationals of the 
host country 
  However French and Spanish citizens can only undertake non-salaried 
professional activity after ten years of uninterrupted residence 
  Access to the liberal professions depends on the law of the host 
country, which in Andorra is subject to specific authorisation  
  These provisions on non-salaried activity might be made more 
favourable in an agreement between Andorra and the EU. 
Andorra and Portugal have also signed a Convention on 23 July 2007, 
which is identical to the trilateral Convention regarding their nationals, 
reflecting the importance of the Portuguese community in Andorra, now 
easily the third largest in number. 
These rules are asymmetrical. France and Spain are extending 
conditions equal to those for other EU nationals, which mean complete 
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freedom of access to the labour market. Andorra remains especially 
restrictive with regard to the liberal professions. 
A comparison may be made with the labour market regime 
negotiated by Liechtenstein with the EU over the terms of its membership 
of the European Economic Area. The EEA covers only part of the EU acquis 
in the field of labour market and social policy. Basically the EU regulations 
on the free movement of labour/people have to be implanted in full. 
However Liechtenstein has negotiated special derogations allowing it to 
limit the number of resident permits granted to foreigners (see section 4.1.2 
below for detail).  
Other elements of EU labour market law, such as governing 
employment contract (working time, rest time, paid holidays, part-time and 
temporary work contracts), are not included in the EEA. Similarly the EU’s 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers is neither included in the 
EEA, nor is it a legally binding text for the EU member states. These 
fundamental rights include chapters such as social protection, which 
however are only the subject of recommendations by the Commission. In 
1993 a Protocol on Social Policy was adopted, supplementing the Treaty on 
European Union of 1992, which sets the rules for the EU to legislate by 
qualified majority or unanimity on matters of social and employment 
policy, from which the UK obtained an opt-out clause. This means that 
within the EU and EEA there is a continuum of social and labour market 
policy matters, which range from hard legal obligations for both the EU 
and EEA (essentially free movement), through to those that are obligatory 
for the EU but not the EEA (essentially employment contract), and finally 
elements that are the subject of only recommendations at EU level (social 
protection), or for which special opt-out provisions have been agreed for 
one member state. 
11.  Perspectives on EU relations with its neighbours 
The future of Andorra’s relations with the EU has to be placed in the 
context of the EU’s complex and growing set of systemic relationships with 
its wider neighbourhood. While  the ‘neighbours’ are highly differentiated 
by geography, culture, size and political regimes - from Iceland to Russia 
and on to Morocco via the Balkans and Middle East - the EU has revealed 
by its actual policies the tendency to project its norms, standards and many 
of its policies externally beyond its frontiers. This takes place through 
negotiation of treaties of association bearing different names, but with 
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encounters increasing resistance within the EU itself, while the demands 
from the ‘neighbours’ are still increasing, it seems highly likely that the 
EU’s policies towards its neighbourhood will continue to deepen.  
11.1  Forms of agreement between the EU and its neighbours 
11.1.1 The European Economic Area 
The example of most relevance to Andorra is undoubtedly the European 
Economic Area (EEA), whose membership today comprises Iceland, 
Norway and Liechtenstein.38 These small or very small European 
democracies have achieved very high levels of prosperity alongside deep 
integration with the EU without membership.  
Negotiations over the EEA began in 1990 after the President of the 
Commission, Jacques Delors, proposed to the EFTA member states a 
relationship of virtual economic membership of the EU without political 
membership. The impetus for this came from the EU’s apparent success in 
completing its internal market under the so-called ‘1992’ programme. 
Delors was motivated by the desire to avoid over-expanding the EU with  
numerous small states, especially given the special political preferences of 
some of the EFTA states, for example the neutrality of Switzerland and 
Sweden. The deal with the EEA was to grant to the participating states full 
and guaranteed participation in the four freedoms of the EU’s internal 
market – with its complete freedoms of movement for goods, services, 
labour and capital.  
The condition, however, was that the EEA states adopt all the EU’s 
internal market laws (acquis communautaire), and not only the stock of such 
laws at the time of signing the EEA Treaty in 1992, but also all future 
legislation in this area. The EEA Treaty was thus quite extraordinary in its 
dynamic aspect, since the non-EU states were signing an open-ended 
commitment to adopt all future EU legislation in the internal market area, 
without advance knowledge what this might consist of. The initial 
commitment entailed adopting no less than 1,089 Directives from the EU’s 
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acquis, with the EEA states having also to adopt implementing legislation of 
their own to achieve conformity with the EU law (see Table 12).39 
Table 12. The scope of the European Economic Area 
Cases of non- or partial 
implementation 
Policy area  Number of 
directives in 
the EEA 
acquis  Norway Iceland  Liechtenstein 
Technical barriers to trade  486  20  16  4 
Other trade in goods  13  0  0  0 
Veterinary and related 
measures* 
235 15  33  0 
Free movement of persons  71  3  4  4 
Free movement of capital  1  1  1  0 
Financial services  53  2  1  4 
Information technology 
and audio-visual 
22 1  0  6 
Transport (road, rail, 
maritime and air) 
70 5  10  4 
Social (health and safety, 
labour law and equal 
rights) 
50 2  1  4 
Consumer protection  12  3  2  2 
Environment (air, water 
and waste) 
43 1  0  0 
Public procurement  9  0  4  0 
Company law  12  0  0  0 
State aid  3  0  0  0 
Statistics 9  0  0  0 
Total 1,089  53  72  28 
* Iceland and Liechtenstein are exempt from many of these measures. 
Source: Emerson, Vahl & Woolcock, op. cit.  
The largest number of these directives concerned technical barriers to 
trade in industrial and agricultural goods (721), which would not be of 
great concern to Andorra, given its predominantly service sector economy. 
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However important sets of directives are relevant to priority interests of 
Andorra, including the free movement of persons (71), free movement of 
capital (1), financial services (53),  social policy (health and safety, labour 
law and equal rights) (50), consumer protection (12), environment (43) and 
company law (12). 
In order to alleviate the conspicuous ‘democracy deficit’ of the EEA 
system for the non-EU states, since they could not be part of the EU’s 
legislative and policy-making process, it was further agreed to devise 
special institutional arrangements for the EEA states to enter into the 
policy-shaping system, and to have autonomous executive and legal 
institutions. An EEA Council brings together ministers of EEA and EU 
member states with the EU institutions, and an EEA Joint Committee 
prepares their work at senior official level. A Surveillance Authority was 
established within the EFTA secretariat in Brussels to ensure that the EEA 
states are correctly implanting the acquis. An EFTA Court has been created 
to decide on cases of non-compliance. The most significant concession to 
the EEA states has been the obligation under Article 99 of the EEA Treaty 
to seek the advice of EEA experts on draft legislation, and Article 100 which 
calls upon the Commission to ensure “as wide a participation as possible” 
in preparatory stages. This means participation in as many as 200 
committees of the Commission and Council. 
There are some important borderline categories of EU internal market 
law regarding what is ‘in’ the field of EEA jurisdiction, and what is 
‘outside’, i.e. not having to be adopted by EEA partner states. Agricultural 
policy market mechanisms are outside the EEA. Taxation is also outside, 
except to the extent of newly negotiated provisions regarding the taxation 
of savings income. Social and labour market law are ‘in’ for the freedom of 
movement of labour, but not otherwise for the EU’s labour market 
legislation. 
These arrangements all function, but with a much smaller EEA than 
originally envisaged for all EFTA states. The governments of Austria, 
Finland, Sweden and Norway quickly reached the conclusion that full 
membership of the EU would be preferable. Referenda were held on EU 
accession in all four countries. In Austria, Finland and Sweden, the results 
were positive, but the Norwegian people voted against, and so Norway 
reverted to its EEA membership. Switzerland also signed the EEA Treaty, 
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Switzerland had to re-start negotiations bilaterally over its own special 
relationship with the EU (see further below)   
11.1.2 The case of Liechtenstein in the European Economic Area 
The case of Liechtenstein is of particular interest as a comparator for 
Andorra, being a micro-state of even smaller size (about one-third by 
population and territory). There are both political and more technical 
aspects to consider.40  
At the political level, in opting for the EEA Liechtenstein chose to go 
the whole way in adopting EU law of the internal market. In principle there 
are no derogations either for past or future EU law. However Liechtenstein 
requested one important derogation from the standard package, namely on 
the movement of persons and residence of non-nationals of Liechtenstein 
on its territory. Given Liechtenstein’s very small size, an agreement was 
made effectively limiting the number of non-Liechtenstein citizens to one-
third of the total population. In 1999 the EEA Joint Committee agreed to a 
further rule, that the number of resident permits granted annually to EU 
and other EEA citizens could be controlled, but in such as a way that the 
increase in their number cannot be restricted to less than 1.75% per annum.   
This derogation would be of interest to Andorra in the hypothesis of 
its seeking to accede to the EEA. On the other hand other parts of the EU 
acquis that Liechtenstein has entirely taken on would represent a challenge 
for Andorra as of today, namely strict implementation of all EU financial 
market  acquis,  a n d  c o m p l e t e  f r e e d o m  o f  m o v e m e n t  o f  c a p i t a l .  T h u s  i n  
Liechtenstein there are no restrictions on foreign investment. Some parts of 
the Liechtenstein banking sector was initially worried about adopting the 
whole of the EU financial markets acquis, but the sector has adapted and 
become more specialised, for example in fund management. The number of 
banks in Liechtenstein has grown from three in the 1990s to 15 in 2007. 
Some of these banks are subsidiaries of EU-based banks, and thus subject to 
home country supervisory control (in the EU member states). However 
several Liechtenstein banks have for their part established subsidiaries in 
the EU.  
At the more technical level Liechtenstein found ways of legislating 
and implementing the huge EU internal market acquis in a manageable 
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way. As a general rule, the law of Liechtenstein (like Switzerland) regards 
the international law of organisations of which it is member as being 
directly applicable. In this respect Liechtenstein has a lighter legislative 
procedure than Norway, whose parliament requires explicit legislation for 
each act. In the case of Liechtenstein the procedure is different for EU 
regulations that are directly applicable, and EU directives that require more 
detailed implementing legislation. For all EU law there was no translation 
burden, since all texts existed in German in any case. A standard legal 
template was devised to preface EU legal acts that had to be confirmed by 
parliament. For EU regulations the German language texts were directly 
transposed into Liechtenstein law by a special simplified procedure agreed 
with the parliament. In the case of directives that require detailed 
implementing legislation, the task is passed to a coordination department 
of the government to prepare the legal acts. However short-cuts are used 
where feasible, for example by copying the implementing legislation 
adopted by Germany or Austria. 
Liechtenstein’s tax, social security and labour market law is notable 
for being mostly very ‘unexceptional’ by average European standards. 
While the EEA does not cover taxation, Liechtenstein has a personal income 
tax of 18%, in addition to which social security charges are quite heavy. 
There are wealth and capital gains taxes. The social security system is of 
standard coverage, including an unemployment benefit scheme that 
applies without discrimination to Liechtenstein citizens and legally resident 
foreigners.  
11.1.3 Switzerland as an alternative model  
The term ‘Swiss model’ is being frequently used in discussions of the 
variety of arrangements seen in the EU’s relationships with its neighbours. 
The Swiss case is certainly unique in some respects, but whether it should 
be viewed as a model is itself debatable, given its accidental origins 
following the unexpected rejection of ratification of the EEA by 
referendum.  
The distinguishing characteristic of the Swiss relationship is that it is 
built on a series of sector-specific agreements, rather than a comprehensive 82 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
multi-sectoral treaty.41 No other country has as many agreements with the 
EU as Switzerland. However the EU itself has increasingly developed an 
‘anti-cherry picking’ doctrine in its negotiation of agreements with close 
neighbours. By this the EU expresses its negative attitude towards third 
parties that try to negotiate agreements for close association with the EU 
only on those selected items that appeal to it. This doctrine, which has no 
official standing but is a real feature of EU negotiating practices, says that 
the third parties that wish to come close to the EU should be willing to 
accept complex agreements consisting of a mixed bag of items, where 
individual items may have different cost-benefit qualities for the one and 
other side.  
For this reason the early Swiss experience of making numerous 
isolated agreements with the EU on an ad hoc basis came under pressure 
from the EU side when the question arose what to do after Switzerland’s 
failure to ratify the EEA. When Switzerland proposed that the substitute to 
the EEA should be a number of sector-specific agreements, the EU 
responded by insisting that there should be multiple agreements bunched 
in packages, with the proviso that failure to agree or to ratify any one of the 
packages would nullify the whole set. Two such packages, called 
‘Bilaterals’, have subsequently been negotiated, Bilateral I being negotiated 
between 1994 and 1998, and Bilateral II between 2001 and 2004. The 
following three tables give an idea of the content. Box 6 lists 25 trade and 
industry agreements negotiated between 1956 and 2004 outside the 
Bilaterals. Boxes 7 and 8 list the contents of the two Bilateral packages. 
The Bilaterals contain much of what Switzerland would have 
undertaken in the EEA, especially in Bilateral I regarding technical barriers 
to trade. To this extent it amounts to a re-packaging of the EEA matter, 
although outside the institutional structures of the EEA. Here lies an 
important point for those who suppose that the so-called ‘Swiss model’ is 
less subject to the democratic-deficit objection to the EEA. In fact 
Switzerland ends up with a less strong position than the EEA states in the 
policy-shaping process, and in some respects on matters of legal 
procedures.  
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Box 6. Agreements between Switzerland and the EU, 1956-2004 
Trade and industry agreements 
1967  Tariffs on certain cheeses 
1972  Agreement between the EC and Switzerland (the ‘free trade agreement’)* 
1974  Clock and watch industry 
1985  Trade in soups, sauces and condiments 
1986  Trade in non-agricultural and processed agricultural goods 
1989  Trade in electronic data interchange systems 
1990  Simplification of inspections and formalities in respect to the carriage of 
goods 
1995  Trade in certain agricultural and fishery products 
2001  Tariff preferences under the General System of Preferences (GSP) 
Transport agreements  
1956  Railway tariffs for the carriage of coal and steel through Swiss territory 
1992  Carriage of goods by road and rail 
Research agreements 
1978  Thermonuclear fusion and plasma physics 
1985  Scientific and technical cooperation 
1988  R&D in the field of wood, including cork, as a renewable raw material  
1988  R&D in the field of advanced materials (Euram) 
1991  European Stimulation Plan for the Economic Sciences (SPES) 
1991  EEC R&D programme in the field of applied metrology and chemical analysis 
Other bilateral agreements 
1957  Consultation agreement between Switzerland and the ECSC High Authority 
1984  Prevention of fraud 
1988 Terminology   
1991  Direct insurance other than life insurance 
2004 Europol 
Multilateral agreements: EEC/EFTA conventions 
1987  On the simplification of formalities on trade in goods 
1987  On a common transit procedure 
1990  Procedure for the exchange of information in the field of technical regulations 
_______________________ 
* The 1972 agreement (formally consisting of two agreements, one with the European 
Community and one with the ECSC) is frequently referred to as the ‘free trade 
agreement’, despite the fact that there is no reference to free trade in the title. Hereafter, it 
is referred to as the 1972 agreement. 
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Box 7. EU-Switzerland Bilateral I sectoral agreements 1994-1998 
1. Research  
2. Technical barriers to trade 
3. Free movement of persons  
4. Air transport  
5. Land transport  
6. Agriculture  
7. Public procurement 
Source: Vahl & Grolimund, op. cit. 
However Bilateral II went wider, notably including agreements of the 
taxation of savings (comparable to Andorra’s agreement of 2004), inclusion 
in the Schengen area and other items relating to the EU’s area of Liberty, 
Justice and Security (Pillar III of EU competences). In this respect the ‘Swiss 
model’ is an example of a flexible updating of the content of the EEA 
Treaty. The EU’s own policies have advanced substantially since the EEA 
was conceived, which means that the EEA states have themselves had to 
make sector-specific agreements outside the scope of the EEA Treaty. In 
particular Norway and Iceland have become full members of the Schengen 
area. Moreover the EEA excluded obligations under the EU’s acquis in the 
area of taxation, and as a result both Switzerland and Liechtenstein (as well 
as Andorra and other very small states and entities) found themselves 
requested by the EU to enter into negotiations for agreements on the 
taxation of savings.  
Box 8. EU-Switzerland, Bilateral II sectoral agreements, 2001-2004 
1.  Processed agricultural goods 
2.  Statistics 
3.  Media 
4.  Environment  
5.  Pensions 
6.  Education, occupational training, youth (declaration of intent)  
7.  Taxation of savings 
8.  Schengen 
9.  Dublin  
10.  Fight against fraud  
 
Source: Vahl & Grolimund, op. cit. 
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Overall the comparison of the EEA multilateral model and Swiss 
bilateral model shows increasing convergence between the two. The EEA 
states have had to make further sector-specific agreements outside the field 
of the EEA Treaty, whereas the Swiss bilaterals now amount to much of the 
EEA matter plus the same sector-specific agreements as the EEA states 
have made. 
11.1.4 Agreements with the wider European neighbourhood 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes in all of 
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the period 1989-1991 has led 
the EU to seek to bind these countries into the norms and standards – both 
political and technical – of modern Europe. The result has been an 
extraordinary proliferation of comprehensive agreements between the EU 
and its neighbours in the wider Europe. These agreements have had 
different names, but they have important common characteristics.  
The first model was that of the Europe Agreements designed for the 
Central and East European states that were applying for full EU 
membership. These agreements were basically a pre-accession strategy, and 
were structured along the lines of the EU’s existing competences in the 
early 1990s, thus mainly in the economic area, but before the arrival of the 
euro as common currency. There was a long list of chapters, corresponding 
roughly to what became subsequently the 31 chapters of the accession 
negotiation process (see Annex H). The agreements also provided for the 
rapid move to free trade and also massive financial and technical 
assistance. 
Because of this essentially economic content, the Europe Agreements 
were not very explicit on political criteria. However this lacuna was filled 
in 1993 when a summit meeting in Copenhagen established what became 
known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which included the requirement of 
stable democracy, respect for human rights and an effective rule of law, as 
well as compliance with the EU acquis and a competitive economy.  
For the non-accession candidate states of the former Soviet Union, a 
weaker derivative of the Europe Agreements was devised – Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements (PCA). The first PCA was negotiated with 
Russia, testing how far this country would be willing to go in taking on the 
same agenda as the Europe Agreements. The result was a model PCA 
which had the same structure of chapters, but with much lower levels of 
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accession negotiations required categorical alignment on the EU acquis, and 
supporting implementation measures, the PCAs simply advocated non-
binding ‘cooperation’ in the same fields, with correspondingly weak 
results. The PCA with Russia was then used as a template for negotiations 
with all other CIS states, starting with Ukraine, but going on to include 
PCAs with all the Southern Caucasus and Central Asian states. The content 
got progressively weaker as the process reached out even to Kyrghizstan 
and Tajikistan bordering on China.    
For South-East Europe the context was marked by the post-Yugoslav 
wars, involving Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia in 1992-93, and then Kosovo in 
2000. However for all these states the EU was willing to acknowledge their 
aspirations for full membership at least in the long-run, and so a graduated 
process was devised. For states not yet deemed ready for the status of 
‘candidate’, a two-step procedure was devised around a new model 
agreement called the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). The 
first preliminary step was for the partner states (all of the former 
Yugoslavia, plus Albania, and minus Slovenia which was already an 
accession candidate) to reach certain basic criteria as functioning states. It 
took time indeed for Bosnia and Albania to meet these conditions. The 
second stage was negotiation of the SAA, the model for which again started 
as a derivative of the Europe Agreements with their long list of chapters of 
EU competences (see Annex I for the case of the Croatian SAA). However 
the SAAs had also to address the special post-conflict or conflict prevention 
contexts in much of the region. In addition the political parts of the 
Copenhagen criteria were given prominent attention, as well as the EU’s 
new competences in the field of Liberty, Justice and Security. The agenda 
for combating organised crime and corruption was given high priority. 
Overall the SAA process couples the conventional matter of alignment on 
the EU acquis with the more dramatic matters of conflict 
resolution/prevention and state-building, including fundamental 
constitutional issues in the cases of Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Macedonia. 
These major developments in the EU’s external relations to the North, 
East and South-East in turn spilled over into new initiatives for the 
Southern Mediterranean region, reflecting the enduring balance of interests 
within the EU between the Northern and Southern member states. In 1995 
the Barcelona process was launched as a regional multilateral initiative 
with political, economic and security chapters, coupled with the 
negotiation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements progressively with 
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was the commitment to a phased introduction of bilateral free trade with 
the EU, alongside the usual very long list of areas for possible cooperation. 
In addition major economic aid and investment facilities were created. 
The next major phase in these developments came when the 2005 
enlargement was becoming a firm prospect. Concern was expressed about 
the relative disadvantage that the EU’s ‘new neighbours’ (e.g. Ukraine, 
given Poland’s accession) might perceive and indeed actually experience. 
As a result pressures grew for what has become the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was initially targeting the new 
European neighbours of the former Soviet Union. However again the EU’s 
North-South balance had to be respected, and so the ENP was extended to 
the Mediterranean states of the Barcelona process as well as to the South 
Caucasus states. The ENP process had led to the negotiation of bilateral 
Action Plans, which are once again structured along the lines of the 
chapters of the accession process, even though it is stressed that the ENP 
brings no commitments to membership perspectives. The Action Plans 
contain a mix of specific and operational commitments and looser 
exhortations to make domestic political and economic reforms (see Annex J 
for the chapter headings of the Ukrainian Action Plan).  
The ENP does contain the prospect of moving on from the (usually) 
three-year Action Plans to the opening of negotiations for new 
comprehensive agreements, to replace for the Eastern neighbours the 
PCAs. The process is most advanced in the case of Ukraine, where 
negotiations have actually begun for an ‘Enhanced Agreement’. Two 
features of this likely new generation of agreements should be noted, as 
Andorra reflects on the nature of its future relations with the EU.  
First there is the matter of content. The EU system has deepened and 
matured considerably over the last two decades under the so-called ‘pillar’ 
system for the EU’s old and new competences. The internal market has 
been completed, the euro has been introduced (Pillar I), the common 
foreign, security and defence polices have advanced considerably (Pillar II), 
and the Schengen system has been introduced together with an expanding 
jurisdiction in the field of justice and home affairs (Pillar III). Put in terms 
of the EU’s legal categories, all three pillars have advanced to the point that 
they become subjects also for the EU’s external relations, especially with its 
close neighbours, therefore leading to a new model of more comprehensive 
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Second, there is the question how these agreements are named. All 
the above categories of agreement are legal treaties with the highest legal 
status in international law, subject to ratification by all the parliaments of 
EU member states. The term ‘association agreement’ is being used in some 
cases, but there is no clear definition or legal meaning attached to the use of 
the word association, or its non-use. For example the word association is 
used in the case of the Balkan SAAs, which contain a membership 
perspective, and in the case of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements which 
do not. The EU’s recent free trade agreement with Chile is also designated 
an association agreement. The new agreement envisaged with Ukraine is 
for the time being called ‘Enhanced Agreement’ reflecting its likely multi-
pillar content, but also the Ukrainian side considered the Commission’s 
initial proposal for a ‘European Neighbourhood Agreement’ to be too 
exclusionary in implication. Ukraine is currently proposing the appellation 
‘Political Association and Economic Integration Agreement’.  
11.1.5 Participation in EU agencies and programmes  
The Commission has recently, in the context of the measures to improve 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, addressed comprehensively the 
question how far non-member states can participate in the work of the EU’s 
fast-growing number of specialised agencies, and also the operational 
programmes of various policies.42 The principles set out in the Commission 
document apply more widely to third countries, and so this is relevant to 
the interest that has been expressed by Andorra in certain agencies and 
programmes.  
There are now 21 agencies dealing with EC (Pillar I) competencies 
and a further 6 under EU (Pillars II and III) competencies. The Commission 
has reviewed the statutes of these agencies and has determined that 20 out 
of the total of 27 agencies are in principle open to third country 
participation. Of those that might be o f  m u t u a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
Andorra, one might mention the European Environment Agency and the 
European Police Office (Europol). 
The document further identifies 34 EC programmes of which 18 are 
considered to be potentially open to third countries. Of those that might be 
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of mutual interest in the case of Andorra, one might mention Hercule II 
(activities combating fraud, including cigarette smuggling), Pericles 
(against counterfeiting of the euro), Customs 2013 (for cooperation between 
customs authorities of the EU and neighbouring countries), Fiscalis 2013 
(for cooperation between tax authorities of the EU and neighbouring 
countries), the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework programme 
(fostering SMEs and eco-innovation), the Security and Safeguarding 
Liberties programme (counter terrorism and crime), the Intelligent Energy-
Europe programme and the European Regional Development Fund. 
It is for third countries to express their interest in participation, with 
decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis on the basis of identified 
mutual interests. Participating third countries are expected to make 
financial contributions.  
11.2  Relationships with small states and autonomous entities 
While the case of Liechtenstein has already been discussed for some of its 
aspects, the present section looks comparatively at the complete set of very 
small sovereign states in Europe (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San 
Marino, Vatican), as well as the several highly autonomous non-state 
entities dependent in various ways on EU member states (Guernsey, Jersey, 
Ile of Man, Gibraltar in relation to the UK, the Aaland Islands as part of 
Finland and the Faroe Islands as part of Denmark). These various cases are 
interesting for the present study for two reasons. First they reveal various 
precedents for how the special interests of these very small states and 
entities may be accommodated in the context of EU laws and policies. 
Second, it is important for Andorra to be aware of trends in these 
relationships and the policies of these other states and entities, since the 
European Union and international community will be making these 
comparisons as they decide on positions to be adopted in relation to each of 
them individually.  
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Table 13. Europe’s smallest states and non-state entities 
 
Population  Territory 
(km2) 
Status 
Sovereign states      
Andorra 81,222  468  Sovereign  state 
Liechtenstein 33,000  160  Sovereign  state 
Monaco 32,000  2  Sovereign  state 
San Marino  28,000  61  Sovereign state 
Vatican 783  0.44  Sovereign  state 
Non-state entities       
Jersey  80,000  72  UK Crown Dependency 
Guernsey  60,000  48  UK Crown Dependency 
Isle of Man  70,000  572  UK Crown Dependency 
Gibraltar  30,000  6  UK Crown Colony 
Aaland Islands  25,000  300  Finland – autonomous 
entity 
Faroe Islands  45,000  375  Denmark – autonomous 
entity 
Smallest EU states      
Malta 400,000  316  Sovereign  state 
Luxembourg 451,600  2,586  Sovereign  state 
11.2.1 The sovereign states43 
San Marino’s relations with the EU seem to have been interacting with the 
case of Andorra. The EC-San Marino Customs Union Agreement of 1991 
followed shortly after Andorra’s Customs Union agreement of 1990, and its 
trade policy provisions are modelled on the Andorra agreement, except 
that for San Marino agricultural products are included (contrary to their 
exclusion in the case of Andorra). However the San Marino agreement 
already envisaged wider cooperation in the fields of diversification of the 
economy, environment, tourism, communications, information and culture. 
These fields of cooperation in turn seem to have been the model for the 
Andorra’s 2004 Cooperation Agreement with the EU. The San Marino 
agreement also ensures non-discrimination on grounds of nationality for 
workers in each other’s territory, including social security coverage. Since 
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this last aspect involves the competences of member states the agreement 
had to be ratified by all member states, which was only completed 11 years 
later in 2002.  The government of San Marino has expressed its 
disappointment that the areas opened for cooperation have not given 
greater results, which seems to correlate with Andorra’s experience under 
its Cooperation Agreement of 2004. San Marino was able however to 
negotiate a monetary agreement with the EU for minting euro coins on the 
condition of applying EU financial market and monetary directives. San 
Marino has also signed an agreement on the taxation of savings similar to 
Andorra. San Marino is the only European micro-state not to have been on 
the OECD’s first 2000 list of ‘uncooperative tax havens’. Indeed San Marino 
has significant personal and corporate income taxes. Its recent reforms 
include strengthening the bank supervisory system and removing 
restrictions on the employment of non-resident workers. 
In February 2007, the IMF completed its report on San Marino 
economic and financial policies with the following positive assessment: 
“San Marino is reinventing itself in response to global competition. A slew 
of reforms has been initiated, which, combined with stronger growth in 
neighbouring Italy and the euro area, have improved macroeconomic 
prospects. Growth has rebounded”.44  
On 27 August 2007, there was a new development, when the foreign 
minister of San Marino, Mr Fiorenzo Stolfi, wrote to the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU in the following terms: 
… I wish to inform the Council of the European Union that San 
Marino Government has expressed its willingness to achieve 
increasing integration within the European Union and to further 
discuss the possibility of submitting its candidature for 
membership of the European Union.  … I thank you in advance, 
Dear Minister, for the attention you will pay to the process that 
my Government intends to start in order to achieve a new status 
of San Marino vis-à-vis the European Union. …”  [Italics retained 
as in the original letter]. 
This initiative by San Marino, which seems to have come as a surprise 
to Brussels, will put the spotlight on some of the scenarios discussed in this 
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report (in section 6 of Part A), and oblige Europe’s other micro-states to 
reflect on their own position in this regard. 
Monaco has a stronger bilateral relationship with France than in the 
case of Andorra, notwithstanding the unique role of Andorra’s Co-Princes 
as Heads of State. The France–Monaco bilateral treaty of 2002 stipulates 
that Monaco’s international relations should always be subject to 
agreement with France. Monaco is part of the EU’s customs union by virtue 
of its bilateral relations with France, without a specific agreement with the 
EU. Given the agreement with France over the free movement of persons, 
the introduction of the Schengen regime required clarification of the status 
of Monaco’s seaport and heliport. The Schengen executive committee 
concurred that these could be accepted as authorised points of crossing the 
EU’s external frontiers. Monaco has agreed with the EU terms for becoming 
fully part of the euro area, accepting the full EU acquis for financial 
markets. In addition the French Commission Bancaire shares responsibility 
for supervising the financial sector. Monaco is still listed by the OECD as a 
‘non-cooperative tax haven’, the main point of criticism being the absence 
of information-sharing agreements with regulatory and fiscal authorities 
other than those of France. This designation is mitigated by the fact that 
French citizens resident in Monaco are subject to French income tax, and 
there is also an information exchange agreement with France. It has a 33% 
corporate tax. 
11.2.2. The non-state autonomous entities45  
Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man are self-governing in all matters except 
international relations and defence, for which the UK is responsible. All 
three entities are small island economies based on financial services and 
tourism. They are neither colonies nor part of the UK, and have limited 
international legal personality. Their relations with the EU is set out in 
Protocol 3 of the UK’s act of accession to the EU, according to which they 
are part of the EU for the purposes of the customs tariff and the free 
movement of goods. This is equivalent to Andorra’s customs union 
agreement, although it goes further with respect to trade in agricultural 
goods and aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy. The three entities 
are also “part of the EU”, and their passports bear the triple designation 
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“European Union, British Isles, Bailiwick of Jersey [or Guernsey, etc.]”. This 
could prove an interesting precedent for other very small states and 
entities, in that a way seems to have been found for the citizens of these 
islands to gain full rights of movement and residence of EU citizens 
without their entities having the status of member state.  
All three entities have joined in the withholding tax system linked to 
the EU taxation of savings directive, with the three staged rates of 15, 20 
and 35%. The three entities also cooperate now with a view to 
implementing the so-called ‘Basel II’ standards for the regulatory 
requirements of banks, involving risk assessment, which have become 
mandatory within the EU under the financial services directives.46  
The IMF completed assessments in November 2003 of all three, 
noting high levels of compliance with the key sets of international 
standards for financial markets, namely the core principles of Basel, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) statement of 
best practices of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) and 
the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) with 
regard to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of 
terrorism (CFT). Their respective Financial Services Commissions are 
“commended for the high level of compliance with these major 
international standards”.47 
They have low but still significant income tax for individuals (20% for 
Guernsey and Jersey, and 10-18% for the Isle of Man). For the corporate 
income tax all three are intending to introduce ‘0-10%’ regimes, with 0% as 
the standard rate and 10% for financial services by 2010. However the 0% 
rate is likely to be contested by the European Commission on grounds that 
it would contradict the EU’s Code of Conduct on fiscal matters. All three 
are regarded as ‘cooperative’ by the OECD Global Forum on Taxation, and 
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share information with other fiscal and financial market supervisory 
authorities.  
The three islands take a pro-active view with regard to the setting of 
international standards for financial markets, and are invited to participate 
in international standard-setting bodies. In the words of the director-
general of the Jersey Financial Services Commissions: “Seats at the table can 
only be obtained by those jurisdictions that meet international standards. 
We have those seats and are able to participate in the development of 
international standards – raising those standards, achieving a level playing 
field, applying our own values and acting in our own economic interest”.48 
The three islands may be viewed as adopting a high quality branding 
strategy, in the interest of building, and gaining from, a comparative 
advantage.  
Gibraltar is a colony and overseas territory of the UK, and part of the 
EU. It is largely self-governing, except for international relations, defence 
and internal security. Gibraltar is part of the EU by virtue of Article 299(4) 
of the EC Treaty, which provides that “The provisions of this Treaty shall 
apply to the European territories for whose external relations a Member 
State is responsible”. However the UK’s Treaty of Accession allows 
Gibraltar to be excluded from the common customs tariff, common 
commercial policy, common agricultural policy and the value-added tax 
directives. Gibraltar is however applying the EU internal market acquis, 
including the free movement of labour and the financial services directives. 
Almost all its banks are subsidiaries or branches of EU-controlled banks, 
which  means they are subject to home country control for supervisory 
purposes (i.e. controlled by the authorities of EU member states), and 
therefore obligatorily in compliance with EU standards. Gibraltar is not a 
low tax jurisdiction, with personal income tax in the 20-40% range, and a 
domestic corporate tax of 35%. The IMF has noted that “the  Gibraltar 
authorities are to be commended for the resources they have devoted to 
international cooperation in the field of information exchange with 
financial supervisory authorities”, and as part of the EU for their “full 
cooperation with criminal investigations in EU member states”.49 
                                                      
48 Richard Pratt, “Setting International Standards – The Advantage of Being at the 
Table”, public speech, 6 June 2003 (www.jerseyfsc.org).  
49 IMF, Gibraltar – Assessment of Financial Sector Supervision and Regulation, IMF 
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The Aaland Islands are an autonomous, Swedish-speaking part of 
Finland. Their relationship with the EU i s  d e f i n e d  i n  P r o t o c o l  2  t o  t h e  
Finnish Act of Accession, according to which the Islands are part of the EU 
in all respects, subject however to two derogations concerning citizenship 
and taxation. These two derogations are however of high relevance for 
Andorra.  
Regarding citizenship, the Aaland Islands can restrict the rights of 
access to regional citizenship, without which permission is required to own 
property, establish businesses or provide services. Newcomers to the 
Islands can only apply for regional citizenship after five years of 
continuous residence and proficiency in the Swedish language.   
Regarding taxation, the Aaland Islands are exempted from EU 
harmonisation of indirect taxes, including the value-added tax and excise 
duties. This allows the Islands to base their prosperity on a combination of 
tourism, and duty-free sales both onshore and offshore on shipping lines 
that serve routes with Finland and Sweden. In these respects the Aaland 
Islands bear some comparison as a maritime version of the mountainous 
Andorra. However the Aaland Islands do apply Finnish income taxes. 
The Faroe Islands are part of Denmark with a large measure of 
autonomy, although some policies are the joint responsibility of both the 
Islands and Denmark. They elect two members of the Danish parliament, 
and passports indicating that the holders are both Danish citizens and 
Faroese residents. However the Islands are not part of the EU, and so EU 
laws do not apply. The relationship with the EU is currently defined in 
practice in a fisheries agreement of 1980 and a trade agreement of 1997 
providing for free trade. The issue of independence for the Faroe Islands is 
a continuing matter of political interest, and in March 2001 the Faroese 
parliament set out a proposal for a gradual move to independence by 2012. 
The case of the Faroe Islands is of interest in the present context only to 
illustrate how the EU has managed all kinds of special relationships with 
very small yet historically distinct entities – in this case an entity that can be 
part of an EU member state without being part of the EU. 
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Annex A 
Customs Union 
[signed 28 June 1990] 
The Principality of Andorra, and the European Economic Community,  
Desirous of introducing, in respect of their trade relations, arrangements to 
take the place of national arrangements currently in force and respecting 
the specific situation of the Principality of Andorra,  
Considering that, owing to geographical, historical and social and 
economic factors, Andorra's exceptional situation justifies special 
arrangements, particularly as regards exemption from import duties, 
turnover tax and excise duties collected on goods imported by travellers 
from Andorra into the Community,  
Have agreed as follows:  
Article 1.  
Trade between the European Economic Community, on the one hand, and 
the Principality of Andorra, on the other, shall be governed by the 
provisions set out below.  
Title I 
Customs Union 
Article 2  
A customs union shall be established between the European Economic 
Community and Andorra for the products covered by Chapters 25 to 97 of 
the Harmonised System in accordance with the procedure and conditions 
set out under this Title.  
Article 3  
1. The provisions of this Title shall apply to:  
(a) goods produced in the Community or in the Principality of Andorra, 
including those obtained wholly or in part from products which come from 
third countries and are in free circulation in the Community or in the 
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(b) goods which come from third countries and are in free circulation in the 
Community or in the Principality of Andorra.  
2. Products coming from third countries shall be considered to be in free 
circulation in the Community or in the Principality of Andorra if the import 
formalities have been complied with and any customs duties or charges 
having equivalent effect which are payable have been levied, and there has 
been no total or partial drawback of such duties or charges in respect of the 
said products.  
Article 4  
The provisions of this Title shall also apply to goods obtained in the 
Community or in the Principality of Andorra, in the manufacture of which 
were used products coming from third countries and not in free circulation 
either in the Community or in the Principality of Andorra. These provisions 
shall, however, apply to those goods only if the exporting Contracting 
Party levies the customs duties laid down in the Community for third 
country products used in their manufacture.  
Article 5  
The Contracting Parties shall refrain from introducing between themselves 
any new customs duties on imports or exports or charges having 
equivalent effect, and from increasing those already applied in their trade 
with each other on 1 January 1989.  
Article 6  
1. Customs duties on imports and charges having equivalent effect in force 
between the Community and the Principality of Andorra shall be abolished 
in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3.  
2. On 1 January 1991, the Principality of Andorra shall abolish customs 
duties and charges having equivalent effect on imports from the 
Community.  
3. (a) From 1 January 1991 the Community, with the exception of the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, shall abolish customs 
duties and charges having equivalent effect on imports from the 
Principality of Andorra.  
(b) From 1 January 1991 the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic shall apply the same customs duties in respect of the Principality 
of Andorra as they apply in respect of the Community as constituted on 31 
December 1985.  
(c) In the case of processed agricultural products covered by Chapters 25 to 
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No.3033/80, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) shall apply to customs duties 
constituting the fixed component of the charge on imports of those 
products into the Community from the Principality of Andorra, while the 
variable component provided for in the Regulation shall continue to apply.  
(d) By way of derogation from sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), imports 
covered by the provisions relating to tax relief for travellers referred to in 
Article 13 shall be exempt from customs duties from 1 January 1991.  
Article 7  
1. For products covered by the customs union, the Principality of Andorra 
shall adopt, with effect from 1 January 1991:  
- the provisions on import formalities applied by the Community to third 
countries,  
- the laws, regulations and administrative provisions applicable to customs 
matters in the Community and necessary for the proper functioning of the 
customs union.  
The provisions referred to in the first and second indents shall be those 
currently applicable in the Community.  
2. The provisions referred to in the second indent of paragraph 1 shall be 
determined by the Joint Committee provided for in Article 17.  
Article 8  
1. (a) Over a period of five years, and beyond that period if no agreement 
can be reached in accordance with (b), the Principality of Andorra shall 
authorise the Community, acting on behalf of and for the Principality of 
Andorra, to enter goods sent from third countries to the Principality of 
Andorra for free circulation. Entry into free circulation will be effected by 
the Community customs offices listed in Annex I.  
(b) At the end of this period, and under Article 20, the Principality of 
Andorra may exercise right of entry into free circulation for its goods, 
following agreement by the Contracting Parties.  
2. Where import duties are payable on goods pursuant to paragraph 1, 
these duties shall be levied on behalf of the Principality of Andorra. The 
Principality of Andorra shall undertake not to refund these sums directly 
or indirectly to the parties concerned.  
3. The Joint Committee provided for in Article 17 shall determine:  
(a) possible changes of the list of the Community customs offices competent 
to clear the goods referred to in paragraph 1 and the procedure for 
forwarding the said goods to the Principality of Andorra referred to in 
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(b) the arrangements for assigning to the Andorran Exchequer the amounts 
collected in accordance with paragraph 2, and the percentage to be 
deducted by the Community to cover administrative costs in accordance 
with the relevant regulations in force within the Community;  
(c) any other arrangements necessary for the proper implementation of this 
Article.  
Article 9  
Quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and all measures having 
equivalent effect between the Community and the Principality of Andorra 
shall be prohibited from 1 January 1991.  
Article 10  
1. Should either Contracting Party consider that disparities arising from the 
other Party's application, in respect of imports from third countries, of 
customs duties, quantitative restrictions or any measures having equivalent 
effect, or of any other measure of commercial policy, threaten to deflect 
trade or to cause economic difficulties in its territory, it may bring the 
matter before the Joint Committee, which shall, if necessary, recommend 
appropriate methods for avoiding any harm liable to result therefrom.  
2. Where deflections occur or economic difficulties arise and the Party 
concerned considers that they call for immediate action, that Party may 
itself take the necessary surveillance or protection measures, notifying the 
Joint Committee without delay; the Joint Committee may recommend that 
the said measures be amended or abolished.  
3. In the choice of such measures, preference shall be given to those which 
least disturb the operation of the customs union and, in particular, the 
normal development of trade.  
Title II 
Arrangements for products not covered by the Customs Union 
Article 11  
1. Products covered by Chapters 1 to 24 of the Harmonised System which 
originate in the Principality of Andorra shall be exempt from import duties 
when imported into the Community.  
2. Rules of origin and methods of administrative cooperation are set out in 
the Appendix.  
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Article 12  
1. The arrangements applied to goods from third countries imported into 
the Principality of Andorra shall not be more favourable than those applied 
to imports of Community goods.  
2. Products covered by headings No. 24.02 and 24.03 of the Harmonised 
System which are manufactured in the Community from raw tobacco and 
which meet the conditions of Article 3(1) shall be eligible, when imported 
into the Principality of Andorra, for a preferential rate corresponding to 60 
per cent of the rate applied in the Principality of Andorra for the same 
products vis-à-vis third countries.  
Title III  
Common Provisions  
Article 13.1. Exemptions from import duties, turnover tax and excise duties 
levied on imports by travellers between the Contracting Parties and 
applicable to goods contained in the personal luggage of travellers coming 
from one of the Contracting Parties shall be those currently applicable in 
the Community in respect of third countries, provided imports of those 
goods are strictly non-commercial.  
2. With regard to the products covered by Title II of this Agreement and 
listed below, the exemptions referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted 
within the following quantitative limits for each traveller entering the 
Community from the Principality of Andorra:  
  milk powder 2.5 kilograms  
  condensed milk 3 kilograms  
  fresh milk 6 kilograms  
  butter 1 kilograms  
  cheese 4 kilograms  
  sugar and confectionery 5 kilograms  
  meat 5 kilograms 
3. Details of quantitative limits 
4. Within the quantitative limits laid d o w n  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  i n d e n t  o f  
paragraph 3, the value of the goods listed therein shall not be taken into 
consideration for determining the exemptions referred to in paragraph 1.  
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Article 14  
The Contracting Parties shall refrain from any domestic tax measure or 
practice leading directly or indirectly to discrimination between the 
products of one Contracting Party and similar products from the other 
Contracting Party. Products sent to the territory of one of the Contracting 
Parties shall not be eligible for a refund of domestic charges which is higher 
than the charges which have been levied directly or indirectly.  
Article 15  
1. In addition to the cooperation provided for in Articles 11(2) and 17(8), 
the administrative authorities of the Contracting Parties responsible for 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement shall assist each other in 
other cases so as to ensure compliance with the provisions.  
2. Arrangements for the application of paragraph 1 shall be determined by 
the Joint Committee referred to in Article 17.  
Article 16  
The Agreement shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security, the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants, the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value, the protection of industrial or commercial 
property or controls relating to gold and silver. Such prohibitions or 
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Contracting 
Parties.  
Article 17  
1. A Joint Committee shall be set up with responsibility for administering 
this Agreement and ensuring that it is properly implemented. To that end, 
it shall formulate recommendations. It shall take decisions in the cases 
provided for in the Agreement. The decisions shall be executed by the 
Contracting Parties in accordance with their own regulations.  
2. With a view to the proper performance of this Agreement, the 
Contracting Parties shall  
carry out exchanges of information and, at the request of either Party, shall 
consult together in the Joint Committee.  
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4. The Joint Committee shall be composed, on the one hand, of 
representatives of the Community and, on the other, of representatives of 
the Principality of Andorra.  
5. The Joint Committee shall take decisions by common accord.  
6. The Joint Committee shall be chaired by each of the Contracting Parties 
in turn in accordance with the arrangements to be laid down in its rules of 
procedure.  
7. The Joint Committee shall meet at the request of either of the Contracting 
Parties, to be lodged at least one month before the date of the intended 
meeting. Where the Joint Committee is convened under Article 10, it shall 
meet within eight working days from the date on which the request is 
lodged. 
8. In accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph 1, the Joint 
Committee shall determine methods of administrative cooperation for the 
purposes of applying Articles 3 and 4, taking as a basis the methods 
adopted by the Community in respect of trade between the Member States; 
it may also amend provisions in the Appendix, referred to in Article 11.  
Article 18  
1. Any disputes arising between the Contracting Parties over the 
interpretation of the Agreement shall be put before the Joint Committee.  
2. If the Joint Committee does not succeed in settling the dispute at its next 
meeting, each Party may notify the other of the designation of an arbitrator; 
the other Party shall then be required to designate a second arbitrator 
within two months.  
3. The Joint Committee shall designate a third arbitrator.  
4. The arbitrator's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.  
5. Each Party involved in the dispute shall be required to take the measures 
needed to ensure the application of the arbitrator's decision.  
Article 19  
In trade covered by this Agreement:  
- the arrangements applied by the Principality of Andorra vis-à-vis the 
Community may not give rise to any discrimination between the Member 
States, their nationals or their companies.  
- the arrangements applied by the Community vis-à-vis the Principality of 
Andorra may not give rise to any discrimination between Andorran 
nationals or companies.  
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Title IV  
General and Final Provisions  
Article 20  
This Agreement is concluded for an unlimited duration. Within five years 
of its entry into force, the two Parties shall begin consultations to examine 
the results of its application and, if necessary, to open negotiations on its 
amendment in the light of that examination.  
Article 21  
Either Contracting Party may denounce this Agreement by notifying the 
other Contracting Party in writing. In that case, the Agreement shall cease 
to have effect six months after the date of such notification.  
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Annex B 
Cooperation Agreement 
 
[Signed 15 November 2004] 
The European Community of the one part, the Principality of Andorra of 
the other part, 
Resolved to consolidate and extend the existing close relations between the 
European Community and the Principality of Andorra, 
Considering that trade relations between the European Community 
and the Principality of Andorra are governed by the agreement in the form 
of an exchange of letters signed in Luxembourg on 28 June 1990, which 
establishes a Customs Union, 
Considering that European integration has made considerable 
progress since that date, 
Considering the exceptional situation of the Principality of Andorra, 
which is surrounded by the territory of the European Union but is not a 
member of it, 
Considering the desire of the Principality of Andorra to play a greater 
part in the current integration of Europe and therefore to expand the scope 
of its relations with the European Union, 
Considering that the European Community and the Principality of 
Andorra should conclude an agreement to provide the broadest possible 
basis for their cooperation in all areas of common interest within their 
fields of competence, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Principles 
Article 1 
The European Community and the Principality of Andorra (hereinafter the 
Contracting Parties) undertake, within the limits of their respective powers, 
to cooperate on the broadest possible basis and to their mutual advantage 
in matters of common interest, and in particular the priority areas referred 
to in Articles 2 to 8. 
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Areas of cooperation 
Article 2 
Environment 
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate to protect and improve the 
environment with a view to sustainable development. Their cooperation 
shall cover the following areas: climate change, 
Protection of nature and biodiversity, environment and health, 
management of natural resources and waste management. To this end, they 
shall seek to reconcile the conservation of the Pyrenean environment with 
economic development. 
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate, in a spirit of shared 
responsibility, to resolve the environmental problems confronting the 
Principality of Andorra and the Pyrenean regions of the European 
Community. They shall take account of the fact that certain problems, such 
as that of waste, are connected with the movement of goods and persons 
between their respective territories. The Contracting Parties shall, in 
particular, cooperate in the transfer and disposal of waste.  
In so far as its means allow, and provided such standards are relevant 
in terms of the protection of the environment and sustainable economic 
development in the Principality, the Principality of Andorra shall 
endeavour to adopt environmental standards equivalent to those of the 
European Community. The European Community shall, on request, 
cooperate with the Principality of Andorra to this end. 
The Contracting Parties shall study the feasibility and practicalities of 
involving the Principality of Andorra in such Community environmental 
programmes open to non-member countries as may be of interest to it.  
The European Community shall help establish cooperation between 
the European Environment Agency and the Principality of Andorra. 
Article 3 
Communication, information and culture 
Within the scope afforded by Community initiatives and Andorran law, the 
Contracting Parties agree to undertake joint projects in the area of 
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in the spirit of Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. 
Such projects may include: 
— exchanges of information on topics of mutual interest in the fields 
of culture and information, 
— the organisation of cultural events, 
— cultural exchanges, 
— the conservation of the Andorran and Pyrenean architectural 
heritage and the restoration of monuments and sites, 
— the conservation and promotion of the Andorran and Pyrenean 
cultural heritage, 
— the establishment of cross-border research programmes on history, 
art and languages, 
— measures to preserve, enhance and disseminate the Catalan 
language, 
— the participation of the Principality of Andorra in European 
cultural projects. 
Article 4 
Education, vocational training and youth 
Guided by Articles 149 and 150 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, the Contracting Parties shall undertake to cooperate in the 
field of education and vocational training 
With a view to helping create a European education area. 
The Contracting Parties shall study the feasibility and practicalities of 
involving the Principality of Andorra in such European Community 
education, vocational training and youth programmes as may be of interest 
to it. 
Article 5 
Social and health issues 
The Contracting Parties shall undertake to study ways of strengthening 
coordination in social matters through exchanges of experts, cooperation 
between administrations, cooperation between businesses and training. 110 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
The Contracting Parties shall use the same approach for the purposes 
of cooperating in the field of public health. 
The Contracting Parties shall avoid all discrimination based on 
nationality against workers who are nationals of the other party and legally 
resident on their respective territories with regard to 
Working conditions, pay and redundancy. 
The Contracting Parties’ cooperation on labour issues shall cover, 
inter alia, the development of careers guidance services, planning and the 
promotion of employment at local and regional levels. 
Article 6 
Trans-European networks and transport 
The Contracting Parties shall undertake to pursue their cooperation on 
trans European transport, energy and telecommunications networks and 
on transport in general. This cooperation shall be aimed, inter alia, at 
promoting the study of projects of common interest which show due 
regard for the Pyrenean environment. In their cooperation, the Contracting 
Parties shall be guided by the objectives set out in Articles 154 and 155 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
Article 7 
Regional policy 
The Contracting Parties, each in accordance with its own legislation, hereby 
agree to step up their regional cooperation, in line with the European 
Community’s policy of cross-border, transnational and interregional 
cooperation. 
To that end, they shall encourage the following courses of action: 
— the study of a concerted approach to the development of the 
regions situated on the frontier between the European Community and the 
Principality of Andorra with a view to promoting a policy on the Pyrenees 
comparable to that on the Alps. Similarly, the European Community will 
offer the Principality of Andorra the possibility of taking part in future 
programmes of the Interreg type on the same terms as other non-member 
countries, 
— the organisation of visits and exchanges of officials and experts, 
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— cooperation in matters of mountain policy, drawing on the 
Community policy aimed at ensuring continued and sustainable 
agricultural land use, economic development and the preservation of the 
countryside. 
Article 8 
Other areas of cooperation 
The Contracting Parties may by mutual consent extend this Agreement by 
concluding agreements on specific matters. 
General provisions 
Article 9 
1. A Cooperation Committee shall be responsible for administering this 
Agreement and ensuring that it is properly implemented. 
2. For the purpose of the proper implementation of this Agreement, 
the Contracting Parties shall exchange information and, at the request of 
either Party, shall hold consultations within the Cooperation Committee. 
3. The Cooperation Committee shall draw up its rules of procedure. 
4. The Cooperation Committee shall be composed, on the one hand, 
of representatives of the European Community and, on the other, of 
representatives of the Principality of Andorra. 
5. The Cooperation Committee shall take decisions by common 
accord. 
6. The Cooperation Committee shall be chaired by each of the 
Contracting Parties in turn, in accordance with the arrangements to be 
established in its rules of procedure. 
7. The Cooperation Committee shall meet by common accord at the 
request of either of the Contracting Parties. The Cooperation Committee’s 
rules of procedure shall specify the practical arrangements for the 
organisation of meetings. 
Article 10 
The Contracting Parties agree that any dispute arising between them 
over the implementation or interpretation of this Agreement shall be 
submitted to the Cooperation Committee. 
Article 11 
This Agreement shall be concluded for an unlimited period. 112 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Article 12 
Either Contracting Party may denounce this Agreement by notifying 
the other Contracting Party in writing. In that case, the Agreement shall 
cease to have effect six months after the date of such notification. 
Article 13 
This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories to 
which the Treaty establishing the European Community is applied and 
under the conditions laid down in that Treaty and, 
on the other, to the territory of the Principality of Andorra. 
Article 14 
This Agreement shall be approved by the Contracting Parties in 
accordance with their own procedures. 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second 
month following notification that the procedures referred to in the first 
subparagraph have been complied with. 
Article 15 
1. This Agreement shall be drawn up in duplicate in the Czech, 
Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, 
Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, 
Slovene, Spanish, Swedish and Catalan languages, each of these texts being 
equally authentic. 
2. The Maltese language version shall be authenticated by the 
Contracting Parties on the basis of an exchange of letters. It shall also be 
authentic, in the same way as for the languages referred to in paragraph 1. 
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Annex C 
Agreement on Taxation of Savings Income1 
[signed 15 November 2004] 
The European Community and the Principality of Andorra, 
hereinafter referred to as ‘Contracting Party’ or ‘Contracting Parties’ as the 
context may require, with a view to introducing measures equivalent to 
those laid down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on 
taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments, hereinafter 
referred to as ‘the Directive’, within a framework of cooperation which 
takes account of the legitimate interests of both Contracting Parties and in a 
context where other third countries in a situation similar to that of the 
Principality of Andorra will also be applying measures equivalent to the 
Directive, 
have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
Aim 
1. Within a framework of cooperation between the European Community 
and the Principality of Andorra savings income in the form of interest 
payments made in the Principality of Andorra to beneficial owners who are 
individuals identified as residents of a Member State of the European 
Community in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 3 shall 
be subject to a withholding tax to be levied by paying agents established on 
the territory of the Principality of Andorra under the conditions laid down 
in Article 7. This withholding tax shall be levied unless the voluntary 
disclosure measures are applied in accordance with the rules set out in 
Article 9. The income corresponding to the amount of withholding tax 
levied in accordance with Articles 7 and 9 shall be shared between the 
Member States of the European Community and the Principality of 
Andorra according to the rules set out in Article 8. To ensure that this 
                                                      
1  [Full title] Agreement between the European Community and the 
Principality of Andorra providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in 
Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings in the form of interest 
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Agreement is equivalent to the Directive, these measures shall be 
supplemented by rules on the exchange of information on request set out in 
Article 12 and by the consultation and review procedures described in 
Article 13. 
2. The Contracting Parties shall take the necessary measures to 
implement this Agreement. The Principality of Andorra shall in particular 
take the necessary measures to ensure the tasks required to implement this 
Agreement are carried out, irrespective of the place of establishment of the 
debtor of the debt claim which produces the interest, by the paying agents 
established on its territory, and shall expressly provide for provisions on 
procedures and penalties. 
Article 2 
Definition of beneficial owner 
1. For the purposes of this Agreement, ‘beneficial owner’ means any 
individual who receives an interest payment or any individual for whom 
an interest payment is secured, unless he provides proof that this payment 
has not been made or secured on his own account, where: 
(a) he acts as a paying agent within the meaning of Article 4; or 
(b) he acts on behalf of a legal person, an entity whose profits are 
taxed under the general arrangements for business taxation, an 
undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities established 
in a Member State of the European Community or in the Principality of 
Andorra; or 
(c) he acts on behalf of another individual who is the beneficial owner 
and informs the paying agent of the identity of this beneficial owner in 
accordance with Article 3(1). 
2. Where a paying agent possesses information suggesting the 
individual receiving an interest payment or for whom an interest payment 
is secured may not be the beneficial owner, it must take reasonable 
measures to establish the identity of the beneficial owner in accordance 
with Article 3(1). If the paying agent is not able to identify the beneficial 
owner, it shall treat the individual in question as the beneficial owner. 
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1. The paying agent shall establish the identity of the beneficial owner in 
the form of his name, forename and address according to the anti-money-
laundering provisions applying in the Principality of Andorra. 
2. The paying agent shall establish the residence of the beneficial 
owner on the basis of rules which may vary according to the time at which 
the relations between the paying agent and the beneficial owner of the 
interest are entered into. Subject to the conditions set out below residence 
shall be considered to be in the country where the beneficial owner has his 
permanent address: 
(a) for contractual relations entered into before 1 January 2004, the 
paying agent shall establish the residence of the beneficial owner according 
to the anti-money-laundering provisions applying in the Principality of 
Andorra; 
(b) for contractual relations entered into, or transactions carried out in 
the absence of contractual relations, on or after 1 January 2004, the paying 
agent shall establish the residence of the beneficial owner on the basis of 
the address mentioned in the official identity document or, if necessary, on 
the basis of any documentary proof presented by the beneficial owner and 
according to the following procedure: for individuals presenting an official 
identity document issued by a Member State of the European Community 
who declare that they are resident in a State which is not a Member of the 
European Community, residence shall be established by means of a 
residence certificate or a document authorising residence issued by the 
competent authority of that third country in which the individual declares 
he is resident. If such a certificate of residence or document authorising 
residence cannot be provided, residence shall be considered to be in the 
Member State of the European Community which issued the official 
identity document. 
Article 4 
Definition of paying agent 
For the purposes of this Agreement, ‘paying agent’ means any economic 
operator established in the Principality of Andorra who pays interest to, or 
secures the payment of interest for the immediate benefit of, the beneficial 
owner, whether the operator is the debtor of the debt claim which produces 
the interest or the operator charged by the debtor or the beneficial owner 
with paying interest or securing payment of the interest. 
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Article 5 
Definition of competent authority 
1. For the purposes of this Agreement the ‘competent authorities’ of the 
Contracting Parties means those listed in Annex I. 
2. For third countries, the competent authority is that defined for the 
purposes of bilateral or multilateral tax conventions or, failing that, such 
other authority as is competent to issue certificates of residence for tax 
purposes. 
Article 6 
Definition of interest payment 
1. For the purposes of this Agreement, ‘interest payment’ means: 
(a) interest paid or credited to an account relating to debt claims of any 
kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a 
right to participate in the debtor's profits, and in particular, income from 
government securities and income from bonds or debentures, including 
premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or debentures; 
penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest 
payments; 
(b) interest accrued or capitalised on the sale, refund or redemption of 
the debt claims referred to in (a); 
(c) income deriving from interest payments, either directly or through 
an entity referred to in Article 4(2) of the Directive distributed by: 
(i) undertakings for collective investment established in a Member 
State of the European Community or in the Principality of Andorra; 
(ii) entities which qualify for the option under Article 4(3) of the 
Directive; 
(iii) undertakings for collective investment established outside the 
territory referred to in  
(d) income realised on the sale, refund or redemption of shares or 
units in the following undertakings and entities, if they invest directly or 
indirectly via other undertakings for collective investment or entities 
referred to below, more than 40 % of their assets in debt claims as referred 
to in (a): 
(i) undertakings for collective investment established in a Member 
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(ii) entities which qualify for the option under Article 4(3) of the 
Directive; 
(iii) undertakings for collective investment established outside the 
territory referred to in  
Article 17 
However, the Principality of Andorra shall have the option of 
including income mentioned under (d) in the definition of interest payment 
only to the extent that such income corresponds to gains directly or 
indirectly deriving from interest payments within the meaning of (a) and 
(b). 
2. As regards paragraph 1(c) and (d), when a paying agent possesses 
no information concerning the proportion of the income which derives 
from interest payments, the total amount of the income shall be considered 
to be an interest payment. 
3. As regards paragraph 1(d), when a paying agent possesses no 
information concerning the percentage of the assets invested in debt claims 
or in shares or units defined in that paragraph, that percentage shall be 
considered to be more than 40 %. Where it cannot determine the amount of 
income realised by the beneficial owner, the income shall be deemed to 
correspond to the proceeds of the sale, refund or redemption of the shares 
or units. 
4. As regards paragraph 1(b) and (d), the Principality of Andorra 
shall have the option of requiring paying agents in its territory to annualise 
the interest over a period of time which may not exceed one year, and 
treating such annualised interest as an interest payment even if no sale, 
redemption or refund occurs during this period. 
5. Income derived from undertakings or entities that have invested 
up to 15 % of their assets in debt-claims within the meaning of paragraph 
1(a) are not considered as a payment of interest within the meaning of 
paragraph 1(c) and (d). 
6. From 1 January 2011, the percentage referred to in paragraph 1(d) 
and paragraph 3 shall be 25 %. 
7. The percentages referred to in paragraph 1(d) and paragraph 5 
shall be determined by reference to the investment policy laid down in the 
fund rules or instruments of incorporation of the undertakings or entities 
concerned and failing that, by reference to the actual composition of the 
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Article 7 
Withholding tax 
1. Where the beneficial owner of the interest is resident in a Member State 
of the European Community, the Principality of Andorra shall levy a 
withholding tax at a rate of 15 % in the first three years of application of 
this Agreement, 20 % in the subsequent three years and 35 % thereafter. 
2. The paying agent shall levy withholding tax as follows: 
(a) in the case of an interest payment within the meaning of Article 
6(1)(a): on the amount of interest paid or credited; 
(b) in the case of an interest payment within the meaning of Article 
6 ( 1 ) ( b )  o r  ( d ) :  o n  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  i n t e r e s t  o r  i n c o m e  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h o s e  
paragraphs or by means of a levy of equivalent effect to be borne by the 
recipient on the full amount of the proceeds of the sale, redemption or 
refund; 
(c) in the case of an interest payment within the meaning of Article 
6(1)(c): on the amount of income referred to in that paragraph; 
(d) where the Principality of Andorra exercises the option under 
Article 6(4): on the amount of annualised interest. 
3. For the purposes of points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2, withholding 
tax shall be levied pro rata to the period of holding of the debt claim by the 
beneficial owner. When the paying agent is unable to determine the period 
of holding on the basis of information in its possession, it shall treat the 
beneficial owner as having held the debt claim throughout its period of 
existence unless he provides evidence of the date of acquisition. 
4. Tax imposed on and tax withheld on an interest payment other 
than the withholding tax provided for under this Agreement shall be 
deducted from the withholding tax calculated in accordance with 
paragraphs 1 to 3 on the same interest payment. 
5. Subject to the provisions of Article 10, the levying of withholding 
tax by a paying agent established in the Principality of Andorra shall not 
preclude the Member State of the European Community of residence for 
tax purposes of the beneficial owner from taxing the income in accordance 
with its national law. Where a taxpayer declares income from interest paid 
by a paying agent established in the Principality of Andorra to the tax 
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resides, this income shall be taxed at the same rate as that applying to 
interest earned in this Member State. 
Article 8 
Revenue sharing 
1. The Principality of Andorra shall retain 25 % of its revenue from the 
withholding tax referred to in Article 7 and transfer 75 % to the Member 
State of the European Community of residence of the beneficial owner. 
2. Such transfers shall take place in one single operation for each 
Member State for each calendar year at the latest within a period of six 
months following the end of the calendar year in which the tax was levied. 
The Principality of Andorra shall take the necessary measures to ensure the 
proper functioning of the revenue-sharing system. 
Article 9 
Voluntary disclosure 
1. The Principality of Andorra shall provide for a procedure allowing 
beneficial owners not to bear the withholding tax referred to Article 7 
where the beneficial owner provides his paying agent with a certificate 
drawn up in his name by the competent authority of his Member State of 
residence in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. 
2. At the request of the beneficial owner, the competent authority of 
his Member State of residence shall issue a certificate containing the 
following information: 
(a) the name, forename, address and tax identification number or, 
failing such, the date and place of birth of the beneficial owner; 
(b) the name and address of the paying agent; 
(c) the account number of the beneficial owner or, where there is 
none, the identification of the security. 
This certificate shall be valid for a period not exceeding three years. It 
shall be issued to any beneficial owner who requests it within two months 
of the date of submission of the request. 
Article 10 
Elimination of double taxation 
1. The Member State of the European Community of residence for tax 
purposes of the beneficial owner shall ensure the elimination of any double 
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referred to in Article 7, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this 
Article. 
2. If interest received by a beneficial owner has been subject to the 
withholding tax referred to in Article 7 in the Principality of Andorra, the 
Member State of the European Community of residence for tax purposes of 
the beneficial owner shall grant him, in accordance with its national law, a 
tax credit equal to the amount of tax withheld. Where this amount exceeds 
the amount of tax due in accordance with its national law on the total 
amount of interest subject to withholding tax, the Member State of 
residence for tax purposes shall repay the excess amount of tax withheld to 
the beneficial owner. 
3. If, in addition to the withholding tax referred to in Article 7, 
interest received by a beneficial owner has been subject to any other type of 
withholding tax and the Member State of the European Community of 
residence for tax purposes grants a tax credit for such withholding tax in 
accordance with its national law or double taxation conventions, such other 
withholding tax shall be credited before the procedure in paragraph 2 is 
applied. 
4. The Member State of the European Community of residence for tax 
purposes of the beneficial owner may replace the tax credit mechanism 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 by a refund of the withholding tax 
referred to in Article 7. 
Article 11 
Negotiable debt securities 
1. From the date of application of this Agreement and as long as the 
Principality of Andorra imposes the withholding tax referred to in Article 
7, and at least one Member State of the European Community applies a 
similar withholding tax, but until 31 December 2010 at the latest, domestic 
and international bonds and other negotiable debt securities which were 
first issued before 1 March 2001 or for which the original issuing 
prospectuses were approved before that date by the competent authorities 
within the meaning of Council Directive 80/390/EEC, or by the responsible 
authorities in the Principality of Andorra, or by the responsible authorities 
in third countries shall not be considered to be debt claims within the 
meaning of Article 6(1)(a), provided t h a t  n o  f u r t h e r  i s s u e s  o f  s u c h  
negotiable debt securities are made after 1 March 2002. 
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2. However, as long as at least one of the Member States of the 
European Community also applies similar measures, the provisions of this 
Article shall continue to apply beyond 31 December 2010 in respect of 
negotiable debt securities: 
— which contain gross-up and early redemption clauses, and 
— where the paying agent defined in Article 4 is established in the 
Principality of Andorra, and 
— where the paying agent pays interest to, or secures the payment of 
interest for the immediate benefit of, a beneficial owner resident in a 
Member State of the European Community. 
If and where all Member States of the European Community cease to 
apply similar provisions, the provisions of this Article shall continue to 
apply solely in respect of negotiable debt securities: 
— which contain gross-up and early redemption clauses, and 
— where the paying agent of the issuer is established in the 
Principality of Andorra, and 
— where that paying agent pays interest to, or secures the payment of 
interest for the immediate benefit of, a beneficial owner resident in a 
Member State of the European Community. 
If a further issue is made on or after 1 March 2002 of an 
abovementioned negotiable debt security issued by a government or a 
related entity acting as a public authority or whose role is recognised by an 
international Treaty, the entire issue of such security, consisting of the 
original issue and any further issue, shall be considered a debt claim within 
the meaning of Article 6(1)(a). 
If a further issue is made on or after 1 March 2002 of an 
abovementioned negotiable debt security issued by any other issuer not 
covered by the preceding subparagraph, such further issue shall be 
considered a debt claim within the meaning of Article 6(1)(a). 
3. This Article shall not prevent Member States of the European 
Community and the Principality of Andorra from taxing the income from 
the negotiable debt securities referred to in paragraph 1 in accordance with 
their national laws. 
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1. The competent authorities of the Principality of Andorra and the 
Member States of the European Community shall exchange information 
concerning the income covered by this Agreement on conduct constituting 
a crime of tax fraud under the laws of the requested State or the like. The 
like includes only an offence with the same level of wrongfulness as 
conduct constituting a crime of tax fraud under the laws of the requested 
State. Until it introduces the concept of the crime of tax fraud in its internal 
law, the Principality of Andorra shall undertake, where it is the requested 
State, to treat as tax fraud for the purposes of the first subparagraph, 
conduct which, as a result of deception, damages the financial interests of 
the tax authorities of the requesting State and constitutes under the laws of 
the Principality of Andorra the crime of fraud. In response to a duly 
justified request, the requested State shall provide information concerning 
matters mentioned above in this Article which are subject to, or likely to be 
subject to, an investigation by the requesting State on a non-criminal or 
criminal basis. 
2. In order to determine whether information may be provided in 
response to a request, the requested State shall apply the statute of 
limitations under the law of the requesting State instead of the statute of 
limitations applicable under the law of the requested State. 
3. The requested State shall provide information where the requesting 
State has reasonable grounds for suspecting that such conduct constitutes 
the crime of tax fraud or the like. Where the Principality of Andorra is the 
requested State, the acceptability of the request must be determined within 
a time limit of two months, by the judicial authorities of the Principality of 
Andorra in relation to the conditions laid down in this Article. 
4. The requesting State's grounds for suspecting that an offence may 
have been committed may be based on:  
(a) documents, whether authenticated or not, including books of 
accounts or accounting documents or documents relating to bank accounts; 
(b) statements by the taxpayer; 
(c) information obtained from an informant or third person that has 
been independently corroborated or otherwise appears credible; or 
(d) circumstantial indirect evidence. 
5. Any information exchanged in this way shall be treated as 
confidential and may be disclosed only to persons or the competent 
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interest payments referred to in Article 1, either as regards withholding tax, 
and the revenue deriving there from referred to in Articles 7 and 8, or as 
regards the voluntary disclosure arrangements referred to in Article 9. 
Those persons or authorities may disclose the information received in 
public court proceedings or in judicial decisions concerning such taxation. 
Information may be communicated to another person or authority only 
with the written and prior agreement of the competent authority of the 
party providing the information. 
6. The Principality of Andorra will agree to enter into bilateral 
negotiations with any Member State wishing to do so, in order to define the 
individual categories of cases falling under ‘the like’ in accordance with the 
procedure applied by that State. 
 
Article 13 
Consultation and review 
1. The Contracting Parties shall consult each other at least every three years 
or at the request of either Contracting Party with a view to examining, and 
— if they consider it necessary — improving the technical functioning of 
this Agreement and assessing international developments. Consultations 
shall be held within one month of the request or as soon as possible in 
urgent cases. 
On the basis of such an assessment, the Contracting Parties may 
consult each other in order to examine whether changes to the Agreement 
are necessary in the light of international developments. 
2. Once they have acquired sufficient experience of the full 
implementation of Article 7(1) of the Agreement, the Contracting Parties 
shall consult each other in order to examine whether changes to this 
Agreement are necessary in the light of international developments. 
3. For the purposes of the consultations referred to in paragraphs 1 
and 2, the Contracting Parties shall inform each other of any developments 
which could affect the proper functioning of this Agreement. This shall also 
include any relevant agreement between one of the Contracting Parties and 
a third country. 
4. In the event of disagreement between the competent authorities of 
the Principality of Andorra and one or more of the other competent 
authorities of the Member States of the European Community in 
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application of the Agreement, they shall endeavour to resolve their 
differences amicably. They shall immediately notify the Commission of the 
European Communities and the competent authorities of the other Member 
States of the European Community of the results of their consultations. The 
Commission of the European Communities may take part in the 
consultations at the request of any of the competent authority on issues of 
interpretation. 
 
Article 14 
Application 
1. Application of this Agreement is conditional on the adoption and 
implementation by the dependent or associated territories of Member 
States mentioned in the report from the Council (Economic and Financial 
Affairs) to the European Council of Santa Maria de Feira of 19 and 20 June 
2000, and by the United States of America, Monaco, Liechtenstein, 
Switzerland and San Marino of measures which are respectively identical 
or equivalent to those laid down in the Directive or in this Agreement and 
providing for the same dates of implementation. 
2. The Contracting Parties shall decide by mutual consent, at least six 
months before the date referred to in paragraph 6, whether the condition 
set out in paragraph 1 is satisfied as regards the dates of entry into force of 
the relevant measures in third countries and the dependent or associated 
territories concerned. If the Contracting Parties do not decide that this 
condition is met, they shall fix by mutual consent a new date for the 
purposes of paragraph 6. 
3. Notwithstanding its institutional arrangements, the Principality of 
Andorra shall implement this Agreement from the date referred to in 
paragraph 6 and shall notify it to the European Community. 
4. Implementation of this Agreement or parts thereof may be 
suspended by either Contracting Party with immediate effect by means of 
notification addressed to the other party where the Directive or a part 
thereof ceases to be applicable either temporarily or permanently in 
accordance with European Community law, or where one of the Member 
States of the European Community suspends the application of its 
implementing legislation. 
5. Each Contracting Party may also suspend implementation of this 
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to above (United States of America, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Switzerland or 
San Marino) or one of the dependent or associated territories of the 
Member States of the European Community referred to in paragraph 1 
subsequently cease applying measures identical or equivalent to those of 
the directive. Suspension of implementation shall not come into effect until 
two months after notification. The Agreement shall begin applying again 
once measures have been reincorporated. 
6. The Contracting Parties shall adopt the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Agreement by 1 
July 2005 at the latest. 
 
Article 15 
Signing, entry into force and termination 
1. This Agreement shall be ratified or approved by the Contracting Parties 
in accordance with their internal procedures. The Contracting Parties shall 
notify each other when these procedures have been completed. This 
Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month 
following the last notification. 
2. Either Contracting Party may terminate this Agreement by giving 
notice addressed to the other. In such a case, the Agreement shall cease to 
have effect twelve months after the serving of said notice. 
 
Article 16 
Claims and final account 
1. Termination or the total or partial suspension of this Agreement 
shall not affect claims by individuals. 
2. In such a case, the Principality of Andorra shall draw up a final 
account before this Agreement ceases to apply and make a final payment to 
the Member States of the European Community. 
Article 17 
Territorial scope 
This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories where the 
Treaty establishing the European Community applies, and under the 
conditions provided in the said Treaty, and on the other hand, to the 
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Article 18 
Annexes 
1. The two Annexes shall form an integral part of this Agreement. 
2. The list of competent authorities featured in Annex I may be modified by 
a simple notification to the other Contracting Party by the Principality of 
Andorra in so far as it concerns the authority identified in point (a) of the 
said Annex, and by the European Community insofar as it concerns the 
other authorities. The list of related entities featured in Annex II may be 
amended by common accord. 
Article 19 
Languages 
1. This Agreement is drafted in duplicate in the following languages: 
Catalan, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, 
Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, 
Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish; the texts in each language being equally 
authentic. 
2. The Maltese language version shall be authenticated by the 
Contracting Parties on the basis of an Exchange of Letters. They shall also 
be authentic, in the same way as for the languages referred to in paragraph 
1.In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the 
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Annex D 
Memorandum of Understanding 
 
[signed 15 November 2004, accompanying the Agreement on the Taxation 
of Savings Income] 
 
The European Community, [the member states] and the Principality of 
Andorra 
Have agreed as follows: 
When an Agreement providing for measures equivalent to those laid down 
in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of income from interest 
payments (hereinafter referred to as the Directive) was concluded, the 
European Community, its Member States and the Principality of Andorra 
signed this Memorandum of Understanding supplementing this 
Agreement. 
1. The signatories to this Memorandum of Understanding consider 
that the said Agreement between the European Community and the 
Principality of Andorra and this Memorandum of Understanding are an 
acceptable agreement protecting the legitimate interests of the Parties. 
Consequently, they shall apply in good faith the measures agreed and shall 
refrain from taking any unilateral action which might jeopardise this 
Agreement without reasonable cause. If a serious discrepancy is discovered 
between the scope of the Directive adopted on 3 June 2003 and that of the 
Agreement, in particular as concerns Articles 4 and 6 of the latter, the 
Contracting Parties shall consult each other forthwith in accordance with 
Article 13(4) of the Agreement to ensure that the equivalent nature of the 
measures provided for by the Agreement is safeguarded. 
2. The European Community undertakes to enter into, within the 
transitional period provided for in the abovementioned Directive, 
discussions with other major financial centres to ensure that measures 
equivalent to those of the Directive are applied by these jurisdictions. 
3. With a view to applying Article 12 of the said Agreement, the 
Principality of Andorra undertakes to introduce into its legislation during 
the first year of the application of the Agreement, the concept of the crime 
of tax fraud, consisting at least of the use of documents which are false, 
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intent to deceive the tax authorities in the field of taxation of savings 
income. The signatories to this Memorandum of Understanding note that 
this definition of tax fraud concerns only needs relating to the taxation of 
savings, within the framework of the Agreement, and is without prejudice 
to developments and/or decisions relating to tax fraud under other 
circumstances and in other forums. 
4. The Principality of Andorra and each Member State of the 
European Community wishing to do so shall enter into bilateral 
negotiations to define the administrative procedure for the exchange of 
information. 
5. The signatories to this Memorandum of Understanding solemnly 
declare that the signing of the Agreement on the taxation of savings, 
together with the opening of negotiations for a monetary agreement, 
constitute a significant step in the deepening of cooperation between the 
Principality and the European Union. 
In this context of deepening relations, in parallel with the bilateral 
negotiations provided under point 4, the Principality of Andorra and each 
Member State of the European Community shall enter into consultations 
with a view to defining a wider field of application for economic and fiscal 
cooperation. These consultations will take place in a spirit of cooperation 
that takes account of the efforts for alignment in the fiscal area achieved by 
the Principality of Andorra and solidified by the signature of this 
Agreement.  
In particular, these consultations might lead to the implementation: 
  of bilateral programs for economic cooperation in order to promote the 
integration of the Andorran economy into the European economy, 
  of bilateral cooperation in the area of taxation aimed at examining the 
conditions in which withholding taxes levied by the Member States on 
receipts from the provision of services and financial products, might be 
eliminated or reduced. 
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Annex E 
Allocution de M. Jacques Chirac,  
Président de la République
2 
 
Palais de l'Élysée, Paris, le jeudi 26 avril 2007 
 [Extraits] 
  […] Aujourd'hui, l'Andorre est un État reconnu par la communauté 
internationale, et les Andorrans ont, entre leurs mains, la maîtrise et la 
responsabilité intégrales de leur destin. 
Depuis 1993, ils ont su, avec talent, assumer la difficile responsabilité de faire 
connaître et entendre la voix de l'Andorre sur la scène internationale, dont 
témoigne le nombre croissant d'Ambassadeurs accrédités auprès de ce pays.  
La qualité de vos représentants, au sein des nombreuses instances 
internationales dont l'Andorre est membre, a permis de vous faire apprécier de 
tous, dans le monde entier, et j'ai été heureux de vous apporter, au nom de la 
France, un soutien qui ne s'est jamais démenti et que vous m'avez toujours 
rendu.  
Il reste cependant à Andorre de nombreuses étapes à franchir, comme 
dans toute démocratie, et notamment dans le cadre de ses relations avec 
l'Union européenne.  
La Principauté, par sa géographie, son histoire, ses hommes et ses 
femmes, est européenne et ne peut rester à l'écart des évolutions des États 
voisins. L'Andorre dispose ici d'une large variété d'options allant du maintien 
de l'accord commercial actuel aux arrangements plus ambitieux, tels que la 
négociation d'un accord d'association. Ces choix seront déterminants pour 
votre avenir et pour celui des générations futures. Ils doivent cependant être 
précédés d'une large concertation démocratique et d'une réelle compréhension 
par la société civile, sans laquelle, dans une démocratie, on ne peut rien. 
L'Andorre peut compter sur la bienveillance de ses voisins, et de la France en 
particulier, pour l'aider dans ses démarches, mais il vous revient évidemment 
de les entreprendre avec confiance et détermination. Par définition, nous 
soutiendrons les options que vous aurez arrêtées.  
[…] 
                                                      
2 Prononcée à l'occasion de la cérémonie de remise des lettres de créance des 
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Annex F 
Assessment of Financial Sector Supervision and 
Regulation in Andorra3 
 [Extract] Key Recommendations of the International Monetary Fund 
and Authorities’ response 
Recommendation   Term   Authorities’ Response  
Cross Sectoral Issues     
• Adopt international accounting 
standards for all the financial sector, as 
proposed in draft legislation to be 
submitted to Parliament, and adapt 
prudential rules as necessary  
ST   This law is a priority 
for the MF and should 
be approved by the 
General Council in the 
short run  
• INAF to develop its capacity for on-
site supervision by stepping up training 
of new staff and gradually hiring 
additional staff, as needed.   
ST   INAF plans to start 
on-site exams in 
late 2007.  
• INAF to clarify requests to external 
auditors and reach an understanding of 
what is expected from them. Hire 
independent audit firms to assess the 
quality of external audit reports, as 
needed.  
ST   INAF already clarifies 
its requests to auditors 
when necessary and 
comments when 
requests are not 
addressed as required.   
• INAF to revisit the frequency of 
requests made to auditors and consider 
options to implement rotation work 
plans.   
ST   INAF will consider 
implementation of 
rotation work plans 
once INAF’s on-site 
exams are 
implemented.  
• Integrate all norms for external 
auditors into a single body of rules.  
ST   INAF will present this 
proposal in the 
October 2006 meeting 
with banks and 
external auditors.  
                                                      
3 Document of February 2007, available at 
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Banking Regulation and Supervision     
• Full authority to grant and revoke 
bank licenses based on technical 
elements, should be vested in the INAF.   
MT   The final authority to 
grant and revoke 
licenses should remain 
with the government.  
• INAF should be empowered to 
undertake all types of remedial actions, 
including issue an orderly resolution of 
a problem bank and the revocation of a 
financial institution’s license.  
MT   The authorities accept 
that it’s necessary to 
strike a balance 
between INAF’s 
technical decision and 
the approval of the 
government for 
revocation of financial 
institutions’ license.  
• Connected Lending: INAF should en-
sure that credits to insiders and related 
interests are not granted at preferential 
rates and that transactions to insiders, 
such as credits to the members of a 
bank’s Board of Directors, are required 
to be approved by the Board.  
ST   INAF is considering 
issuing a 
communication on 
this matter.  
• INAF should intensify its efforts to 
enter into a formal agreement with the 
banking authorities of foreign 
supervisors that will allow full 
compliance of Andorra as a home and 
host country supervisor. The INAF 
should share with the home country 
supervisor information about the local 
operations of the foreign banks, 
provided its confidentiality is protected.  
ST   The authorities 
reaffirm their 
intention to enter into 
a formal agreement 
with the banking 
authorities of foreign 
banks.   
Regulation and supervision of 
Collective Investment Schemes   
  
• Review the draft law on CIS to: i) en- 
sure proper and disclosed basis for 
asset valuation, pricing and redemp-
tion; and ii) strengthen provisions on 
disclosure to allow evaluation of the 
suitability of a CIS for a particular 
investor.  
ST   The authorities intend 
to work on this as 
soon as possible.  132 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
• The government should table the 
draft law on CIS in the General Council 
with a view to its adoption as soon as 
possible.  
MT   Draft laws have been 
sent to the financial 
sector entities for 
comments. This law is 
a priority for the 
government.   
Regulation and Supervision of 
Insurance Companies   
  
• The MF should require external 
auditors to produce a complementary 
report on policies, systems and 
processes of insurance companies, 
including internal controls, and 
strengthen its oversight capacity.  
ST   Efforts will be 
concentrated to 
implement this 
recommendation in 
the short term.  
• Transfer the responsibility for 
supervision of insurance companies to 
INAF with sufficient supervisory staff 
to carry out this responsibility.  
MT   Once the new 
insurance law is 
approved, this 
responsibility will be 
carried out by INAF.  
• A new insurance law should be tabled 
in the General Council, codifying, inter 
alia, prudential requirements and 
requirements with regards to internal 
controls, conduct of business, policy 
holder protection, public disclosure and 
international cooperation requirements. 
MT   The MF will prepare a 
draft law during 2006, 
in conformity with the 
International 
Association of 
Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS) principles. This 
law is a priority for 
the MF.  
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Annex G 
OECD Model principles of transparency  
and information exchange 
The headings below correspond to the content of the questionnaire of the 
OECD’s Global Forum on Taxation, addressed to 82 tax jurisdictions 
(countries and entities), and which provides the basis for establishing a 
global level playing field in the areas of transparency and effective 
exchange of information. It is also the basis for OECD’s overall assessments 
of whether jurisdictions are ‘cooperative’ or ‘non-cooperative’4.  
A. Exchanging information 
A.1 Existence of mechanisms for exchange of information upon 
request 
A.2 Scope of information exchange 
A.3 Dual criminality and domestic tax interest 
A.4 Safeguards and limitations 
A.5 Confidentiality requirements 
B. Access to bank information 
B.1 Bank secrecy rules 
B.2 Access to bank information for tax purposes 
B.3 Specificity required 
B.4 Powers to obtain information in case of refusal to cooperate 
C. Access to ownership, identity and accounting information 
C.1 Information gathering powers 
C.2 Specific secrecy provisions 
C.3 Bearer securities 
D. Availability of ownership, identity and accounting information 
D.1 Ownership information – for companies, trusts, partnerships, 
foundations 
D.2 Accounting information – for companies, trusts, partnerships, 
foundations 
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Annex H 
Chapter headings used in EU accession negotiations 
Economic issues 
Free movement of goods, customs union  
Freedom of movement for workers  
Right of establishment and freedom to provide services  
Free movement of capital  
Economic and monetary policy  
Taxation  
Social policy and employment  
Sectoral & structural policies 
Agriculture and rural development  
Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy  
Fisheries  
Financial services  
Information society and media  
Transport policy  
Energy  
Trans-European networks  
Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments  
Environment 
Competition policy  
Enterprise and industrial policy 
Public procurement  
Company law  
Intellectual property law  
Consumer and health protection 
Education and culture  
Science and research  
Justice, freedom and security 
Judiciary and fundamental rights  
Justice, freedom and security  
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Foreign and security policy 
External relations  
Foreign, security and defence policy  
Horizontal issues 
Financial control  
Financial and budgetary provisions  
Statistics  
Institutions  136 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Annex I 
Stabilisation & Association Agreement with Croatia, 2005 
 
Political dialogue 
 Democracy 
Regional cooperation 
International issues 
  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Four freedoms 
Free movement of goods 
  Movement of workers, establishment 
Supply of services 
Current payments and movement of capital 
Approximation of laws 
 Competition  policy 
 Intellectual  property  
 Public  contracts 
Product standardisation 
Consumer protection 
Justice and home affairs 
  Reinforcement of institutions and the rule of law 
  Visa, border control, migration 
  Money laundering and drugs 
 Criminal  matters 
Cooperation matters 
  Economic policy & statistics 
 Financial  services 
  Investment promotion and protection 
Industrial cooperation 
Small and medium sized enterprises 
Tourism 
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Taxation 
Social policy 
Agriculture, agri-industries & fisheries 
Education and training 
Culture 
Information society 
Transport 
Energy 
Environment 
Research 
Regional development 
Financial cooperation 
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Annex J. 
 EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2004 
 
Political dialogue and reform 
  Democracy, rule of law and human rights 
Cooperation on foreign and security policy (WMD non-proliferation 
and disarmament,        conflict prevention and crisis management) 
Economic and social reform and development 
Functioning market economy 
Monetary exchange rate and fiscal policies 
Trade market and regulatory reform 
  Movement of goods 
  Right of establishment, company law and services 
  Movement of capital and current payments 
  Movement of persons including workers 
 Taxation 
 Competition  policy 
  Intellectual property rights 
  Public procurement 
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs 
Major sectoral policies 
Transport 
Energy 
Information society 
Environment 
People to people contacts 
  Research & technology 
  Education, training and youth 
 Culture 
  Civil society cooperation 
  Cross-border and regional cooperation 
 Public  health 